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Land reform in South Africa has not been very successful. The process of land delivery has
been slow and livelihoods in South Africa are becoming increasingly vulnerable as land
reform fails to meet its objectives. Since 1994, millions have been made homeless due to
farm evictions that have counteracted the positive impact of land reform. Intensive debate has
been initiated about the approach to land reform; however, current programme-specific
information has been unreliable in providing insight into the impact of land reform projects
that have been implemented.
This thesis exammes the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD)
programme, to determine how it can be enhanced to improve the lives of the programme's
intended beneficiaries. Monitoring and evaluation is examined as a tool for improving
programmes. This research also explores some of the shortcomings of the current monitoring
and evaluation mechanisms for land reform. It is proposed that the LRAD programme should
have a comprehensive M&E system in place to ensure that targets are met and to inform the
promulgation of appropriate new land reform policy.
An LRAD project at Loteni in rural KwaZulu-Natal is used as a case study and exposes some
of the contextual challenges for LRAD policy. The qualitative analysis given provides insight
into some of the problems of implementing the programme and reveals challenges for
extension support. As a result of this critique, some recommendations are provided for
improving the performance of LRAD. Key among the recommendations made to enhance
LRAD is a set of measurable indicators for each of the stated objectives of the LRAD
programme. Adopting such indicators will enable the programme to contribute to the
improvement of the lives and livelihoods of the intended beneficiaries ofLRAD.
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Introduction
Poverty and inequality, around the world, are common developmental problems especially
within poorer countries. A contributing factor to inequities and poverty, initiated by former
government regimes, is that a large proportion of people remain landless. Land reforms in
developing countries have begun to turn around inequities in land. South Africa is one such
developing country where land reform is of critical importance. The historical dispossession
of land in South Africa resulted in the majority of productive agricultural land belonging to
white people. This racially skewed land ownership pattern is currently being addressed
through a programme of land reform.
The approach to land reform has significant value to the future of South Africa. Land reform
creates an opportunity for poor rural South African's to make a better life. Therefore, land
reform is more than just redistributing land it has the potential to improve livelihoods. It is
government's responsibility to ensure that land reforms are implemented to rectify injustices
of the past but also and more importantly to improve the livelihoods of previously
disadvantaged South Africans.
This thesis provides an overview of land reform in South Africa before focusing on the Land
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme, which is currently the
favoured means of implementing land reform. The land reform programme has experienced a
number ofproblems related to policy formulation and implementation. This thesis shows that
the LRAD programme has not overcome these problems. Therefore, this research aims to
address this by examining how the LRAD programme can be enhanced.
The LRAD policy is in place, and although there are a number of fundamental problems with
LRAD as detailed in this thesis, the focus of this thesis is not on changing present LRAD
policy as there has already been a shift in land redistribution policy (see Chapter 1). Instead,
this thesis focuses on how to enhance present policy and its implementation.
The main problem examined in this study was that the LRAD programme had a system for
evaluating the implementation of it its work, but did not have a system for evaluating the
impact of its work. Thus it would be possible to conclude that LRAD was successful simply .
because it was implemented according to plan. However, without a means for determining
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the effect of LRAD on the intended beneficiaries the true impact of LRAD cannot be
determined. While the lack of impact assessment was identified in the planning of the
research, the research was structured to examine LRAD on a broader front. Thus the
overarching question addressed by this study is: How can the LRAD programme be
enhanced?
In order to assist with examining the primary research question, the study was designed to
explore the following sub-questions:
• Is LRAD achieving its objectives?
• How does LRAD contribute to land reform objectives?
• Can market based land reform achieve the objectives ofland reform in South Africa?
• How,is the achievement of land reform objectives measured?
The research also explores an LRAD project and uses it as a case study to confirm the
assertions maintained in the literature under review.
The aim of the study was to provide insight into ways in which LRAD could be improved in
terms of the outcomes derived by the people intended to benefit from the programme. It was
understood from the beginning that this would be a discovery process, resulting not in a
definitive and fixed set of answers, but in an initial set of considerations - derived in large
measure from LRAD beneficiaries - that could begin a process of continuous reassessment of
impact and programme enhancement based on the expansion of evaluation from a limited
implementation focus to a results-based focus informed by the people affected by the
programme.
Chapter 1 looks at the limited success of the South African land reform programme. This
chapter explains how the history of land legislation in South Africa has impacted on land
distribution and the task for land reform to change this. The chapter looks at the
achievements of the land reform programme thus far and how globalisation has shifted the
approach to land reform.
Chapter 2.reopens the debate on land reform and explores issues important for land reform
policy makers and practitioners to consider. Livelihoods in South Africa are examined in the
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context of increasing urbanisation, tenure insecurity and HIV/AIDS. Land reform is posed as
primarily an issue of human rights but that land rights are often undermined. Different
approaches to land reform are examined to understand options for implementing land reform.
Finally, it is proposed that in South Africa where commercial agriculture is increasingly a
difficult activity to make economically viable, the promotion of sustainable livelihoods,
through multiple livelihood strategies, offers some security for beneficiaries of land reform.
Chapter 3 introduces monitoring and evaluation systems. M&E systems are posed as
important for enhancing the performance of land reform projects. The M&E system for land
reform is analysed and shown to be problematic. M&E of LRAD is argued to be necessary to
the success of LRAD projects and a number of suggestions are made..
Chapter 4 examines the LRAD programme in more depth, critically assessing the policy and
examining the extent of impact the LRAD programme may have on rural landlessness and
poverty. The Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme is introduced as an extension
support mechanism for LRAD projects.
Chapter 5 presents the methodology for the research undertaken at a LRAD project in
KwaZulu-Natal. The research is based in the constructivist paradigm in order to provide a
representative reality through the qualitative research process.
Chapter 6 and 7 present the findings and analysis of the research conducted at an LRAD
project in KwaZulu-Natal. This involved working closely with stakeholders, in particular
LRAD beneficiaries, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Land Affairs, to
examine the implementation of the LRAD programme at this site. Analysis of the LRAD
project enables for critique of the LRAD programme.
Chapter 8 draws conclusions about the LRAD programme and land reform in general offering
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Chapter 1:
The status of land reform in South Africa
Introduction
Land reform in South Africa has been termed as the "country's paramount welfare
question" and is considered -"essential to racial peace, economic prosperity, and
environmental justice" (Geisler and Letsoalo, 2000: 5). The World Bank (2003) considers
South Africa is a leading example of market based land reform. This optimistic view of
land reform in South Africa has been disputed by many academics and practitioners. They
maintain that land reform in South Africa, contrary to the World Bank's claims, has not
been very successful (Bernstein, 1997; Wildschut and Hulbert, 1998; Turner and Ibsen,
2000; Aliber, 2003; Andrew et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2003; Mapadimeng, 2003; National
Land Committee, 2003; van den Brink, 2003; Wegerif, 2004).
It is the intention of this Chapter to examine this divide through a historical and contextual
account of land reform in South Africa in order to expose the limited successes of the
South African land reform programme. Section 1.1 shows how the history of land
legislation and segregation has shaped the unequal distribution of land in South Africa. It
introduces post 1994 policy established to deal with this unequal distribution. Section 1.2
looks at each component of the land reform programme in turn and the related status of
each component. In section 1.3, land reform policy is explored and shows how it has since
changed due to the external pressures of globalisation. Section 1.4 looks at some of the
consequences of land reform for agriculture in South Africa.
1.1 History of land legislation and segregation in South Africa
The history of land dispossession in South Africa has resulted in the skewed pattern of land
ownership prevalent today. The historical precedent of segregation based on racial
classification and culture was responsible for land dispossession. In 1913, the all white
Government of the Union of South Africa passed the Natives' Land Act that legalised
exclusive white land ownership outside of 'Native Reserves'. The intention of this Act
was to remove the black South African population to these reserves. It was only in 1948, -
when the apartheid government came to power, that the enforcement of the Land Act
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intensified. Black families who still owned land or lived 'illegally' outside reserves where
forced to relocate (Department of Land Affairs, 1996; Greenberg, 2003). Between 1960
and 1980, 3.5 million black people were forcibly removed from their ancestral lands to
settle in black Reserves (Surplus People's Project, 1983). These black reserves constituted
7% of South Africa's land area and became overcrowded and environmentally degraded.
People living in the reserves resorted to operating as "cheap migrant labour for white
farmers and mines as a livelihood (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). Thus, rural areas
became dominated by large highly mechanised white owned farms surrounded by
overcrowded black reserves, better known as ·homelands, and dormitory towns. The
Natives' Land Act also initiated insecurity around labour tenancy on farms resulting in
evictions ofblack people from white farms where they had been employed (Deininger and
May, 2000). The formulation and enforcement of this Act met considerable resistance
from, and subsequent popularity for, the South African Native National Congress that
promised to address land inequities (Departmentof Land Affairs, 1996).
I
By the end of the 1980s, many black families had been forced off their ancestral land and
formerly self-sufficient farmers now worked as wage workers on large farms, mines and
industries. Ninety percent of agricultural land was white owned. The remaining 10% was
given over to homeland areas supporting 55% of the South African population (Mbongwa
et al., 2000). Subsistence farming in former homeland areas had diminished drastically
and 80% of families living in these areas had to support themselves from migrant earnings
and pensions. The effects of the Native Land Act are still evident today in the racial
territorial divisions within South African demographics and geography (Harley and
Fotheringham, 1999, Department of Land Affairs, 1996). When the Natives' Lands Act
was repealed in 1993 the government had the responsibility of reversing the inequitable
land distribution in South Africa.
In order to combat the discriminatory effects of the Natives' Land Act, the post apartheid
government implemented a programme of land reform (Deininger and May, 2000). The
approach to land reform in South Africa developed from South Africa's Reconstruction
and Development Programme (RDP) policies setup in 1994. The RDP aimed to supply
land and security of tenure to the rural poor and aspirant farmers (Wells, 1995).
Government aimed to address poverty in rural areas by securing access to land. In 1997,
the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) established the land reform programme. The
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objectives of this programme were to redress the injustices of apartheid, to foster national
reconciliation and stability, to promote economic growth, and to improve household
welfare and alleviate poverty (Department of Land Affairs, 1997).
A number of factors impacted on the successful implementation of Land reform. A critical
factor was the downsizing of the public sector. Government faced a severe capacity
problem which made land reform an extremely challenging undertaking particularly in the
former homeland areas (Oxfam Briefing Paper, 1997). Homeland areas had serious
institutional problems inherited from the apartheid era, such as chaotic land administration
and record-keeping in some areas was totally absent, which enabled squatting and
exploitation of land. Additionally, landlessness and overcrowding in the former homeland
areas had resulted in land degradation (Department of Land Affairs, 1996).
Therefore, the historical legacy of land confiscations and relocations to homelands had not
only resulted in the majority of black South Africans becoming landless and poor but also
caused deterioration in the institutional systems governing land. It was within this context
that approaches to land reform had to consider means of addressing landtenure security for
the improvement ofpreviously disadvantaged livelihoods.
1.2 Post-apartheid approach to land ownership in South Africa
The general process of the land reform programme has been unimpressive in terms of
households resettled or gaining secure tenure. In this section, each component of the land
reform programme is examined in order to establish the status of land reform in South
Africa.
The key roles of government in the land reform process provide institutional arrangement
for land reform. Land reform is primarily the responsibility of national government.
National government is responsible for the drawing up of land reform policy and the
procedure by which it is implemented and has established a land reform programme. This
programme consists of three key components, restitution of land rights, the reform of
tenure systems and the redistribution of land, discussed in further detail below (National
Land Committee, 2003). Implementation of these programmes is carried out at the
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provincial level and the DLA is accountable for land transactions whilst the DoA is
involved with extension support (Department of Land Affairs, 1996).
It is important to consider the national objectives of land reform to be achieved through the
land restitution, redistribution and tenure reform programmes. The three components of
land reform should satisfy the following objectives established in the White Paper on
South African Land Policy (Department of Land Affairs, 1997):
• The injustices of racially based legislation
• The inequitable distribution ofland
• The need for security of tenure for all
• The need for sustainable use ofland
• The need for rapid release ofland for development
• The need to record and register all rights in property
• The need to administer public land in an effective manner
Each of the Land Reform sub-programmes are introduced below and assessed in terms of
their progress towards achieving the national land reform objectives shown above.
1.2.1 The land restitution programme
The purpose of land restitution is to restore land or provide compensation to people
dispossessed of land rights by racially discriminatory legislation and practice since 1913.
The approach to restitution is outlined in the Constitution of South Africa, and the
Restitution of Land Rights Act, No. 22 of 1994 (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). The
Act states the qualification criteria for claims, the forms of restitution and compensation,
and the processes necessary for the settlement of claims. It also makes provision for the
establishment of a Land Claims Commission and Land Claims Court to facilitate and
adjudicate the process of claims.
Land restitution in South Africa has been a slow process. Up until 1997, less than five
cases out of the 12000 cases submitted had been finalised. NGOs, at that time, were
concerned that 12000 claims cases were a small number compared to the 3.5 million
people who were forcibly removed under the Land Act of 1913. By the end of 1998, a
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total of 68,878 restitution claims were registered and only 49 claims had been resolved
(Lyne and Darroch, 2001; Harley and Fotheringham, 1999). However, the restitution
process was sped up significantly and by the end of March 2002, the Commission on
Restitution of Land Rights had settled 29,877 claims out of the total 68,878 claims that had
been lodged. By 31 March 2005, the number of claims settled by the Commission on
Restitution of Land Rights' increased to 59,395 benefiting a total of 900,000 individuals on
land extending 887,093 hectares (Department of Land Affairs, 2005).
Although the land restitution programme has made significant progress towards
completion there are some concerns. Lahiff (2002) notes that there has been a bias towards
settling urban claims (72%) over rural claims (28%) and most restitution beneficiaries have
been financially compensated. Thwala (2003) indicates that 40% of land claimants chose
to be financially compensated for their losses. This means that 40% of land claimants have
therefore not benefited from the restoration of land rights, land tenure security or the
potential of this the land asset to improve livelihoods (Thwala, 2003). The 2005 national
budget earmarked the land restitution process R4 million to take it through to expected
• I
completion in 2008 (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). It is doubtful whether this will be
enough as recent independent estimates have put a conservative completion figure in
excess ofRlO million (Hall et al, 2003; Groenewald, 2004; Sapa, 2004).
1.2.2 The land tenure reform programme
The purpose of the land tenure reform programme is to secure tenure for all South Africans
(Department of Land Affairs, 1996). In 1996, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act was
passed and gave labour tenants secure rights to land on which they lived. This was
especially important for people living in homeland areas as it provided protection against
abuses such as the sale of their land by corrupt chiefs or the construction of illegal
development projects (Turner and Ibsen, 2000; Adams et al., 1999).
In 1997, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) was put in place to enable
anyone who had been granted permission on or after 4 February 1997 the right to live and
use that land (Harley and Fotheringham, 1999). Two additional measures were put in
place to achieve secure tenure for farm workers. Firstly, farm worker~ approaching
retiring age (60 years and older) or disabled whilst working had the right to reside on the
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land permanently. Secondly, farm workers living on land for at least 10 years also had the
right to make this their permanent residence (Harley and Fotheringham, 1999). The
Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA) was enacted in 2004 to provide for secure land
tenure rights to communities and persons who occupy and use land in communal areas
(Department of Land Affairs, 2005).
Tenure reform should have far-reaching consequences because of the masses of people
involved. It is estimated that there are 3,9 million black rural households in the former
homeland areas (May et al, 2000a). Additionally, there are about 1,3 million households
living in urban informal settlements and 800000 farm labourer families (roughly 6 million
farm dwellers) staying on farms (May et al, 2000a; Roodt, 2006). Therefore, tenure reform
has the potential to benefit about 6 million households and, as a result of tenure security,
improved food security for a vast number of people (May et al, 2000a). Currently, only
100,175 hectares have been secured through this programme (Department of Land Affairs,
2005). Although the policy is in place there is no proof of ESTA enforcement. In fact, a
recent report initiated by Nkuzi Development Association on farm evictions in South
. Africa revealed the disturbing statistics that some 1.7 million people were evicted and 3.7
million people were displaced from farms since 1984, but that the majority of evictions
have occurred since democracy in 1994. Almost 1 million people have been evicted from
farms and 2.35 million people have been displaced from farms since 1994. This indicates
that current legislation is not enforced and not adequately securing land tenure rights
(Social Surveys Africa and the Nkuzi Development Association, 2005). Many of these
evictions were motivated by the promulgation of ESTA and government is currently
exploring how to remedy this situation (Department of Land Affairs, 2005).
1.2.3 The land redistribution programme
The land redistribution programme was established to provide the poor with land for
residential and productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods (Department of
Land Affairs, 1996). Land redistribution was intended to assistthe urban and rural poor,
farm workers, labour tenants, and emerging farmers. The programme aimed to achieve the
RDP goal of redistributing 30% of farmland in the period until 1999. The land
redistribution programme provided a Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) to
households or groups to purchase land from willing sellers, including the state. In setting
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out its policy the Department maintained the importance of giving priority to the
marginalised, to women in need and to projects that could be speedily implemented
(National Land Committee, 2003).
However, delivery has not been a strong characteristic of the land redistribution
programme. From 1997-2001, a total of 121,484 hectares of farmland was acquired by
historically disadvantaged people in KwaZulu-Natal (Lyne and Darroch, 2002). In that 5
year period, only 2.3% of the land available for redistribution had been transferred in
KwaZulu-Natal. The national figures reflected similarly poor performance in land transfer.
It was estimated that 1.76 million rural households across South Africa required farmland
amounting to 23.6 million hectares but by 1998 only 161,317 hectares (0.7%) ofland had
been transferred. This rate of land transfer was significantly distant from the national
target ofredistributing 30% of agricultural land by 1999 (Harley and Fotheringham, 1999).
The SLAG programme was the primary redistributive agent during this period of poor
delivery. The SLAG programme did not attain government's goal of redistributing 30% of
white-owned farmland to disadvantaged people (Lyne and Darroch, 2001). Additionally,
SLAG projects were often situated on land of lower agricultural quality on which it was
difficult to grow crops or rear livestock and this was not conducive to improving
livelihoods of the poor (Graham, 2000). As a result the Minister for Agriculture and Land
Affairs placed a moratorium on the SLAG programme in 1999 (Wegerif, 2004).1
The under performance of the SLAG programme was one of the reasons government
devised a new redistribution policy (Wegerif, 2004). In 2001, the Land Redistribution for
Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme was announced. In contrast to SLAG,
where the black poor were the primary beneficiaries and did not need to invest money to
benefit, LRAD beneficiaries have to invest initial capital to qualify for a grant. The level
of the grant is linked to the applicant's own financial contribution. LRAD grants start at
R20000, with a minimum beneficiary contribution of R5000, rising to a maximum grant of
R400000 where the required beneficiary contribution is RlOOOOO (Lyne and Darroch,
2001). Therefore, LRAD aims to benefit those already with some financial resources (Hall
1 It is important to note that Schmitz (2001: 6) argued that "while faulty, the [SLAG] programme had
probably not been in such a bad state as to warrant an abrupt halt to the approval of new projects".
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et al, 2003). LRAD is not only focused on reducing poverty but at creating an
environment for economic growth through farming (Wegerif, 2004).
The SLAG programme, with its focus on the provision of land for settlement purposes, is
still in operation focusing on those communities who require land for housing mostly in
urban areas. For example, a farm of 1000 hectares worth R4 million was acquired for the
residents of Alexandra in Gauteng purely for residential purposes (Didiza, 2002).
Although SLAG is still operational it is seldom used as LRAD is the new DLA flagship for
redistributing land in rural areas (Hall et al, 2003).
This shift from SLAG to LRAD exemplifies government's keen interest in establishing
economically viable enterprises. However, critics of LRAD warn that land redistribution is
unlikely to effect more than 1,5 million households over the next decade (May et al.,
2000a). Government's revised target of redistributing 30% of agricultural land by the end
of 2014 may be out of reach again, as predictions indicate that only 4.6% of agricultural
land will be redistributed by 2015 (Sibanda, 2001). If government's objective is to be
attained, a delivery rate of 2.2 million hectares per year would need to be reached. This
seems unlikely considering that during the period 1996-2005 only 3.1 million hectares had
been delivered through all Land Reform sub-programmes (Department of Land Affairs,
2005; Hall, 2004a). Further, it was estimated that LRAD would probably only benefit
2000 households per year taking, at current spending patterns, 125 years to complete the
redistribution of 30% of agricultural land to black people (Aliber, 2003; Thwala, 2003). In
fact, LRAD has achieved even more poorly transferring 72,687 hectares of land to 5109
beneficiaries since its inception (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). And the mounting
pressure to place 30% of South Africa's agricultural land in the hands of black farmers
could result in a land crisis, similar to that in Zimbabwe, especially when land reform is
not on course to meet the target deadline of 2015 (Hall et al, 2003; Greenberg, 2003).
1.2.4 Administrative capacity
As noted earlier, land reform is identified as one of the most important unresolved
components post-apartheid South Africa needs to address. Yet the DLA, the primary
agents for the land reform programme, only received a paltry 0.3% of the 2003 national
9
budget to implement land reform.2 Further, under-spending within the department has
been problematic in the past. However, improvements were seen in 2005 with spending
reaching 98% (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). This lack of finance and associated
administrative incapacity has contributed to the slow delivery rate of land reform in South
Africa (May et al., 2000a). Administrative irregularities have occurred where land has
been bought for land reform purposes. Land purchase over and above the market value, is
depleting financial reserves and leaving fewer resources available for effective land
reform. For example in Mpumalanga, government paid 300% more for property than the
last market value pricing (Arenstein and Groenewald, 2004).
1.3 Policy change and land reform
South Africa has seen a fundamental shift in the approach to land reform. Section 1.2.3
explained that the land redistribution programme initiated a new sub-programme called
Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD). LRAD is a direct result of the
adoption of macro economic policy. This had critical impact on the way land reform was
implemented, who it benefited and what its impacts would be (Wegerif, 2004).
1.3.1 The policies impacting on the approach to land reform
Following the 1994 elections in South Africa, the new ANC led government developed the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP aimed to address the many
social and economic problems facing the country. A key aspect of the RDP was that it
recognised the connection between different social problems, such as the lack ofhousing, a
shortage of jobs, inadequate education and health care and a failing economy. It proposed
job creation through public works and the building of houses and provision of services
would be done in a way that created employment. However, the RDP could not attain the
targets in the short period of time it set for itself and the sustainability of the RDP housing
and infrastructure programmes were questionable (Terreblanche, 1999).
2 In 2003 , the DLA received R1.09 million (0.3%) of the R287.9 billion national budget (Department ofLand
Affairs ,2004). Projected revenues for 2005 /2006 are expected to reach R379.2 billion and the DLA has been
allocated R2.03 billion (0.5%) for this period (Manuel, 2005) .
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In 1996, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, effectively replacing
the RDP, was accepted as macroeconomic strategy aimed at strengthening economic
development and international competitiveness, encourage employment, and the
redistribution of income and socioeconomic opportunities (Knight, 2004; Strydom, 2000).
This policy document was supported strongly by business. However, there was opposition
to the strategy from trade unions, NGOs and other people-centred organisations. COSATU
and the SACP saw GEAR as inappropriate for South Africa (Terreblanche, 1999). They
maintained that GEAR, with its focus on stringent monetary and fiscal targets, conflicted
with the RDP goal of growth based on job creation, meeting people's needs, poverty
reduction and a more equitable distribution of wealth (Knight, 2004). COSATU
highlighted how, thus far, GEAR had failed to deliver the promised economic and job
growth or significant redistribution of income and socio-economic opportunities for the
poor (Knight, 2004). This is confirmed by May et al (2004, 18): "GEAR's principle
achievements have been reductions in the budget deficit and the inflation rate rather than in
growth, job creation and poverty reduction."
As shown above, there are ambivalent views about the ideological policy shift from the
RDP to GEAR. The critics of GEAR believe that land reform should benefit the "poorest
of the poor" in the creation of sustainable livelihoods. However, there are others, like
Bernstein (2005), who do not think Government has the capacity to implement a
nationwide project like land reform and should rather concentrate on empowering those
with some resources available to them in order to maintain agricultural production on
redistributed agricultural land. However, land reform that is not pro-poor orientated
contradicts the stated objectives of land reform as outlined by the white paper (Strydom,
2000).
In order to understand this shift in policy, GEAR needs to be considered in the context of
globalisation.
1.3.2 The effects of globalisation
In the preceding section, national macroeconomic policy was shown to have shifted land
reform policy from a SLAG to a LRAD driven approach. The shift in national policy from
a pro-poor RDP transformative agenda to an economically driven GEAR approach has
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failed to contribute substantially to the redistribution of income and socio-economic
opportunities for the poor. This section extrapolates on how globalisation has put great
pressure on the South African government to conform to global market requirements.
Globalisation has been and will continue to influence economies strongly throughout the
world, including South Africa. The phenomenon of globalisation has emerged as a global
capitalist economy. It has been created through the use of technological advancements in
the business world which have made markets more accessible and competitive. Global
markets have enabled trade to expand and high-tech manufactured goods are the
commodities most important to global economies and hence international trade today.
This has changed what is produced and the way the production of goods and services
operates through a network of multinational corporations, small and medium businesses.
The result is that globalisation has moved beyond the control of anyone nation, country or
state (Castells, 2001).
Globalisation has forced South Africa into a scenano where they must produce
commodities to compete internationally (Mboweni, 2000). This pressure resulted in the
formulation of the GEAR policy.3 In the context of GEAR, land is a resource that South
Africa has to utilise effectively to maintain and improve its economic performance
globally. Land reform and, specifically, LRAD offers an agricultural opportunity for
South Africa to increase its agricultural output for export and foreign currency.
Globalisation has more negative effects for developing countries. This is mainly due to the
under resourced status of developing countries and economies compared to their
technology affluent counterparts. The global economy is an economy dependent on .
technological needs and therefore puts developed countries at a particular advantage in the
market place. This means that developed states will stay stronger than developing states
(Gelb, 2001; Goodenough, 2003). This is an environment in which exploitation of weaker
developing economies can occur. Often developing countries will accommodate industry
and services from developed countries. This promotes local economic growth within a
developing country but often it allows for the exploitation of cheap labour and the
environment to make short term gains (Goodenough, 2003). The products, where the real
3 In 2006, the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) succeeded GEAR as guiding
macroeconomic policy. Analysis of ASGISA is outside the time frame of this study.
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economic value lies, remain in the hands of the original investor country. The developing
country may only benefit marginally in comparison to the value of the product. Thus,
developing countries continue to be exploited to sustain a superior economy that holds
little long term benefit for them. This continues to keep developing countries less
competitive, marginalised and less developed than developed countries (Gelb, 2001).
Based on the above it can be concluded that to escape the exploitative effects of
globalisation South Africa has to join the global market and establish viable opportunities
for economic growth in a competitive global arena. It is within this context of
globalisation that South Africa developed the GEAR macro-economic policy. The
problem with the transformative pro-poor RDP approach was that it was not economically
orientated. Globalisation does not support non-economic orientated programmes, like the
RDP approach to land reform. Therefore, the economic pressure on South Africa to make
land economically productive is a result of fierce global competition.
1.3.3 Black economic empowerment
Globalisation has encouraged the formation of a new black elite, now a formidable force,
that put pressure on government to accept the free market ideology of GEAR
(Terreblanche, 1999). Black business stands to gain significantly, locally, from GEAR.
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategies aim to transform the South African
economy. The Black Economic Empowerment in Agriculture (AgriBEE) charter states
that black South Africans must own 30% of agricultural land by 2014 and hold 50% of
agricultural senior management posts by 2008 (AgriBEE Steering Committee, 2005).
Public perception is that, presently, BEE has not boosted employment creation. What
seems to be happening is that black business is not actively pursuing building new business
and investment. BEE companies have not invested in businesses and initiatives that lead to
job creation for a greater number of people (Hassen, 2004; Groenewald, 2004). Unless
BEE "serves the interests of the poor it will go wrong" as there are dangers in developing a
black neo-colonial class (Turok, 1999: 7). However, the framework for BEE in which to
operate is still at a developmental stage and expectations may be, at this point, over
ambitious. Land reform offers BEE a chance to focus on the emerging farm companies
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and boost economic growth through employment and increased agricultural productivity.
However, it seems that there is no clear link between BEE and land reform initiatives.
1.4 The agricultural challenge for land reform in South Africa
The transformative agenda of the land reform programme aims to address the unequal
distribution of land by dividing land more equitably among South Africans. The majority
of land in rural areas is used for agricultural purposes. The South African agricultural
sector has two economies: a commercial agricultural economy and subsistence agricultural
economy. The challenge for government and post-apartheid society is to merge the two
without debilitating the commercial agriculture economy or South Africa's agricultural
potential for production (Cousins, 2007; Mbeki, 2004).
Commercial agriculture was heavily subsidised by the apartheid government, but with the
liberalisation of markets in South Africa commercial agriculture has had to compete
internationally. This has resulted in commercial farmers operating on smaller budgets,
realising lower profit margins and the closing of numerous agricultural operations (Hall,
2004b).
However, even within a predominantly white owned agricultural industry struggling to
remain productive and economically viable, many have embraced land reform.
Commercial farmers and corporations have accepted that land reform must be
implemented and that resisting land reform would contribute to probable expropriation, the
confiscation of land and "Zimbabwe" type land invasion. Tongaat Hulett, as an example
of corporate agriculture, has implemented a land redistribution programme to ensure the
sustainable agricultural production of cane for the sugar mills4• This process of Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE), through the promotion of black small to medium size
cane farmers, has been successful in producing commercial surplus-creating farming in
KwaZulu-Natal (Boyce, 2002). Other racially transformative means within the agricultural
sector proving successful are share equity schemes whereby farm workers buy into
partnership with commercial farmers using their land grants (Ranchod, 2004).
4 Tongaat Hulett Group Limited is a company in KwaZulu -Natal that produces sugar amongst other
commodities. Tongaat-Hulett owns 23 000 hectares ofland in South Africa. In 2005, 21% of total cane
procurement was purchased from previously disadvantaged South Africans .
http://www.tongaat.co.za/an/introduction.asp
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1.4.1 Small scale farming: The future of South African agriculture
Commercial South African agricultural sector has been historically elitist. Currently,
agriculture is dominated by relatively large farms that are owned and operated by a few
individuals (Pantland, 2001). Despite South Africa's apartheid history of policies
favouring large, high-input farms there is local and international evidence claiming that
large-scale mechanised farms are inefficient when compared to small-scale farms
(Ghimire, 2001; Varadarajan, 2003; van den Brink, 2003). This does not mean small-scale
farmers produce higher yields (van den Brink, 2003). It means that large-scale farmers
produce higher yields because their inputs are higher. The World Bank supports the small-
scale farming sector for three reasons: efficiency (small-scale farmers generate more profit
for every monetary unit invested), poverty reduction and equity. Therefore, trends,
policies and distortions that favour large farms over smaller farms should be removed (van
Zyl et al., 1995). Additionally, any opposition to land reform due to arguments that
agricultural productivity will suffer as a consequence of decreasing farm sizes is
unwarranted. In fact, if literature is to be believed, as farm sizes decrease, as a result of
land reforms, agricultural efficiency should increase. As populations increase in size land
becomes more scarce and more contentious. The increased agricultural strain on land, due
to population growth, creates unfavourable farming conditions for large scale farmers and
a trend to carving up ofland into smaller parcels (Varadarajan, 2003).
Farms will have to become even smaller if the skewed land ownership patterns are to be
rectified in South Africa and as more people become dependent on land to survive. Small
farms are efficient and can produce proportionally at least the same and more than their
large scale counter-parts. The difficulty is making emerging black farmers with limited
land and agricultural skill as productive as their white competitors.
~ Literature ~oes ~onflict over the farm size vs production issue . However, recent literature does accept the
Inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. It must be remembered that small scale fanners
under Apartheid were predominantly black and faced a long list ofgovernment policies which had crippling




Despite World Bank optimistic reports, land reform in South Africa has not achieved its
objectives. Land reform has not been as successful as was hoped initially in changing
inequitable land ownership patterns in South Africa. The land restitution programme has
been the most successful but with large numbers of restitution claimants benefiting
financially has been disappointing in contributing to land ownership transformation. The
focus of land reform has moved away from redistributing land to account for the injustices
of the apartheid past in South Africa towards a strong emphasis on making land
economically viable through agriculture. The shift from the RDP, pro-poor approach, to
the GEAR, pro-production approach, has sparked debate about the intentions of land
reform within a global market.
Instead of pursuing an approach to land reform for purposes of social justice, a market
based approach is being driven that should improve economic performance and enhance
the position of South Africa to create economically viable agricultural enterprises through
LRAD. However, this is difficult as emerging farmers are often under skilled. The aim of
LRAD was to provide land reform beneficiaries with a programme to support their farming
needs and revive and grow the agricultural sector. Whilst the new land redistribution
flagship, LRAD, is probably not going to speed up the land reform process it does offer an
opportunity for rural agricultural development to contribute to the economy and the
improvement ofrural livelihoods. LRAD is critiqued in more detail in Chapter 4.
Land reform has the potential to address the historical land ownership imbalances caused
by South Africa's past and improve livelihoods. While land reform has had partial success
with the former, the latter remains largelyrignored in land reform policy. Chapter 2
, /




Reopening the debate on land reform
An introduction to the debate
Van den Brink (2003) affirms the argument established in Chapter 1, that is, that land
reform in South Africa has not been as successful as planned. "International experience
demonstrates that even though the 'land question' is often said to be a priority equity issue,
many countries in the world have made remarkable little progress on it" (van den Brink,
2003: 17). In July of2005 the National Land Summit in Johannesburg reopened the debate
on land reform to investigate the poor delivery of land to potential beneficiaries by the land
reform programme (Goebel, 2005). The South African Government admits that under the
market-based approach to land reform, the primary objective of distributing land to
previously disadvantaged people has not been achieved (Didiza, 2006). Land reform
targets continue to be revised, and the shift from SLAG to LRAD has not improved the
delivery rates required (Lahiff and Rugege, 2003). This has initiated debate about whether
the current market-based approach to land reform is effective.
Critics of market-based approaches to land reform maintain that substantial change in land
distribution does not occur due to unfair markets (Hall et al., 2003; National Land
Committee, 2003; El-Ghonemy, 2001; Aliber and Mokoena, 2002). Chapter 1 has shown
that government's targets for land delivery have not been attained. Every time government
has revised their land reform targets or changed their policy they have done so without
appropriate programme and product specific performance information (Hall, 2004a; Hall et
al, 2003).6 This questions the appropriateness of policies that have been adopted to
implement land reform.
Government has failed to address the needs of communities before moving to consider
forms of land transfer that mayor may not speed up the process of fulfilling the promise of
the DLA's slogan: "Getting people back to the land" (Sonjica, 2001: 1). Additionally,
while the objective of the DLA is to get 30% of South Africa's land back to black people
~ In Chapter 4, evaluation of the land reform programme and LRAD is examined to emphasise the
Importance ofprogramme evaluation to future policy making and further debate on land reform,
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by the end of 2014, it is not the DLA's responsibility to ensure that land be utilised for
productive agricultural purposes (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). Critics
of land reform have used this issue of non-utilisation of land as a caution against using fast
track land reform techniques to move people onto land (Moyo, 2004; MMPZ, undated).
Van den Brink (World Bank senior economist) and Cousins (Director of the Programme
for Land and Agrarian Studies at the University of the Western Cape) maintain that fast
track land reform, or expropriation, is slower and can be more expensive than other forms
of acquisition (Groenewald, 2006; van den Brink, 2003; Cousins, 2000). Van den Brink
(2003) elaborates on the issue of expropriation to emphasise that international experience
has shown the legal process of expropriation is time consuming as every farm owner can
contest expropriation orders in court, contributing significantly to the cost of expropriation
and associated compensation. In South Africa, government has faced similar negative
experiences and this may explain why expropriation has only been utilised where
negotiated redistribution failed (Groenewald, 2006).
There has been limited achievement of land reform targets and the review process has
provided little indication of the direction for land reform. While there are no published
empirical facts, news reportage indicates that the review process has been disappointing.
Government has not come out with a clear direction for land reform to attain its targets of
the completion of the restitution process by 2008 and transferring 30% of farmland to
black owners by 2015 (Groenewald, 2006).
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the complex nature of the land question as
advocating a change in approach to land reform may not be the solution to landlessness
and poverty if this does not achieve land reform objectives. Vulnerable livelihoods are
examined in section 2.1. It is argued that land reform has increased the vulnerability of the
poor to urbanisation, insecure tenure and HIV/AIDS. In section 2.2, access to land,
livelihoods and land reform processes are exposed as issues of basic human rights. Thus
the increasing vulnerability of livelihoods indicates growing violation of these rights.
Section 2.3 looks at different approaches to land reform and the case of Zimbabwe in
Section 2.4. In section 2.5, agricultural restructuring as a means of land reform is posed as
creating an inequitable agrarian system. In Section 2.6, the concept of sustainability is
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introduced as a key consideration for land reform and future land use. Elements of this
research take into account popular debate around land reform.
2.1 Vulnerable livelihoods in the new South Africa
"Poverty is generally characterised by the inability of individuals, households or entire communities to
command sufficient resources to satisfy a socially acceptable minimum standard ofliving. ,,7
The inequitable policies of apartheid and the existence of the former homelands have
meant that landlessness, overpopulation, overgrazing and increased land degradation
occurred in many rural areas of South Africa (Ekbom, 2003). These previously
disadvantaged communities, now the urban and rural poor, have not had access to
appropriate assets upon which livelihoods can be established to deal with disasters and
events that disrupt the functioning of society (Moore, 2001).
The actual extent of poverty at the end of apartheid in 1994 was unknown. The newly-
formed, democratically elected South African government took the initiative to conduct a
nationwide poverty assessment to analyse the extent of poverty and inequality in South
Africa. In 1998, the findings of the assessment were published in the Poverty and
Inequality Report which indicated that 50% of the national population was poor, defined as
surviving on less than R15 per day. It was also found that poverty is more common in
rural areas and severe in former homeland areas. (Ranchod, 2004)
Recently, South Africa has been labelled as acountry with one of the highest levels of
income inequality (known as the Gini coefficient which indexes the gap between the rich
and the poor) in the world. While income inequalities between racial groups have been
declining, income inequalities within groups, or intra-group inequalities, have increased
(Cousins et al., 2005). In South Africa, 17% of the population receives 72% of the income
whilst 50% of the population only obtains about 3% of the income (Terreblanche, 2002).
The notion that economic growth must occur before poverty can be reduced seems to have
been accepted by the South African government (Mbeki, 1999). The claim that
"redistribution" can only take place after growth has increased a society's resources results
in the marginalization of the poor.f Bo Goransson (2004) suggests that instead of ignoring
the rights and priorities of the poor focusing on capacity building, security and stability at
7 May, 2005: 5
8 This is the so called 'Trickle down effect' (Bo Goransson, 2004).
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the grass roots level will provide an empowering environment for improving livelihoods,"
Cousins (2007, 5) calls this "accumulation from below" which encourages the promotion
ofmultiple livelihood strategies. Poor people rely on multiple livelihood sources including
agriculture, and also employment, government welfare packages and micro enterprises.
Bartering, the harvesting of natural resources and construction are also important forms of
income in rural areas (Cousins, 2007).
Deininger and May (2000) state that the development of the productive potential of the
rural sector appears to be a critical pre-condition for sustainable poverty reduction. May
(2000) argues that sustainable improvements in the quality of life are best achieved by
enhancing the capabilities of disadvantaged communities. Therefore, policy must focus on
initiatives that improve the ability and capabilities of the majority of South Africans. This
includes current efforts to implement policy that redistributes land. However, while the
redistribution of assets, such as land, to the poor is important in South Africa it is not
instrumental in reducing poverty and inequality unless there is appropriate policy to
provide opportunity for asset building (May, 2000). (;:
»:
The following subsections examine how urbanisation, land reform, foreign land ownership
and HIV/AIDS have contributed towards making livelihoods vulnerable.
2.1.1 Urbanisation and the emergence of slums
Global urbanisation has increased substantially from only 86 cities worldwide with a
population over 1 million in 1950, to 400 cities in 2006 and it is projected that by 2015
there will be at least 550 such cities (Davis, 2006). The world is entering an era where, for
the first time, urban population numbers are exceeding rural population figures. And in the
next 30 years virtually all of the world's population growth will occur in urban areas of
low and middle income countries (Landsberg, 2005). As Davis (2006) points out, there is
no indication whether this many cities are biologically or ecologically sustainable10,
especially since cities have large, and growing, poor populations. The majority of the
urban poor cannot afford formal housing and thus often have no alternative but to reside in
9 This is what has been termed the 'Trickle up effect'.
10 There is also evidence from sub-Saharan Africa to suggest that increasing levels ofurbanisation reduces a
country's GDP (Walker, 2002) .
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slums where housing conditions are grossly inadequate (UN-Habitat, 2003). Slums, also
known as informal settlements, are by definition an unsafe living environment. Slums
expose poor people to vulnerable situations in the process ofurbanisation. Slum ecology is
a hazard for those residing in slums. Slums are prone to disaster because they emerge
through an informal process rather than by formal municipal planning. The mountains of
rubbish, excrement and other foreign substances that characterise slums put people at risk
of disease. Slums are often located in geologically unstable areas where rain can cause
mudslides and flooding or near dangerous industrial areas where pollutants infect the slum
dweller environment (Davis, 2006). Further, slum dwellers are exposed more easily to
water borne diseases and HN/AIDS (UN-Habitat, 2003).
Seventy two percent (72%) of Africa's urban population lives in slums (Landsberg, 2005).
South Africa has a growing slum population and, according to research conducted by the
University of Stellenbosch, up to 80% of South Africa's population will reside in cities or
towns by the year 2026, which makes South Africa one of the fastest urbanising countries
in the world (Jenkins, 1997). The housing backlog has grown exponentially from 1.4
million, 12 years ago, to 2.4 million in 2006 (van der Westhuizen, 2004). The City of
Johannesburg established that there are 189 informal settlements (209 308 informal
structures) within the jurisdiction of that city. The City aims to eradicate informal
settlements by 2008 through the provision of formal accommodation (Landsberg, 2005).
However, it is unclear whether the City will be able to achieve this objective or how many
more informal settlements will have established themselves by 2007. In KwaZulu-Natal,
the provincial government has drafted the Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of
Slums Bill to deal with the escalation of informal settlements in urban areas (Chief
Directorate: State Law Advisory Services, 2006). Media reportage indicates that
government may be more concerned with eradicating informal settlements than providing
alternative accommodation to those that inhabit them. This viewpoint is supported by the
slow progress with the building of low cost housing, as there will not be enough houses to
cater for displaced informal settlement residents as a result of slum clearing (Pithouse,
2006). The potential eradication of slums indicates that tenure security for slum dwellers
remains uncertain.
Oscillation between rural and urban contexts is a significant component of livelihood
strategies for many urban poor (Walker, 2002). There are numerous reasons why South
21
African's might migrate to urban centres like Johannesburg. There are the attractions of
better employment prospects, housing and basic services (Bemstein, 2005). Increasingly
one of the reasons for urbanisation is insecure tenure. Social Surveys Africa and the Nkuzi
Development Association (2005) documented that over 67% of evicted farm dwellers
settled in urban areas, many in informal settlements.
Insecure tenure is not only a rural phenomenon. Davis (2006) documents the failing of
developing countries to provide housing for new urban workers as post independence
governments abdicate responsibility for the poor to rule in the interests of local elites. A
consequence of urbanisation is mass eviction of people back to the rural areas. When a
city administration cannot cope with the influx of people, municipalities move to evict and
demolish informal settlements (Davis, 2006) .11
2.1.2 Failure ofland reform to promote land tenure security
The increasing dissatisfaction amongst the landless regarding the progress of land reform is
apparent in media reportage. The Landless People's Movement has warned that "the
people's anger will break out" if land redistribution targets are not achieved (Goebel, 2005:
346). Aliber (2003) and Walker (2002) recognise that people's perceptions of land is a
highly emotive issue and one that takes on a far greater importance than its apparent
importance to the economy.
The progression of Zimbabwe's controversial land reform programme and the resultant
land invasions have exacerbated anxiety about land in the (white) South African
commercial farming community (Goebel, 2005; Lyne and Darroch, 2002). This anxiety is .
heightened by perceptions of land reform. Hlopoyiya (undated) indicates that there is the
perception amongst some black people that land reform is there to topple white
commercial agriculture and replace it with black commercial agriculture or black land
owners. Land invasion can compromise the viability of agriculture on farms (Boyce,
2002). However, even though South African law does not permit land invasions they do
occur, as exemplified in the Vryheid-Babanango invasions (refer to Appendix 1). Evicted
11 Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina is a case in point where rapid urbanisation and subsequent slum
growth resulted in the eviction of over 700,000 people from their homes and livelihoods (Tibaijuka, 2005).
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farm workers and labour tenants without alternative accommodation have no where to go
and as a result invade former employer 's land (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). In
KwaZulu-Natal, Boyce (2002) confirms that there have been cases at Nqabeni (South
Coast), Mangete, Nonoti and Kranskop (North Coast) where farmers have been driven off
their land.
The Zimbabwe situation indicates the potential volatility of land reform within Southern
Africa. In Zimbabwe, the slow pace of land reform resulted in a politically unsustainable
and explosive situation (Deininger et al., 2002). Part of the problem in Zimbabwe was that
commercial farmers opposed national land reforms which contributed to delaying the
implementation of land reform. Deininger et al (2002: 16) issue a warning. "The pattern
described for Zimbabwe might not be unique to the country. South Africa and Namibia for
instance are also characterised by an extremely inequitable distribution of land, along
racial lines and a land reform programme that makes little progress".
Referring to South Africa (Sibanda, 2001: 2) noted that: "Land invasions and other related
illegal acts are not tolerated by government". However, when farm invasions occur and
the perpetrators are not dealt with appropriately then it seems to imply that government
does tolerate land invasions. In South Africa, enforcing the law remains vital to political
stability, economic growth and, in the case of invasions, food security. Political instability
undermines land tenure security which has a negative effect on food security (Walker,
2002). For example, the Zimbabwe five year land reform campaign resulted in about 4200
of 4500 agriculturally productive farmers leaving their farms which compromised food
security in Zimbabwe. The evidence from Zimbabwe shows that the fast track approach to
land redistribution threatens food security, at the household and national level (COHRE,
2001). The apparent lack of action against unlawful land invasions will add logically to
speculation over government lacking the political will to implement land reform. Goebel
(2005: 364) confirms that "the South African government is down-playing the land
question". As long as land reform remains politically marginal to the concerns of
government land invasions will continue to occur (Deininger et al., 2002) which results in
an unstable political environment, compromised food security and economic crises.
As shown in Chapter 1, the land redistribution programme has not benefited communities
on the scale required to retain people in rural areas. In fact, redistribution target dates have
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been repeatedly shifted in order to account for slow land delivery (Lahiff and Rugege,
2003). Presently, LRAD only tends to benefit small groups of aspiring farmers (Ministry
for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). These beneficiaries become owners of large
tracts of land, which in effect excludes other members of their communities from land
tenure. The land tenure reform programme failed to prevent the eviction of farm workers
and their families from farms (Social Surveys Africa and the Nkuzi Development
Association, 2005). The result is that land tenure is elusive for many rural families in
South Africa. Van den Brink (2003) concurs saying that where there are no or unclear
property rights and tenure security the problems of eviction, land invasion and disputes
over land are common.
The legacy of Colonialism in Africa tended to favour European settlers over indigenous
population groups and European land administrative systems above indigenous systems. A
land tenure administrative system emerged dominated by the Colonial legal systems,
through formalised individual land titling, as a result of the commodification of land
(Walker, 2002). Recently, new legal frameworks to land tenure have begun to be
investigated as formal individual title deeds to land have failed to solve the problems of
homelessness and tenure insecurity among the rural and urban poor (Cousins et al., 2005;
Ayieko, 2004).12 Although formal titling is accepted to be important it cannot deliver
security of tenure to the majority of citizens, particularly in Africa, on its own. There is
growing consensus that developing nations should rather look at other innovative
approaches to security of tenure including building upon customary tenure and group rights
(Alcock and Homby, 2004; Walker, 2002).
2.1.3 Ownership of land by foreigners in South Africa
In countries such as South Africa where land policy has changed or is changing the
redistribution of land becomes critical to social justice and the sustainability of societies
(Vorley, 2002). News reports in South Africa indicate that land redistribution, tenure
security and livelihoods are beginning to be negatively affected by capitalism through
12 De Soto (2000) suggests that formalising property rights for the poor in houses , land and small businesses
will enable the poor to access capital and participate in the economy. However , critics of de Soto's approach
have substa~tiated their rejection of this idea on the fact that there have been numerous such tiding systems
that have faded to achieve the results he suggests. Additionally, there are different principles that govern
property systems in rural areas that should be accommodated rather than replaced (Cousins et al, 2005).
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growing globalisation (Manyathi, 2006). Globalisation, described in Chapter I, has
exposed South Africa to global market forces. Approximately 68% of land in rural South
Africa is privately owned and thus accessible for purchase (Walker, 2002). The increasing
demand for land by various parties (including the mining industry, housing estates, golf
course developments and eco tourism ventures) continue to pose a threat to tenure security
(Panel of Experts on Foreign Ownership of Land, 2006). In this context, the regulation and
monitoring of land ownership cannot be overlooked.
While land reform has failed to provide land to the majority of poor South Africans, there
have been some positive steps made in addressing land ownership. Over the last few
years, it has been raised that the lack ofknowledge about land under foreign ownership and
the unregulated ownership of land and property by foreigners might seriously impact the
amount of land available and affordable for land reform. As a result of this concern the
Panel of Experts on Foreign Ownership of Land (PEFOL) was constituted to provide
recommendations to government policy development on foreign ownership of land. The
PEFOL is of the opinion that foreign ownership of land in South Africa is significant
enough to require policy and legislative regulation (Panel of Experts on Foreign Ownership
of Land, 2006).
2.1.4 HIV/AIDS
"HIV/AIDS will influence who gets land in the initial reform process , how the land is then used, and how it
will be subsequently redistributed in future."l 3
Another aspect that has high impact on livelihoods in South Africa is HN/AIDS. The
South African land reform programme has neglected to address this issue which negatively
affects the lives of all South Africans (Walker, 2002). HIV/AIDS is affecting negatively
both the institutions that manage land reform and the beneficiaries of land reform
/ " "
(Ranchod, 2004). HIV/AIDS affects the official capacity to deliver on government
programmes (Walker, 2002). Beneficiaries of land reform are already taking a great risk in
participating in the land redistribution programme as the little income that beneficiaries
have is invested in acquisitions of land and agricultural inputs and implements.
Compounding this, the risk of participation in land redistribution programme is raised
substantially by HN/AIDS. Poor people are more vulnerable to contracting HIV/AIDS
and have little means to address the illness (Ranchod, 2004). This has a negative impact
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on small scale and labour intensive agriculture as resources are diverted to pay for medical
costs, funerals and orphans (Walker, 2002). This is problematic for the viability of small
scale farms (Ranchod, 2004; Wegerif, 2004). Wegerif (2004: 9) goes further to say that,
"The effects ofHIV/AIDS may well neutralise the prospects for growth in agriculture."
2.2 Land access and human rights
Throughout the world, human rights are increasingly recognised as pivotal in human
development (UNDP, 2000). Secure tenure is an internationally recognised human right;
this right includes the human right to livelihood and land. International law respects that
people depend on land for their livelihoods in order to survive (PDHRE, 2006a). In
confirmation of this, El-Ghonemy (2001: 63) notes, "Land reform is primarily an issue of
basic human rights. It implies access to land and its benefits on more equitable and secure
terms for all of those who physically work it and primarily depend upon it for their
livelihoods".
The history of land in South Africa makes the issue of land important to the vast majority
ofrural people. The inequitable land ownership patterns resulting from South Africa's past
has presented land reform as an issue of basic human rights. The South African
government confirms that rights in land, including the right to land and access to land, are
rights endorsed by the South African constitution which instructs the State to enable access
to land on an equitable basis (Didiza, 2006). However, rights pertaining to land access and
tenure security continue to be.undermined.) Forced eviction is a violation of basic human
"
rights including those in land (PDHRE, 2006b). Social Surveys Africa and Nkuzi
Development Association (2005) documented the extent of evictions from South African
farms. Since 1994 almost 1 million people have been evicted from farms and 2.35 million
people have been displaced from farms. Almost, 80% of those evicted are ,~~~~n)and
children. The number of farm dweller households evicted from 1994-2005 was 199,611
households. Whereas the land reform programme, for the same period, only settled or
secured tenure for 164,185 households. Land reform has indirectly contributed to these
farm evictions. The land restitution process enabled labourers and tenants living on farms
to claim land ' according to a set of criteria. This resulted in the eviction of tens of
13 Mullins, D. (2001).
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thousands of labour tenants as farmers feared they risked losing land through the claims
process. Similarly, the 1995 Labour Relations Act, 1996 Land Reform (Labour Tenants)
Act, 1997 the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997 new Basic conditions of
employment Act and the revision of the 2003 minimum wage all contradicted their purpose
and resulted in mass eviction of farm dwellers throughout South Africa (Social Surveys
Africa and the Nkuzi Development Association, 2005).
Ideally, in order to secure rights in land, the redistribution of land should benefit the
landless and poor (El-Ghonemy, 2001). In South Africa, the land reform programme aims
to correct skewed land ownership patterns. The restitution programme has carried the
responsibility for remedying the dispossession of land since 1913 and there has been a
clear human rights impetus. As part of the land reform programme, the redistribution and
land tenure programmes are also rights-based vehicles for addressing the equitable
distribution of land and tenure security for those that were not able to claim land or
compensation through the restitution programme (Wegerif, 2004; Aliber, 2003;
Department of Land Affairs, 1997). But since the inception of the land reform programme
in South Africa, the land redistribution programme, as described in the previous chapter,
has shifted away from its rights-based focus of benefiting the majority of the landless and
poor (Walker, 2002).
The next two sections describe different approaches to land reform and some of their
characteristics. The land reform scenario in Zimbabwe is used as an example from which
South Africa can learn valuable lessons.
2.3 Approaches to land reform
The implementation of land reform, around the world, has been dominated by two different
modes of thought One places more importance on economics than any other aspect of
land reform; the other is more concerned with human rights (EI-Ghonemy, 2001). These
different approaches to land reform have manifested themselves as land market reform and
redistributive land reform respectively.
Redistributive land reform is a process whereby land is taken from large scale farmers and
given to the landless poor and previously disadvantaged. This type of land reform often
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occurs after conflict situations (FAO, 1998). Redistributive land reform promotes social
transformation and poverty alleviation especially since land market reform is out of reach
as the poor battle to afford land at market prices (El-Ghonemy, 2001). Redistributive land
reform can reduce poverty through triggering increased agricultural production rvvegerif,
2004). Redistributive land reform has been very successful in a number of countries
including Egypt, China, South Korea and India. In South Korea poverty dropped 50% as a
result of successful redistributive land reform (El-Ghonemy, 2001).
Land market reform or market-led reform, also known as the willing buyer/willing-seller
approach in South Africa, is presently the most common mode of conducting land reforms
(Karumbidza, 2002, El-Ghonemy, 2001). Since the 1980s there has been a move towards
economically orientated land reform. The global market has pressured governments to opt
for land market reform (El-Ghonemy, 2001). The western institutions of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank have played a role in the deregulation of land markets
(Karumbidza, 2002). They ensured that loan applications were refused unless their
conditions ofland markets 'liberalisation' were endorsed (El-Ghonemy, 2001). This tends
to provide enabling conditions for settlers rather than the local rural poor (Karumbidza,
2002). Theoretically, market-led land reform makes land available to those too
disadvantaged to enter into normal land market transactions (FAO, 1998). The state's role
is to provide the former owner with compensation at market or near market value as a poor
fanner is unable to do so. Although market land reform aims to provide land to the poor it
has battled throughout the world to meet set targets (Karumbidza, 2002; El-Ghonemy,
2001). In South Africa, there is growing opposition to market land reforms as the willing-
buyer/willing-seller approach "redistributes little land and benefits few landless families"
(Aliber and Mokoena, 2002: 4). Karumbidza (2002) notes that the slow impact of market-
led land reforms often result in radical campaigns for land reform, Even though the land
reform objectives are driven by the principles of social justice and basic needs as opposed
to market forces, market value remains as a basis for paying owners for their properties
because of the difficulties in calculating a productive value for land (Aliber and Mokoena,
2002). As the National Land Committee (2003: 122) state, "The market is not a solution
for a fair land redistribution after the apartheid .. .markets are never truly free". Sunstein
(1997) agrees stating that free markets can perpetuate injustice.
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An alternative market-led land reform process is supply led redistribution. This is where
land is secured for purposes of redistribution before applicants have indicated their wish to
acquire it. In South Africa, land redistribution is currently demand driven whereby
beneficiaries identify land and approach the DLA to acquire it. In theory, supply-led
redistribution could increase the speed of delivery ofland to beneficiaries as land would be
available to beneficiaries on application. It could also enable land to be acquired more
inexpensively, as negotiation could commence prior to redistribution. Lastly, supply led
initiatives could ensure the acquisition of high quality land. However, this would require
government to be strategic in their thinking about where to redistribute. There is no
shortage of willing sellers and government can buy land for redistribution in sensible areas
where demand is high and infrastructure and support accessible (Aliber and Mokoena,
2002; Cousins, 2007).
Land reform is complex (Walker, 2002). There is no one ideal approach to land reform as
both redistributive land reform and land market reform are open to abuse. The collapse of
land market reform and the subsequent controversial redistributive land reform in
Zimbabwe has confirmed fears of non-market approaches to land reform. But market
approaches to land reform often exclude the very people land reform is supposed to
benefit. The obligation of land reform to redressing human rights violations of the past and
to simultaneously satisfy market requirements is complex as the two perspectives are often
in conflict. As Cousins (2007: 19) points out: "Political dynamics, rather than rational
arguments, are likely to be the key determinant of the content of land and agrarian reform
in South Africa in years to come." Until political prerogatives change, it seems that land
reform in South Africa will remain predominantly market orientated and demand driven in
its approach.
2.4 The Zimbabwean land reform programme: The benchmark for South Africa?
The land history of Zimbabwe and its proximity to South Africa is of relevance to land
reform in South Africa. At Zimbabwean Independence in 1980, the white minority owned
the majority of agriculturally suitable land (Goebel, 2005). The land reform programme
established to address the injustices of British Colonial rule is of importance to this study.
There are striking parallels between Zimbabwe's land reform programme and the South
29
African land reform programme. This section extrapolates on this in order to expose the
effects of inequities in land distribution.
Although the Zimbabwean land reform programme is widely understood to be a failure, in
the late 1980s there was progress being made on resettlement projects. At that time,
ambitious targets for land resettlement were partially achieved, mainly through the
reduction in the number oflarge scale commercial farms and, by 1989, 29% of commercial
farmland had been transferred to 54000 households (Walker, 2002). However, during the
1990s the Government of Zimbabwe changed their land reform strategy. This was
predominantly due to political pressure from war veterans and the numerous land invasions
that had taken place. The Government of Zimbabwe felt that the colonists needed to face
up to their obligations of addressing the injustices they had caused over land inequities and
should therefore fund land reform in the former colony. While the British agreed in
principal this never happened. The British withheld their financial support because they
felt that the Government of Zimbabwe was ignoring the Land Reform and Resettlement
Programme principles they had agreed to (Goebel, 2005; COHRE, 2001).
The lack of financial support and Zimbabwe's lack of progress of land reform resulted in a
land crisis and the large scale invasion of white owned farms across Zimbabwe (Goebel,
2005). The Zimbabwe five year land reform campaign resulted in about 4200 of 4500
agriculturally productive fanners leaving their farms which compromised food security in
Zimbabwe. The evidence from Zimbabwe shows that the fast track approach to land
redistribution threatens food security, at the household and national level (COHRE, 2001).
Zimbabwe's land crisis resulted due to the following:
1. The highly politicised and emotive nature of land.
2. Lack of funding.
3. Budget allocations indicated that land redistribution was not a priority for
government.
4. Poor administration as government failed to follow its own legal and procedural
requirements.




In the points mentioned above, there are alarming commonalities in the run up to
Zimbabwe's land crisis and South Africa land reform programme presently. At least three
of the above points are common.
Point 1: Land reform has become highly political and emotive for land owners and the
landless alike (Goebel, 2005).
Point 3: The South African national budget allocates a small proportion to land reform
(0.3%-0.5%) as explained in section 1.2.4.
Point 5: The emergence of a new land reform policy (LRAD) focused on benefiting black
emerging farmers (Hall, 2004a; Hall et al, 2003).
Elaboration on the fifth point is necessary as this has relevance to the focus of this thesis.
The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), introduced in 1990, was a
market based land policy framework that favoured productive land use and the
establishment of black emerging farmers in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's economic adjustment
process led to a shift in land policies, land ownership structures as well as the uses of land
and natural resources towards new global markets. Moyo (2000) found, from his studies in
Zimbabwe, that economically focused land redistribution led to two things. The first was a
struggle for land rights between land holders and land seekers. The second was greater
polarisation of not only land distribution but resource distribution with an elite few
controlling the majority of resources while the majority of the population is left in poverty.
Similarly, Sobhan (1993) confirms that agrarian reforms can perpetuate polarisation and
poverty if a rural elite survives. He maintained that land reform should eliminate any
current or potential dominant rural class by redistributing land as widely as possible to the
landless and land poor. Moyo (2000: 166) issues a cautionary note: "Worsening conditions
in an inegalitarian agrarian system with underutilised land now being redirected towards
external markets and with low employment and income, lead instead towards 'radical'
strategies of community led self-provisioning of land, continued and increased conflicts
amongst white and black elites against the poor, and increased transaction costs in the land
markets."
In Chapter 1 it was established that the LRAD programme is also a by-product of market-
based policy. Therefore, the effects of the LRAD programme could see a situation
emerging similar to that which Moyo (2000) indicates. This is the subject of the following
section.
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2.5 Agricultural restructuring and land redistribution
The White Paper on land policy (Department of Land Affairs, 1997) identified critical
areas that land reform should address:
• The past injustices of racially based land dispossession;
• The need for a more equitable distribution ofland ownership;
• The need for land reform to reduce poverty and contribute to economic growth;
• Security of tenure for all and;
• A system of land management that would support sustainable land use patterns and
rapid land release for development.
However, the approach taken to meet these objectives seems to be hindering the
participation of the poor in land reform, as described in section 2.4. In fact, international
historical evidence shows that land reform often favours those with more land or capital
(Oberai, 1988). Those who are able to take best advantage of government assistance and
agricultural credit are the capitalist farmers and not the subsistence farmers for whom the
programmes were intended (Oberai, 1988). In South Africa similar trends are occurring
whereby the beneficiaries of land redistribution schemes tend to be the better resourced
(Wegerif2004; Hall, 2004a; Hall et aI, 2003; Mapadimeng, 2003).
The World Bank assisted in the shift from the RDP focus and an emphasis on
redistribution to a GEAR emphasis on production (Karumbidza, 2002). The LRAD
programme was a result of this shift, as detailed in section 1.2.3, and concentrates on
redistributing land to previously disadvantaged black farmers for agricultural production.
This is a tactic by government to ensure that the minimum production levels are sustained
on farms. However, grants are dependent upon the borrower beneficiary providing capital.
This may be difficult for previously disadvantaged farmers, who lack savings (Lyne and
Darroch, 2001). The tendency of LRAD to benefit better resourced black individuals in
order to create a class of black commercial farmers is bound to marginalise the poor
(Davis,2001). Davis (2001) also points out that the DLA may not have the capacity or the
budget to implement an ambitious land redistribution programme.
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Although LRAD is a market-led approach, it does try to balance the effects of the market
by providing grants to beneficiaries. This may allow the poor to enter the market but it
continues to support class formation. As described earlier by Moyo (2000) in section 2.3,
class formation is often a result of market-led land reform. Leo (1984) supports the claim
that development of agriculture under capitalism involves class formation. This implies
that the South African LRAD programme could create a class of agriculturally productive
black small scale farmers. Whilst this may be seen as a positive step towards
transformation within the agricultural industry there are some cautions. There are modes
of thought that warn against agricultural production as a means of land redistribution, not
only because it perpetuates class formation but because the value of land to people with
histories and cultures based in land cannot be under estimated (Bernstein, 1997). The
economic value or viability of land is not the only currency of importance to people and
the inherent value of land should be respected (Aliber, 2003; Walker 2002). As Bernstein
(1997: 27) states, "The history of dispossession and their effects mean that issues of
restitution and redistribution of land extend beyond those of restructuring agriculture and
that land and farming should not be conflated".
The LRAD programme is associated with agricultural restructuring rather than a means of
land redistribution. Creation of a farming elite under the auspices of land redistribution is
contrary to the objectives ofland reform. And although LRAD has the potential to achieve
some level of sustainability for individual projects it is unlikely that LRAD will have a
significant impact on delivery ofthe land redistribution objectives (Mapadimeng, 2003).
2.5.1 Commercial agricultural decline
Land reform is rooted firmly in agriculture. LRAD is specifically geared to promote
agricultural production of redistributed land. However, experience from Asia, Africa and
Latin America has shown that land reform has made little impact on enhancing agricultural
production. Land reform programmes are often in response to political pressure rather than
part of a long term rural development strategy. Therefore, commitment to them wanes as
political prerogatives change (Deininger, 2003).
Historically, commercial agriculture has been the mainstay of rural life. Studies have
shown that agriculture has a positive impact on the rural poor. This is because agriculture
33
typically employs a large number of people and therefore even small growth in agriculture
will have a positive impact on employment and rural incomes (Wegerif, 2004). In South
Africa, agriculture and associated activities are contributing progressively less to the GDP
of South Africa. The liberalisation of markets in South Africa, loss of agricultural
subsidies and a highly competitive global market has seen the contribution that agriculture
makes to the South African GDP diminish substantially as other sectors become dominant
in the economy (Bemstein, 2005). For example, the growing tourism sector contributed
7.1% to the GDP in 200514 (Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa, 2005) compared to
agriculture's GDP contribution of 4.5% in 2004 (Department of Agriculture, 2004). As a
result farmland continues to be converted for other land uses as agriculture becomes less
profitable (Hall, 2004b). And although there has been some redistribution of farmland to
black farmers, especially in the timber and sugar industries, the agricultural sector is not
growing fast enough to accommodate emerging black farmers to participate in commercial
agriculture (Bemstein, 2005).
The shift in commercial agriculture toward more advanced agricultural technologies also
poses a problem for emerging local farmers. Biotechnology is firmly rooted in
globalisation and provides efficient and cost effective means for agricultural production.
However, the initial costs involved in biotechnology for agriculture excludes emerging
farmers from participating in this emerging market (Buseh, 1997).
Another factor that has not been given enough consideration by the land reform debate is
agricultural disinterest. The notion that black people want land for agricultural purposes
has been found erroneous by a Centre for Development Enterprise study (Bemstein, 2005).
Aliber (2003) confirms this indicating that in 2000 a survey showed that only 1.3% of
South African respondents mentioned land as a priority. In fact, most black people want
jobs and housing in urban areas rather than rural land (Bemstein, 2005). The rate of
urbanisation in South Africa would support the fact that South Africa is no longer
predominantly a rural society. However, for the majority of those that remain in rural
areas land remains critical to their survival (Vorley, 2002). But there is little motivation to
farm on a commercial basis where people are increasingly urbanised and disinterested in
farming, the market is progressively agriculturally stagnant and the sustainability of current
14 Tourism contribute a total ofR53.9 billion to the GDP in 2005 (Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa , 2005).
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commercial agricultural models are intensive and questionable. This is a global
phenomenon that is creating a new space for sustainable alternatives for land use (Vorley,
2002; Walker 2002).
2.6 Sustainable livelihoods and land reform
The aim of this section is to bring into the land reform debate the concept of sustainable
livelihoods. This chapter has already introduced the vulnerability of livelihoods in South
Africa in the context of the poor delivery of land reform, continued tenure insecurity and
poverty. The argument here is that ideally land reform in South Africa should promote
sustainable livelihoods.
The concept of sustainable livelihoods is important for rural development and poverty
alleviation (Scoones, 1998). The FAO (2002) noted that livelihoods approaches are
increasingly utilised by governments and development agencies in addressing food
insecurity and poverty. The UK Department for International Development (1999: 1)
defines a sustainable livelihood as: "A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets
(including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means ofliving.
A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future while not
undermining the natural resource base."
Land redistribution provides a basis from which sustainable livelihoods can be launched.
However, the redistribution of assets, including land, to the poor is important but it is not
instrumental in reducing poverty and inequality unless there is appropriate policy to
provide opportunity for asset building (May, 2000). This is where the Sustainable
Livelihood Approach can assist.
The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach is a way of thinking about the objectives, scope and
priorities for development, in order to address poverty (Ashley and Carney, 1999). The
essence of the approach is putting people at the centre of development, through
investigating people's lives, thereby increasing the effectiveness of development assistance
(Department for International Development (DFID), 1999). The approach also considers
that people have multiple livelihood strategies, which are dynamic, that are part of the
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complex environment in which people live (Scoones, 1998). Analysis of assets (namely
human, social, financial, physical and natural) in peoples ' possession and the
vulnerabilities, factors that threaten livelihoods, people are exposed to enable the approach
to focus on what resources people have available to them (Ashley and Carney, 1999).
2.6.1 South Africa follows global trends away from sustainability
The United Nations defines a sustainable society as one which: "meets the needs of the
present without sacrificing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (UN
World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: 43). The premise behind the
concept of sustainability is the fact that the earth's resources are finite (Dobson, 2000).
South Africa much like other developing countries of India, Brazil and China is
conforming to current global trends. Globalisation, discussed in Chapter 1, is a powerful
factor dictating how economies participate in global markets. Globalisation deteriorates
the environment with its emphasis on production and development without concern for the
environment can only be short term and in the long term may increase poverty and
oppression (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994). Roberts (1995: 3) notes that, "Global society
is affecting our finite planet in three different ways:
1. By the numbers ofpeople the earth is expected to sustain.
2. By the levels of consumption of ever more materialistic societies, which harvest
renewable resources beyond their sustainable harvest rate.
3. By pollutants or byproducts, including and increasing range of synthetic products
which nature cannot decompose."
Governments often react inadequately to problems of the environment with the belief that
environmental problems can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or
patterns ofproduction or consumption. However, sustainability is much more than signing
up to a concept, it has essential financial and social connotations that cannot be ignored but
it seems that the concept of sustainability will remain peripheral until it becomes a valuable
commodity on global markets (Dobson, 2000).
In South Africa, the land reform programme has placed some emphasis on sustainability
(Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). The sustainable use of land is an
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objective of land reform (Department of Land Affairs, 1997). Land goes along way to
improving livelihoods and provides a platform to create sustainable livelihoods for the
rural poor (Wegerif, 2004). Therefore, the sustainability of land and its environment is
critical to people who live and depend on this resource for their livelihoods. As such
sustainability should be a principle of any intervention that impacts on the natural
environment. In this context, agriculture should be moving away from unsustainable, large
scale, high input farming.
Conclusion
The land reform programme was established to address inequiiable land distribution in
South Africa by entrenching land rights. The lack of progress in delivering land to the
landless has not impacted on poverty or inequality on a significant scale. The market
related approach to redistributing land is not a fair approach to address the scale of land
need and tenure security for residential, agricultural and non-agricultural activities.
Additionally the objectives of land reform are compromised if only previously
disadvantaged black farmers and not the landless majority are target beneficiaries.
The process of urbanisation is drawing people away from their homes in rural areas.
However, the majority of these people (poor people) can only afford to live in informal
settlements. People are searching for a livelihood whilst simultaneously making
themselves more vulnerable than their rural counterparts. Therefore, urbanisation is not a
sustainable long term solution to unemployment, evictions, land tenure insecurity and other
factors that contribute to rural flight. Effective land reform and income generating
activities in rural areas are therefore crucial to alleviating the population pressure on urban
centres. Presently, land reform is exacerbating problems ofurbanisation through the direct
failure of land reform to secure tenure and improve the livelihoods of the poor. Farm
evictions indicate the extent of the human rights violations still occurring on farms. This
points to current law (and the enforcement of this law) supposedly protecting farm
labourers as being incomprehensive and ineffective. Additionally, and importantly in the
context of this thesis, the farm eviction statistics show how current trends in farm evictions
have dramatically counteracted the impact of land reform.
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The establishment of PEFOL to monitor and regulate foreign land ownership is a
progressive step towards reducing land ownership inequities. But there is still a need to
regulate local ownership, especially large scale land holdings, in a similar manner if
government is truly committed to redistributing land for the benefit of the majority of rural
people. However, whether it is possible to monitor land ownership remains to be seen.
A change in approach to land reform hinges on politics. The current market-led approach
to land reform is entrenched in economics and while much has been done to assist with
creating a more racially equitable land market through Black Economic Empowerment and
other transformation policy, not enough has been done in practice to ensure that the
majority of South Africans benefit from land reform. Economic approaches tend to ignore
the rights of the landless poor and there is growing dissatisfaction with the current resource
distribution measures. The signs of dissatisfaction are there in the form of land invasions
and landless people's movements. However, until such time as there is the political will to
implement land reform on a large scale the status quo will continue.
Agriculture is an increasingly difficult business to make viable especially for emerging
farmers, like LRAD beneficiaries, entering the market. Agricultural decline and the land
reform programme's dependency on agriculture as a livelihood strategy does not bode well
for land reform beneficiaries. The low growth within the agricultural sector and the
increasing number of stakeholders, black and white farmers alike, sharing the sector may
be cause for concern. In an economy where agriculture plays an ever decreasing role it is
doubtful whether LRAD will revive and grow the agricultural sector. Therefore, land
reform policy needs to consider other strategies for land based livelihoods as multiple
strategies contribute to making livelihoods sustainable.
It has been established clearly that the land issue in South Africa is very complex. The
objectives of land reform have been manipulated for perceived market gains from which
the poor are expected to feel the ' trickle down effect' . The right to land is not enforced
and the landless poor continue to be excluded from land reform processes. The decreasing
contribution of agriculture to the formal economy and the net effect of growing agriculture
on rural livelihoods presents motivation for transferring land to the poor for agricultural
production on any scale.
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The importance of dealing with land issues in an efficient and effective way is an aspect
that the South African government has not taken seriously. In the context of LRAD this
means not only handing over land to prospective emerging farmers but enabling them to
farm the land productively. .To do this effectively requires the use of a system to monitor
and evaluate the process of land redistribution and agricultural development for the




Evaluation in land reform
The previous chapter exposed some of issues for debate on land reform. The land reform
debate is complex and requires adequate information in order for debate to be informed.
This chapter introduces evaluation as an important component of any intervention.
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems are vital for information generation on
programmes or projects and this information is used to assist with decision making and
inform debate. Additionally, this chapter strengthens justification of the research carried
out in the case study. In section 3.1, a review of literature commences to provide a
background to evaluation. In section 3.3, this review is used as the basis for analysis of
evaluation of land reform in South Africa and some of the challenges for LRAD. It is
argued that for effective land reform to occur there has to be an effective system of
evaluation in place.
3.1 A briefintroduction to evaluation
There is growing interest and usage of evaluation as a result of social interventions
becoming more popular and effective throughout the world (McEuen, 2002; Babie and
Mouton, 1998). Evaluation was first utilised by the economic sector to account for funds
spent and profit made (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994). Evaluation has developed to
become widely practiced throughout different sectors for different purposes. In the
development sector, evaluation is used to assess whether programmes and projects are
attaining their goals. Evaluation is used to assess and improve performance of an ongoing
programme or to estimate the impacts and evaluate the performance of completed projects
(Babie and Mouton, 1998, Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
Evaluation generates knowledge by understanding how programmes work and how people
change their attitudes and behaviour as a consequence of successful programmes (Babie
and Mouton, 1998). This enables for the provision of information for making decisions
about current as well as future programmes and projects (Rossi and Freeman, 1989).
Further, Sang (1995: 2) states, "Project evaluation is a study to determine worth, quality
and in general, the desirability of a project for a given purpose".
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Evaluating the outcomes or impact of development projects is critical to the progress and
improvement of projects, programmes and policy (Marsden and Oakley, 1990). Therefore,
evaluation needs to become an integral component of increasing the effectiveness" of
development work within South Africa.
3.1.1 Types of evaluation
The two main types of evaluation are quantitative and qualitative evaluation. This is dealt
with in more detail in Chapter 5 but a brief introduction is required for putting evaluation
into context. In the past, quantitative evaluations were more common but increasingly the
limitations of quantitative evaluation are being felt (Guba and Lincoln, 1989).
Traditionally, most indicators used in quantitative evaluations were focused on inputs and
outputs rather than the outcomes or results of programmes (Kumar, 1995). Quantitative
evaluation posed a problem for the social sciences as abstract concepts, issues, feelings and
ideas are impossible to quantify (Stake, 1995; Kumar, 1995; Bamberger and Valadez,
1994).
Qualitative evaluation has more use in social settings . The goal of qualitative research is to
understand the impact of interventions from the perspective of the individuals or groups
being studied (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
3.2 Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) systems: An introduction
This section is intended to introduce M&E as suggested by M&E practitioners. The idea
behind structuring the document this way is that the reader can then compare the
theoretical framework for M&E against the land reform M&E system currently utilised by
the DLA and described in section 3.3.
The World Bank (1987) cited in Bamberger and Valadez, (1994: 4) noted that "The
success rate for development projects in Africa is often less than 50%". This is as a result
of a number of reasons including:
. , A gross lack of information about projects.
• The inability ofprojects to sustain the delivery of services in the long term.
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• The extent to which projects are able to produce their intended development impacts.
• A shortage of financial and professional resources.
Thus the need for M&E in developing countries is growing. Monitoring is a process that
systematically collects data on specified indicators to provide the management and
stakeholders of a development intervention with necessary progress information. This
information is used to make decisions about the intervention. To be effective monitoring
should occur continuously. The aim of M&E is to provide constant monitoring throughout
the programme or project process building a database that provides information for
evaluation (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
M&E systems assist with the clarification of goals and objectives, identify good
programmes or practices and identify weaknesses within projects and take action to correct
them (Kusek and Rist, 2004).
Monitoring of programmes is directed at the extent to which a programme is reaching the
target population, whether or not delivery of services is consistent with programme design
specifications and what resources have been or are deployed (Rossi and Freeman, 1989).
Monitoring enables the assessment of the implementation of a programme. If an
evaluation is conducted, without monitoring information, it may reveal that a programme
has little or no impact. However, the monitoring information will determine that the cause
may have been due to poor implementation and not an ineffective programme (Bamberger
and Valadez, 1994).
For the purposes of this research, three categories of stakeholders are used:
1. International agencies (NOGs, donors, research foundations)"
2. National and sectoral agencies (government, local NOGs, consultants, project
implementation agencies)
3. Project beneficiaries
Each stakeholder group has a different interest in M&E, what should be studied, how and
what the results should show (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 1989).
15 I . I .nternationa agencies are not the focus of this research but have been included here for conceptual
understanding of the stakeholder categories.
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3.2.1 Centralised M&E systems are problematic
Governments in Africa and other developing countries tend to utilise centralised M&E
systems. This is a relatively cost effective and simple way, depending on the accessibility,
reliability and quality of current M&E information from completed and ongoing projects,
to provide governments with broad information about a programme (Bamberger and
Valadez,1994). Unfortunately, centralised M&E systems do have problems. Bamberger
and Valadez (1994) oppose the centralisation of M&E saying that it is not practical or
effective especially where M&E structures are under developed, like in most developing
countries.
Reviews generated by centralised M&E systems are often so broad, usually a national
analysis, that they cannot be utilised by project managers for the improvement of local
projects under their supervision. Additionally, the centrality of an M&E system often
results in a communication and coordination breakdown. This can result in a total collapse
of the M&E system where information is not appropriately collected, analysed or utilised
(Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
3.2.2 Moving away from the implementation focus ofM&E
Traditionally, the mam focus of M&E systems has been on monitoring project
implementation through simple quantitative measures. Less emphasis has been placed on
the operation and sustainability of programmes and whether they are producing their
intended impacts. This is often due to the fact that most government resources go into the
implementation of programmes and that M&E units are usually located in the agencies
implementing projects. Therefore, monitoring of implementation has remained the focus.
This means that M&E is relatively short term and longer term qualitative studies on
impacts are rarely performed (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994; Kusek and Rist, 2004).
M&E is more substantial than the traditional implementation focused M&E system. An
effective M&E system needs to provide feedback on actual outcomes and goals of
government interventions. Traditional implementation of M&E is compliance orientated
(i.e. Did government mobilise the inputs, do the activities and deliver expected outputs?).
However, M&E must work towards achieving the intended results, outcomes and effects of
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a programme rather than just assessing whether the programme is being executed
responsibly as responsible execution of a programme does not guarantee the success of a
particular programme or project. Traditional implementation of M&E has to be built upon
to become results orientated rather than input orientated. What emerges is a results-based
M&E system (Kusek and Rist, 2004).
3.2.3 Towards a results-based M&E system
Continuous feedback to management 'about a programme is important for progress towards
a goal. This requires a quality M&E database to easily access information and thereby
increase transparency and accountability. However, "designing and building a reporting
system that can produce information on performance of government projects, programmes
and polices requires experience, skill and real institutional capacity". (Kusek and Rist,
2004: 21).
For example, Kumar (1995) suggests that an effective results based project M&E system
includes a management information system based on target groups, beneficiary contact
monitoring to understand the response of target groups, diagnostic studies to identify
practical solutions to implementation problems and regular process and impact evaluations.
Kusek and Rist, (2004: 21) raise another issue of critical importance:
"This capacity for a results based reporting system has to include, at a minimum,
the ability to successfully construct indicators; the means to collect, aggregate, analyse and
report on the performance data in relation to the indicators and their baselines; and
managers with the skill and understanding to know what to do with the information once it
arrives. This is a long term process."
3.2.4 Context specific indicators
There has been a shift in development from a top-down, largely technically and
economically driven process to an approach where people and communities define and
take responsibility for their own progress (Kusek and Rist, 2004). Evaluation at the local
or project level has become the means by which progress can be measured by
communities. Bell and Morse (1999) emphasise the need for indicators to be set by those
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best placed to define sustainability, the beneficiaries. Most indicators are set by outsiders,
policy makers, politicians and social or natural scientists who may not be familiar with the
context or needs of the beneficiaries (Bell and Morse, 1999). Jackson (1998: 57) confirmed
this, "The (evaluation) process calls for the community to choose its key indicators itself."
Indicators are an important part of determining progress in the evaluation process.
Indicators determine when the desired outcomes have been achieved (Bell and Morse,
1999; Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
Governments, donor agents, implementing organisations, consultants and beneficiaries all
have different expectations from programmes and different objective and indicator
requirements (Garaycochea, 1990). This has implications for the setting of objectives and
indicators. At the macro or programme level, indicators have to be established at the start
of a programme and can be modified over time. Attempting to identify indicators after a
programme has run for a period of time is difficult (e.g. the Land Redistribution for
Agricultural Development programme). In contrast, at the local or project level, forming
indicators for projects cannot be generalised and are context specific (Kusek and Rist,
2004). However, even though indicators are important, Bamberger and Valadez, (1994: 9)
noted that in "only a few cases are clearly defined output and impact indicators identified."
3.2.6 Participation in evaluation
The approach one takes to evaluation is important to the initial success and sustainability
of an intervention or project (Kusek and Rist, 2004; Guba and Lincoln, 1989). As
described before, a results-based approach to evaluation is designed to address the "so
what" question and provides feedback on actual outcomes and goals of government
actions. . This approach builds onto traditional implementation focused approaches (Kusek
and Rist, 2004). However, it is vital to include participation as integral to the evaluation
process. A participative approach to evaluation is explained by Jackson and Kassam,
(1998: 3):
"Participatory evaluation is a process of self-assessment, collective knowledge
production, and cooperative action in which the stakeholders in a development intervention
participate substantively in the identification of the evaluation issues, the design of the
evaluation, the collection and analysis of data, and the action taken as a result of the
evaluation findings."
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It is widely argued that local people should evaluate their project's performance. Self-
evaluation enables the evaluation to become an inside activity done by the community or
group. Since project participants are to evaluate themselves, evaluation methodology must
take into account the level of capability the project participants (Garaycochea, 1990).
3.2.7 Pilot projects can identify problems
Many programmes identify problems as they progress . This results in programmes being
delayed, as problems are resolved, or being ineffective. However, these drawbacks could
be avoided. Part of the problem is, as Rossi and Freeman (1989: 228) point out, the lack of
piloting:
"When an innovative programme is put in place, it is generally started in a limited
number of sites and an effort is made to gauge its effectiveness. Obviously, it is foolish to
implement a new programme in hundreds of sites across the nation without some
knowledge of its impact."
Piloting is a means of evaluating a programme prior to roll out. Therefore, implementation
can be checked for problems before programme commencement. Pilot projects can also
assist in determining whether the intended objectives and impacts of the programme will
be achieved. Problems can be determined at this experimental stage and dealt with
appropriately before implementing a problematic programme on a large scale (Rossi and
Freeman, 1989).
3.2.8 Utilisation ofM&E information
Many countries around the world have M&E systems in place. However, Rist (1995)
warns that there is no guarantee that governments are utilising evaluation appropriately.
The implementation of any M&E system is dependent on political support for it from
government, stakeholder groups and individuals affected (USAID Center for Development
Information and Evaluation, 2000). Kusek and Rist (2004: 164) state that, "Building such
(M&E) systems is first and foremost a political activity with technical dimensions rather
than vice versa". Conversely, as Germaine and Rea-Dickens (1992: 8) note, "Whatever the
nature of the innovation, it should result from an evaluation of some kind". This means
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that an innovation or intervention should be informed by evaluation research and not only
political prerogatives.
Often resource limitations are blamed for the poor use of evaluation or its total absence.
Many countries face resource constraints with mixed utilisation of evaluation. Therefore,
resources are not the determining factor in the successful use of evaluation but instead it
seems that there is a poor understanding of evaluation and its potential contributions
(Kusek and Rist, 2004; Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
When an evaluation is performed the evaluator should understand the different
perspectives of stakeholders (Checkland, 1993). The information needs of the stakeholders
are important to ensure that the evaluation is focused on utilisation. .The evaluator needs to
understand how best to represent data for the utilisation of the evaluation findings by
different stakeholders (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
An important component of utilisation is accessibility. It is important that M&E
information is available for planning purposes. A commitment to producing useful
information, making this information accessible and working with the users of such
information will enhance an organisations efficiency. M&E information needs to be
accessible and useful for project managers, and increasingly for beneficiaries, and not just
donors and central government (Jackson and Kassam, 1998; Bamberger and Valadez,
1994).
In the last 15 years, the importance of evaluation to policy making and programme
assessments has grown substantially. The challenge now is making evaluation or M&E
more useful and not just a political necessity (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
3.2.9 Organisational learning
"Evaluation is essential to good management. v"
Sustained and self-reliant development depends on the strength and quality of the
organisational learning and development of implementing institutions (Bell and Morse,
1999). The utilisation of M&E information is dependent on the organisational structures
16 Gennaine and Rea-Dickens, 1992: 19
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that manage M&E. Without effective evaluation organisations cannot identify the root
causes that generate their problems (Rist, 1995). However, good management is often lost
because authoritarian systems see evaluation as a means of control (Germaine and Rea-
Dickens, 1992).
A key aspect of effective M&E is the willingness and capacity of organisations to learn.
The willingness and capacity of organisations to learn can be undermined by the culture of
an organisation. Organisations can use evaluation as a threatening means to make people
feel accountable for their work and this can place a negative emphasis on evaluation.
Often as a result there is unwillingness within the organisation to accept the consequences
of an evaluation. This discourages openness and learning as there is as much to learn from
failures as success stories (Kusek and Rist, 2004).
Organisational learning is often ignored when planning shortcuts are taken due to pressure
to start working and meeting targets. High staff turnover impacts on the effects of
organisational learning as staff leave before the impacts can be felt in the implementation
of M&E systems. This results in a loss of institutional memory and reduced organisational
learning (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
Another issue is that of expertise. However, this is hardly surprising when "no country
seems to have an M&E training strategy" (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994: 448).
Evaluation research programmes are frequently not offered at universities or M&E is
normally a component of courses on project planning and management. There is little for
those wanting to specialise in M&E (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).
The responsibility for M&E of national interventions lies with the government. The fact
that a government is not accountable to an external funder or independent organisation
means that they are the sole input on content and organisation of M&E systems
(Bamberger and Valadez, 1994). This responsibility for M&E in an environment where
organisational learning is not fostered has negative consequences for the quality and
utilisation of M&E.
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3.2.10 Developing a framework for comparing M&E systems
The checklist below summarises the main points from sections above. The framework that
emerges forms the basis for analysis ofM&E in South African land reform in section 3.3.2.
This framework is compared against the current approach to M&E of land reform in South
Africa.
A: Results based M&E systems
Implementation is crucial to the effectiveness of a project and thus implementation has to
be evaluated. However, the impact of the implementation cannot be ascertained without an
analysis of the results. Hence any M&E system should be results based ensuring that both
the process (implementation) and the impact (result) of an intervention can be explained
and understood.
B: Sustainability of interventions
An intervention is only successful if it is sustainable. Project sustainability is the delivery
of the project's "intended benefits over an extended period of time" (Bamberger and
Valadez, 1994: 185). This is dependent on:
• context specific indicators
• participation
• piloting ofprojects
• the political environment
C: Usage ofM&E information
The purpose of evaluation is to generate information that can be utilised for improving
interventions. However, this is dependent on a number of factors:
• The political will of a government to implement a M&E system
• Ensuring that the M&E information is utilised
• Centralisation of M&E systems and its impact on the quality and usage of M&E
information
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• Evaluation information contributing to organisation learning
• The evaluator's representation of different issues
3.3 M&E in land reform: a shambles
This chapter, so far, has introduced evaluation as a tool for improving and determining the
impacts of interventions . Importantly it has laid down the theoretical framework for
effective evaluation. This section looks at evaluation as used by the DLA to contrast it
with that suggested in Section 3.2. The aim of this section is to provide some insights into
the M&E system the DLA utilise and some of the shortcomings of this system and suggest
a way forward for LRAD.
.Section 3.3.1 is initiated by examining how the DLA evaluate the impact of land reform
through Quality of Life (QoL) research and the current status of QoL assessment in land
reform. Section 3.3.2 analyses this approach to M&E ofland reform using the framework
developed in 3.2.
3.3.1 Evaluation in practice
What is Quality ofLife (QoL) Research?
The DLA uses QoL research as its primary means for evaluating the impact of land reform
(May, 2004). The DLA's approach to QoL research is explained in more detail in the next
section. The focus of this section is to elaborate on what QoL research entails.
Quality of life is difficult to define and inconsistently used throughout the human sciences
(Rapley, 2003: 19). However, Rapley also indicates that quality of life can be inferred
from the health of a populace. The World Health Organisation (1997: 1) in Rapley
(Rapley, 2003: 27) believes QoL is "A state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being". However, what this means is open to interpretation and it is suggested that the
purpose of a QoL assessment is to assist service providers evaluate the performance of
their services and allow participants to have their say (Rapley, 2003).
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GDP, in the past, has often been used as a measure of quality of life, assuming the higher
the GDP the greater the quality oflife. However, Todaro (1982) found that many countries
that experienced high GDPs simultaneously had high levels ofpoverty, unemployment and
inequity. He argued that GDP and other economic indicators were insufficient for
measuring QoL. Further, Salvaris (1998) in Rap1ey (2003), explains that the GDP cannot
reveal information about the health of the community or the environment or the social
costs of what has been produced in the economy all of which are factors related to quality
of life (Rapley, 2003: 21).
Modernisation and Westernisation has also been commonly used as an indicator of QoL
(RapleY,2003). However, as Veenhoven (1996) cited by Rapley, (2003: 19) points out, it
is misleading to measure quality of life based on the degree to which characteristics of the
dominant Western society are apparent in a nation. Modernisation or Westernisation
cannot and should not mean people have a better quality of life.
The question about what constitutes a life of quality is a debate still continuing today
(Rapley, 2003). This is because quality of life, as a means of measurement, varies
depending on the value society places on life. It is submitted that QoL research, like many
current evaluation methodologies, is not unlike evaluation and M&E as described in
section 3.1 and 3.2. The nature of QoL research is participatory, results-based, and
qualitative. The subjective nature of QoL research requires that qualitative methods be
utilised. Thus QoL research is a system to assess the quality of life people may be
experiencing (Rapley, 2003).
The DLA and the Quality ofLife (QoL) Survey
This next section describes QoL research in South Africa as utilised by the DLA. This
highlights some of the problems faced by the government in implementing a M&E system
as well as some of the constraints this system poses for land reform.
The Directorate Monitoring and Evaluation is the component within the DLA responsible
for evaluating and monitoring the Land Reform Programme through the QoL Survey. The
school of Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal was contracted to
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assist with the QoL survey. This section is taken from a series of concept notes and reports
generated by the school overseen by Professor Julian May.
The first QoL survey implemented by the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate of the
Department of Land Affairs was done in 1997. Sixty-two land reform projects were
surveyed but the information collected was not sufficient to permit evaluation analysis
required by the DLA (May et al., 2000b). This resulted in the survey being revised in
1998/9 and is the same framework utilised presently.
The framework that underpins the present M&E system is based on the following five
indicators ofwell being:
1. Food security was deemed the most important determinant of well being. Food
security affects well being either directly through the cultivation of crops for household
consumption and sales or indirectly by securing tenure accessibility enabling
households to reallocate income towards food security, receive services and invest in
improved shelter and thus improving quality of life.
2. Access to services: although not the DLA's mandate, service provision was
considered central to quality of life of land reform beneficiaries.
3. Local institutions were considered indicative of the effective utilisation of land,
mobilisation and organisation for service delivery and empowerment.
4. Targeting: comparison between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households was
necessary to examine the extent of land reform benefits. A land reform beneficiary
profile was to be compared to the national October Household Survey (OHS).
5. The role of agriculture: this was deemed important with the establishment of the
LRAD programme.
(May, 2005; May, 2004)
These indicators are assessed with two instruments. A household questionnaire to
investigate the characteristics of land reform beneficiaries. And a new community/project
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questionnaire to collect information concerning the projects that have been established by
the land reform programme (May, 2005; May, 2004).
In 1999, it was decided that these instruments were to re-interview households every three
years to build up a database of land reform beneficiaries (i.e. the beneficiary profile) that
would enable for comparison and analysis of different land reform beneficiaries and
projects over a long period of time. Land reform beneficiaries would then have been
compared to a control group of similar demographic and socioeconomic status. This
would be drawn from the annual October Household Survey (OHS) that Statistics South
Africa conduct. Comparison of beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups enables for
unobservable characteristics of beneficiaries to be accounted for. This ensures that
benefits are not attributable to any other factors other than land reform (May, 2005).
However this did not happen. Only two QoL reports were produced, for 1999 and 2000,
both of questionable use. Low response rates, small samples, data capturing errors,
questionnaire ambiguities and interviewing difficulties have severely affected the data
quality. More importantly, the sample design for creating a beneficiary profile has been
compromised as repeat surveys did not take place when they should have and "no
electronic records have been kept showing the names or addresses of those interviewed in
1999 and it appears that the original questionnaires on which names would have been
recorded have been misplaced" (May, 2005: 5).
May (2005) outlined the repercussions ofthis:
• "This will mean that the changes in the quality of life of beneficiaries since receiving
land cannot be determined with any accuracy at this stage" (May, 2005: 5).
• "and links between access to land and improved quality of life can only be partly
investigated" (May, 2005: 5).
• "The impact of earlier land reform policy, in particular SLAG, will be more difficult to
establish, as will the impact of the change in policy from SLAG to LRAD" (May,
2004: 6).
53
The QoL survey restarted, from scratch, in 2005 with the collection of baseline data. The
process of assessment remains the same but re-sampling will occur every 2 years instead of
every 3 years in the period 2005 to 2009. According to May (2005), this will enable for
the land reform programme to be assessed at a provincial level and allow for assessment of
the different land reform programmes. The OHS was replaced by the General Household
Survey in 2000. However, the inadequate quality of life information and time lag has
persuaded the DLA to conduct their own control group survey (May, 2005).
3.3.2 Assessment ofM&E in land reform
The section above describes the severity of the situation of evaluation in land reform. It is
difficult to determine the extent to which the land reform programme has significantly
improved the lives of its beneficiaries or how the different land reform programmes have
contributed to this. The slow progress of land reform is indicative of the calamity of the
M&E of land reform. The South African government has not managed to learn from
international experience on land reform and as a result has encountered shortcomings in
terms of ensuring that the outcomes of land reform can be consistently and effectively
evaluated. This section uses the framework developed in 3.2.10 to assess the fundamental
M&E shortcomings of land reform in South Africa.
A: Results based M&E
In section 3.2.1, it was submitted that QoL research is results based. This is not in dispute.
However, in South Africa the failure of the QoL surveys to provide consistent and reliable
data has compromised the ability of the QoL Report to determine the impacts of land
reform. Thus present information from the QoL surveys is not a reliable reflection of the
impacts of land reform. The QoL Report is predominantly implementation orientated due
to the failure of the QoL surveys to provide information on the impact of land reform.
Since the land reform programme was made operational in 1996 there has not been a
comprehensive study on the impacts of land reform. However, there are positive prospects
that the QoL Report will, once the QoL surveys are operational again, be able to reliably
assess the impact of the land reform programme. This can determine, by consistent and
reliable analysis over a long period of time, whether the benefits of land reform
programme are improving the livelihoods of land reform beneficiaries. Unfortunately,
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what the survey cannot do is pinpoint problematic areas so that these can be addressed.
The broad national level focus of the QoL Report means it cannot assess the extent to
which the different land reform sub-programmes are impacting on beneficiaries' lives.
Evaluation specific to each programme needs to be established if M&E is to improve
different programmes or provide useful information for decision making.
B: Sustainability ofinterventions
The DLA has assigned high priority to the implementation of LRAD. However, as
described in previous sections there are not yet means for determining the project
sustainability. Below the sustainability of land reform is compared against the checklist in
the framework described in 3.2.10.
• Context specific indicators
The sustainability of any intervention is dependent on measurable objectives and
indicators. Land reform objectives are very broad in scope making them difficult to
measure. Furthermore, there are no established indicators by which to measure the
achievement of these objectives. Therefore, the QoL survey, alone, carries the heavy
burden of determining whether the land reform programme has achieved its intended
objectives. Unfortunately, the inadequacy of the QoL Reports to consistently show the
impact of land reform on the target populace has contributed to the poor performance of
land reform in general. This has also prevented review of the QoL indicators, described in
3.3.1, as effective indicators for land reform projects.
• Participation
Participation in the implementation of the land reform programme has been mixed. It is
suggested that the success or failure of an intervention is closely linked to beneficiary
involvement in the implementation of the project (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994; Tandon,
1990; Bahai International Community, 1998). Certainly, LRAD requires committed
participation from beneficiaries. This research will show some of the complexities of
participation. However, the management of programmes is still top-down in approach and
participation of beneficiaries in M&E or programmatic decision making does not occur.
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M&E has not progressed to the stage where beneficiaries are able to evaluate their own
progress.
• Piloting of projects
The land reform programme was subject to some piloting of projects initially (e.g SLAG).
However, when the political prerogatives of national government shifted, with the
introduction of GEAR, the LRAD programme went from draft policy to roll out without
the necessary piloting phases and the subsequent problems with implementing LRAD have
severely affected the performance ofthe programme.
• The political environment
Although, as established earlier, land reform may not be as much a priority as employment
and housing there is a need and demand for land reform in South Africa. Broader society
supports land reforms. The slow progress of land delivery is contributing to hostility in
rural areas, farm invasions and violence. Thus the South African Government is under
mounting pressure to deliver land for residential and productive purposes to maintain
national stability.
This analysis shows that the sustainability of the land reform programme, at this point in
time, is questionable. The QoL surveys have been unable to provide quality information
on land reform. This factor alone has compromised the sustainability of the land reform
programme. Unless M&E of land reform becomes more comprehensive and accurate, land
reform will remain relatively passive in the achievement of its objectives and the
contribution to transforming South African society.
c. Usage
The usage of M&E information is dependent on the factors indicated in A and B above.
Informed decision making is dependent on reliable quality information. In South Africa,
the lack of reliable quality information on land reform has resulted in both under utilisation
of M&E and poor decision making. This section explores some of the key issues for the
utilisation ofM&E.
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• The political will of the South African government to implement a M&E system for
land reform
The DLA does have a M&E system established. However, the extent to which it is
established is questionable. M&E does not seem to be a high priority for the government.
The multitude of problems associated with the M&E process and institutions involved
makes it more of a hinderance that government has to deal with rather than a resource
government can draw on. Therefore, government has not given M&E the attention it
requires.
• The utilisation of M&E information
Chapter 1 described some of the problems with the implementation of the land reform
programme. One of the reasons for the policy shift from SLAG to LRAD was due to the
slow implementation of land reform at that time. However, the implementation of land
reform is still slow and indicative, to a certain extent, of decisions made about the future of
land reform that have not been based on impact or results based M&E systems. Instead
policy makers and politicians have made decisions based on implementation orientated
evaluations, global economic trends and political perogatives without consultation with the
beneficiaries ofland reform.
The Land Restitution process is an example of this. In June of 1998, a Ministerial Review
of the Land Restitution process was commissioned. The findings of this review were:
• Slowness of delivery.
• A crisis of unplannability as a result of the absence of a reliable database. The basic
information necessary for planning, institutional design and resourcing in the
restitution process was wanting.
• A strong perception that there is an opposition between restitution and development.
• Low level of trust between implementers.
• High levels of frustration within the implementing organisations and among claimants.
(Roodt, 2003)
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Roodt (2003: 20) highlights that:
"Attention should be focused, not on whether or not restitution should be rights
based, but on exactly how rights are allocated by the Restitution Act, on the procedures
whereby these rights are given force, and the discourses and practices that arise in
implementation structures."
The findings from the review of the Land Restitution process identified problems with
implementation, as far back as 1998, that are still apparent in land reform processes. This
points to institutional mechanisms for using monitoring and evaluation information as
problematic. Additionally, as noted in 1998, it is not so much the approach to land reform
that is at issue but rather the implementation of land reform in practice. However, the
impact of this review on the land reform process indicates that this information was not
utilised for improving programme performance.
Land reform was reviewed again in 2001 and May et al (2000b) indicated the importance
of M&E for the land reform review process. May et al (2000b: 2) emphasised the
importance of M&E for "all policy analysis in South Africa and provides both insight in to
management and implementation processes".
Again in 2005, the land reform programme was under review due to poor performance and
subsequent political pressure to act. However, evaluation information was unable to be
useful. Firstly, because of the lack of reliable data and secondly, because the scope of
evaluation of land reform is too general.
There is good reason for government and society to be concerned with the clear slow
delivery of land to the landless. However, a call by many, including the Deputy President
at the 2005 Land Summit, for economic approaches to land reform to be replaced by
redistributive land reform or expropriation is based on a lack of appropriate information,
including a total absence of information about the performance of current land reform
products, like LRAD. What there is room for is a dualistic approach to land reform, that
seems to have been informally adopted already, where market-led reforms as well as
expropriation work in tandem to alleviate some of the bottlenecks to delivery. But
evaluation of land reform in as much detail as possible, using context specific indicators,
still needs to be prioritised.
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The reliance on the failed QoL surveys to provide results based evaluation has meant that
quality information on land reform has been unavailable. This has meant that policy
decisions on the direction of land reform have been at best informed through assessment of
implementation and at worst informed by agendas unrelated to land reform.
• Centralisation ofM&E systems
The centralisation of M&E has resulted in a broad survey, the QoL survey, that cannot
determine the extent to which land reform sub-programmes, like that of LRAD, have
contributed to land reform. This has limited the quality and usage of the QoL Report as a
resource for decision making.
• Organisational learning
A feeder for the utilisation of evaluation is that the willingness of organisations to learn.
Reorientation of development efforts through action learning need to occur to facilitate
institutional development. The past apartheid government encouraged the independence of
black homelands. This resulted in a relative lack of experience of development issues both
in theoretical debates and teaching practice. Neglect for development issues was the
outcome. Opportunities for addressing the skills gap are imperative for the future of
development in South Africa. Cross agency collaboration and the networking of
institutional development and development in general is required to make the best use of
the skills which exist. In Chapter 7, problems of collaboration between different
government departments and service providers will be examined in more detail.
Additionally, the process of conducting the research at Loteni revealed the initial fear of
the DLA in exposing themselves to public scrutiny. The culture of fear within an
organisation is not conducive to organisational learning.
There are obviously some big gaps in evaluation of land reform. One of crucial
importance and highlighted by having to start the QoL survey over again is that of
expertise. High staff turnover has contributed to this, as institutional memory is lost. The
government has much to learn with respect to land reform. However, the organisational
learning of the government has been severely limited by the lack of evaluation information
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on land reform. This has contributed considerably to the poor performance of the
programme.
• Initial conclusions (the evaluator's representation of different issues)
A centralised M&E system severely limits the ability of the evaluator, the DLA, to
represent the reality of land reform in South Africa. The QoL Report cannot adequately
represent the issues and concerns of the different stakeholders, especially those of the
beneficiaries. This would be a huge undertaking at a national level and is justification for
the decentralisation of M&E to provincial and local levels. However, this is reliant on the
competence of the DLA and the resources available to represent different realities of land
reform by different stakeholders. The result of this will determine the utility of the M&E
information.
Usage is a complex issue with many factors playing a role in determining whether M&E
information is utilised appropriately.
3.3.3 Assessment ofM&E for LRAD
It has been established that the QoL survey is too broad in scope to be able to determine
the impact of LRAD. At present the current M&E system, the QoL survey, addresses the
land reform programme as a whole. LRAD is a programme that consists of four different
project categories and therefore requires M&E that can assess each of these independently
(i.e. food safety net projects, equity schemes, production for markets and agriculture in
communal areas).
It is important to build a picture of the institutional and policy arrangements around the
M&E of LRAD and not just of land reform. The policy document of LRAD fails to
indicate the means for programme monitoring and evaluation. The LRAD policy
document describes audits as the means by which physical and financial expenditure will
be accounted for. However, there is no mention of how M&E will be used to assess the
performance of LRAD. Holism emphasises the importance of the parts (i.e. LRAD) that
make up the whole (i.e. the land reform programme) (Checkland, 1993). Therefore, M&E
at present is limited in what it can contribute to the improvement of LRAD and hence land
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reform as a whole. If there is the political will to make LRAD successful then M&E will
have to be conducted at this level.
Evaluating LRAD through Communal Property Associations (CPAs)
Most LRAD projects operate as a CPA. This section documents what the Legal Entity
Assessment Programme (LEAP) found when investigating whether CPAs were achieving
their intended objectives.
In support of the deficiencies of LRAD M&E the LEAP found that
• Many of the objectives did not have indicators or the indicators related to the CPA Act
and were not relevant at the local level.
• There were unrealistic expectations of CPAs. CPAs were expected to perform many
functions at an early stage meet the objectives of democracy and equity and exhibit
viability and sustainability.
• There was a lack of understanding in what constituted an institution. It was not just
about registering as a CPA but building the capacity to ensure practices progress
through different management designs.
• CPAs were isolated. They were not linked to other institutions of land administration
like local government unless they did this themselves. There was no support offered to
CPAs. The DLA was supposedly responsible for monitoring and supportingCPAs but
this was not done.
• The language used m the founding documents was in English and contained
complicated legal terminology which made it difficult for non-english speaking
members to understand and contained clauses that the community did not know about.
Additionally, these documents were not available on site and did not explain the key
issues of land rights management.
(Cousins and Homby, 2002)
As a result of these problems, LEAP could not make a judgement on whether these
institutions were working. This exemplifies the need for agreed, clear and appropriate




Land reform in South Africa carries the burden of being politically, economically, socially
and culturally sensitive. The success of land reform is therefore critical to the stability of
rural South.Africa. This places grrat necessity and importance on the evaluationof land
reform.vHowever, as shown in this chapter, evaluation ·of land reform has not been as
successfulbr useful as planned;resulting in uninformed"decision making and 1n~h-ective
policies. -<""Progress with landireform and its different products is dependent on a
comprehensive M&E system that can inform policy makers as well as project managers
about the direction of future decisions. The participatory and results based approach that
M&E should consider is indicative of the direction M&E and evaluation in general is
moving, towards the people.
The analysis of M&E of land reform in South Africa has been critical of its poor
performance and contribution to policy and decision making. However, the potential for
M&E is growing and, now more than ever, vital to agriculturally productive land reform.
3.4.1 Setting up the future evaluation ofLRAD
This conclusion proposes a way forward for the M&E of LRAD . This section will
augment Chapter 7 where specific reference to objective and indicator setting will be
important for showing the complexity of evaluation.
It has been shown in this chapter that the need for evaluation of land reform and LRAD is
crucial to directing implementation towards achieving the objectives of the respective
programmes. This chapter has examined evaluation broadly and looked at the short
comings of the current evaluation of land reform in South Africa. In this context the
research undertaken is important to contributing to knowledge of the benefits of an LRAD
project and land reform in general.
3.4.2 This research focuses on evaluation at two levels
The previous section emphasised that there is a need for a shift from M&E systems that are
primarily activity based or implementation focused to results based or impact focused. It is
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also crucial for the success of LRAD for M&E on at least two levels. The first is at the
government level and the second is at the beneficiary level.
LRAD at the government level
Results based M&E means that government will have to measure achievements of the land
. reform programme from impacts of the programme rather than what inputs they supply and
C"":"outputs they achieveasthis may not impact substantially on the beneficiaries or contribute
to achieving LRAD goals. However, M&E can only be conducted if there are clear
goalposts and means to measure if goals have been achieved. The LRAD policy document
".has established the objectives but lacks the indicators for M&E.
Due to the significance of LRAD politically and as an economic tool it is imperative that
LRAD is successful for the purposes of political stability and economic growth. The need
for M&E is vital to the implementation of LRAD in achieving its outcomes as no pilot
projects where run prior to commencement of the programme. This means that M&E will
have to provide recommendations for future LRAD projects learning from the mistakes of
present LRAD projects.
The need for independent assessment of LRAD is exemplified in the national QoL report.
This report cannot account for progress within LRAD projects as it focuses too broadly on
land reform in general. What is required is system that can pinpoint that a certain result
was due to the LRAD programme so that replication or improvement can occur.
For the purposes of this research, indicators have been proposed for the LRAD objectives
(see Chapter 8). The indicators are suggested as a starting point to the M&E of LRAD.
Indicators are, by nature, flexible and subject to change or adapt over time.
LRAD at the beneficiary level
This chapter has put forward that participatory evaluation is necessary for the success of
interventions. Beneficiaries need to be able to manage their resources and as such will
require a direction forward. Beneficiaries should establish their own objectives and
indicators to use as a M&E framework by which they can evaluate their progress.
I
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This type of evaluation promotes beneficiary ownership of the project. The success of
LRAD projects is primarily in the hands of the beneficiaries themselves and evaluation is a
tool that can be used to assist in the process. The knowledge created by citizens and
professionals together can make interventions sustainable in the long term.
The research at Loteni looks into the establishment of-a locally managed participatory
M&E system. This is presented and discussed in Chapter 7;
3.4.3 LRAD and evaluation
The problems of centralised M&E systems have been highlighted in section 3.1.2.
Bamberger and Valadez (1994) suggest that M&E units should be created within each
project. However, this requires great institutional capacity and resource allocation by
government. Therefore, capacitating beneficiaries to establish an M&E system may be an
alternative to reliance on current centralised M&E practices. The project level M&E can
then contribute to the centralised M&E system.
The focus of this research is on how to make LRAD more effective. A number of
activities are proposed as a start:
1. Develop measurable indicators for the LRAD objectives so that M&E of the
programme can commence and yield useful results for the improvement of programme
delivery/implementation.
2. Develop objectives and indicators, with LRAD beneficiaries, through a process of
empowerment and participatory workshops so that they can M&E their progress
towards their own vision for their land.
3. Through the process of 1 & 2 identify strengths and weaknesses of LRAD and provide
some recommendations for government to improve implementation.
4. Continue to contribute baseline data to the M&E database of the LRAD programme so
that comparisons over time of the beneficiaries can occur to determine whether the
programme is having a positive effect.
The findings from conducting the above activities are reported and discussed in Chapter?
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Chapter 4:
The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) Programme: Room
for improvement?
The poor performance of the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) programme,
described in Chapter 1, was instrumental in the Government of South Africa establishing a
new land redistribution programme. Essentially, land redistribution during 1995-1999
under SLAG was too slow, the land that was redistributed was agriculturally poor, and the
necessary structures were not in place to support beneficiary communities in creating
viable enterprises.
GEAR macroeconomic policy, largely a policy politically and economically motivated to
follow global trends, created the context in which the LRAD programme emerged. The
focus on emergent commercial farmers from historically disadvantaged communities is
indicative of GEAR's influence in making land productive rather than its distribution
equitable (Mapadimeng, 2003).
The LRAD programme is designed to do more than just redistribute land. It is a process
incorporating capacity building, improved services and infrastructure to establish viable
farming ventures. This chapter highlights some of the problems with LRAD policy.
4.1 The policy
The LRAD policy was initiated in August 2001 (Schmitz, 2001). According to the
Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs (2000: 2) the objectives of LRAD, which are to
be achieved in the 15 years from 2000, are to:
• "Increase access to agricultural land by black people (Africans, Coloureds and Indians)
and to contribute to the redistribution of approximately 30% of the country's
commercial agricultural land (i.e. formerly' white commercial farmland') over the
duration of the programme.
• Contribute to relieving the congestion in over crowded former homeland areas
• Improve nutrition and incomes of the rural poor who want to farm on any scale
• Overcome the legacy ofpast racial and gender discrimination in ownership of farmland
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• Facilitate structural change over the long term by assisting black people who want to
establish small and medium sized farms
• Stimulate growth from agriculture
• Create stronger linkages between farm and off-farm income generating activities
• Expand opportunities for promising young people who stay in rural areas
• Empower beneficiaries to improve their economic and social well-being
• Enable those presently accessing agricultural land in communal areas to make better
productive use of their land
• Promote environmental sustainability ofland and other natural resources."
Despite attempts to define objectives it is apparent that the objectives of LRAD are vague
and have no means for assessment (i.e. no indicators). The policy does not indicate how
much LRAD is expected to contribute to the target of redistributing 30% of the country's
commercial agricultural land. Wegerif (2004) points out another issue for clarity: that is,
there is confusion over whether LRAD is to redistribute 30% of all agricultural land or just
30% offonnerly white commercial farmland (Wegerif, 2004).
Under the auspices of the LRAD programme there are four different categories of LRAD
projects. These are summarised below:
• Food safety net projects enable LRAD beneficiaries to acquire land for crop and
livestock production to improve household food security.
• Equity schemes allow LRAD beneficiaries to access a grant that will enable them to
buy into existing agricultural enterprise. The grant recipient will be a eo-owner and an
employee of the farm,
• Production for markets is a commercial agriculture activity. These LRAD
beneficiaries will use their financial and technical resources to produce for markets,
over and above what they require for subsistence needs.
• Agriculture in communal areas projects assist communities, and individuals part of
communities, in making productive investments in their communal land to enhance
production and food security.
(Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000)
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Clearly, LRAD is intended to supply land for a range of categories of projects including
subsistence through food safety net projects. However, according to Wegerif (2004), who
conducted extensive case study research into LRAD projects in Limpopo Province in 2004,
ascertained that land acquired through LRAD is ultimately not for subsistence but for
commercial agricultural enterprises and this is the trend in South Africa at large.
When the LRAD policy document came out in 2001 there were concerns about the
programme needing to transfer assets relevant to agricultural production and this would
mean working with other stakeholders (Schmitz, 2001). However, only the DoA is
referred to in the policy document. In fact, between August 2001 and December 2002, the
Land Bank was involved in eo-financing LRAD projects with the DLA. This proved
successful as LRAD projects routed through the Land Bank generally moved quickly to
completion. However, the Land Bank was a victim of it own success as the budget
allocation from the DLA was spent quickly and resulted in a strained relationship between
the DLA and the Land Bank and the subsequent termination of agency agreement between
the two institutions (HSRC, 2003). In can be argued that the poor coordination and
collaboration between institutions is a direct indication ofunclear policy.
The LRAD policy document also indicates that LRAD is important for redressing gender
imbalances in land access and ownership, citing that "not less that one third of the
transferred land resources should be accrued to women" (Ministry for Agriculture and
Land Affairs, 2000: 3). However, the policy then states that: "Group production projects
will be discouraged" (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000: 3). This is difficult
to avoid, particularly where beneficiaries have grouped together to acquire the land.
Additionally, as pointed out by Wegerif (2004), women tend to be included in group
projects and not individual LRAD projects. Therefore, LRAD is contradicting itself by
discouraging group production projects in which women are more likely to participate.
However, the concern government has about group projects is not unfounded. In an earlier
assessment of land reform projects, Deininger and May (2000) found that smaller projects
(less than 10 households) were more successful than larger projects. This was confirmed
by the HSRC report which indicated that group farming projects tend to fair poorly in
comparison with family farm type projects, and although cooperative farming under SLAG
tended to fail this model still appears popular with beneficiaries (HSRC, 2003). It was also
found that the management structures ofunsuccessful projects consisted mainly of trusts or
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common property associations (Deininger and May, 2000). This has implications for the
tenure security of LRAD projects since LRAD favours groups formed as common property
associations.
The LRAD policy document clarifies that it is the responsibility of the DoA to provide
agricultural support services to LRAD projects (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs,
2000). However, the support from the DoA has been deteriorating since inception of the
land redistribution programme (Aliber, 2003) which is problematic because the DoA's
failure to provide extension compounds problems ofLRAD projects.
4.2 LRAD grants
The LRAD programme is a grant based mechanism that enables beneficiaries to provide
capital for purchasing land. To receive a R20000 grant a beneficiary must contribute
R5000 up to a maximum contribution of RI 00000 for a R400000 grant. The minimum
contribution ofR5000 can be contributed in the form of sweat equity (i.e. their own labour)
but any contribution greater than R5000 must be provided in cash or loans (Ministry for
Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000).
Group applications have to register as a legal entity, usually a common property
association, to own the land. This enables the beneficiaries to combine their grants in
order to finance the land and enterprise acquisition. Any further finance would have to be
arranged through loans or other government programmes (Wegerif, 2004).
Generally, the larger the grant the more commercially orientated the project. Projects
where beneficiaries access the minimum grant of R20000 are deemed Food Safety Net
Projects (HSRC, 2003). However, according to Cousins (2000) this should not prohibit
LRAD beneficiaries from scaling up their farming operations. In fact, the LRAD policy
document indicates that the approval of an LRAD grant is based on the profitability of the
project (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). This indicates that projects are
expected to advance towards financial viability and food safety net projects will not be
approved unless they intend to become profitable.
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There have been indications that LRAD applicants are not always able to identify land on
the market that suits their needs. The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, Act 70 of
1970, allows for the subdivision of agricultural land so that potential LRAD beneficiaries
can afford to purchase the smaller parcels of land with their LRAD grant (HSRC, 2003).
However, the time and resources taken to process applications for subdivision is restricting
the implementation ofLRAD (Lyne and Darroch, 2002).
4.3 LRAD application
The LRAD Policy document determines that the national departments of Agriculture and
Land Affairs are jointly responsible for the design of LRAD, policy issues and the design
of training programmes. The national DLA is responsible for budgeting for provision of
LRAD grants whilst the provincial DoA is expected to budget for post settlement support
for LRAD projects. The Provincial Grant Committee (PGC) is the body set up to approve
LRAD projects and is made up of various stakeholders including the departments of
Agriculture and Land Affairs (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). The
HSRC indicates that the LRAD project cycle is simpler than the SLAG programme as it
does not require ministerial approval. Instead, the PGC approves the project for
authorisation by the Provincial Director of the DLA (HSRC, 2003).
The DLA oversees LRAD processes up until the transfer of land to the beneficiaries
(Wegerif, 2004). This involves assisting potential beneficiaries with LRAD applications.
An LRAD application is complicated and often design agents are appointed to assist
beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are expected to:
• provide detail on the size of the grant they would prefer;
• identify the land they wish to purchase;
• provide a business plan on their intention for land use;
• obtain an endorsement from the local DoA office regarding the feasibility of the plan;
and
• confirmation from a professional valuer that the land price is reasonable.
(Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000)
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They also need:
• A provisional agreement of sale;
• Proof from the Restitution commission or DLA that the property is free of claims.
• Confirmation of the sellers legal possession of the land.
(HSRC, 2003)
This information is submitted to the PGC for approval or rejection. A number of reasons
could result in rejection. These include:
• Poor land quality;
• Disapproval of the land use intended;
• A high asking price for the land or;
• The applicants have already obtained land grants (Wegerif, 2004).
In practice, there is much variability in the sequence and content of the steps (HSRC,
2003). The variability between the LRAD policy and LRAD application is problematic
because this enables for manipulation and abuse of the LRAD programme which has
resulted in the poor performance ofLRAD projects.
4.4 Scale of benefit of LRAD
There was enormous positivity about LRAD when it emerged in 2001. It was well
positioned to impact on the access of rural communities to an essential productive
resource, land (Schmitz, 2001). Unfortunately, LRAD has some fundamental weaknesses
that contradict land redistribution objectives .
Aliber (2003) indicates that LRAD maintains the willing buyer / willing seller principle
which is objectionable to the landless precisely because the landless have to buy back their
own land. The LRAD programme has also been shown to perpetuate the concentration of
land in the hands of those with financial and political power (Greenberg, 2004; Wegerif,
2004; Hall, 2004a; Walker, 2002). Chapter 2 has already gone into detail about the class
formation that LRAD creates through the favouring ofbetter resourced individuals . Poorly
resourced individuals and groups will continue to be excluded by LRAD for a number of
reasons, including language and knowledge barriers, the lack of access to finance and the
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approval of projects only if they are perceived to be financially viable (HSRC, 2003;
Wegerif, 2004; Aliber, 2003).
LRAD can benefit only a limited number of people can accommodate only about 1700 to
2000 households per year, which is insufficient given LRAD's target. If LRAD managed
to reach its target of redistributing 30% of agricultural land this would only benefit a
maximum of 300,000 households. In 2003, rural landlessness was estimated at about
675,000 households and rural unemployment affected at least 3.2 million black people.
Therefore it is questionable whether this would satisfy the land demand of the majority of
South Africans (Aliber, 2003; HSRC, 2003; Thwala, 2003).
Cousins (2000) takes the limited benefit of LRAD further to note that the redistribution of
state land to emerging farmers exclusively is robbing the poor of a key resource. His
estimate of the number of potential emerging farmers ranges between 20000-30000. This
is far lower that that indicated above and represents about 2% of those in need of land.
However, an important point that Cousins makes is that funding allocation for LRAD
should be proportional to the number of those to benefit. Therefore, based on his estimate,
allocation of funds larger than 10% of the land redistribution budget would not be justified
ifthe primary goal is to address poverty and inequality (Cousins, 2000).
Post-transfer production and benefits are also questionable. The settlement of large
populations (twenty or more families) on land makes the viable production of land
difficult. Paterson (2006), an independent agricultural consultant, emphasised that already
established commercial farmers with 2000 cattle and extensive lands were not making
much profit. Where about R400000 of cattle are stolen annually farmers can expect
returns of only 2-3% ( Paterson, 2006).
Clearly, LRAD objectives are not being achieved (Hall et al., 2003). To reach the target of
2014 the delivery rate will have to rocket to 2.2 million hectares per year (Hall et al, 2003).
However, by 2005, the land reform programme had only delivered 3.1 million hectares of
land in total. Additionally, LRAD was 40% below its projected target number of hectares
to transfer even though 101 % of the LRAD budget was spent. (Department of Land
Affairs, 2005) This points to a lack of finance available for LRAD transactions.
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Table 1 below shows the performance of LRAD during the period 1 April 2004 - 31
March 2005. The limited number of beneficiaries reduces the possibility of LRAD
achieving its objectives and contributing to broader land reform objectives ofrectifying the
injustices of the past regarding skewed land ownership patterns (Aliber, 2003).
Table 1: LRAD perfonnance for period 1 April 2004 - 31 March 2005




Number of farms 372 328
transferred
Number ofbeneficiaries 8418 5109
Number ofhectares (ha) 120128 ha 72687 ha
(Department of Land Affairs, 2005: 64)
Additionally, there have been cases where LRAD projects have had to be taken over by
private agricultural companies. For example, the Mamahlola Project and the Sapekoe Tea
Plantation outside Tzaneenhas been taken away by the Minister for Agriculture and Land
Affairs in Limpopo Province from the CPA (consisting of LRAD beneficiaries) due to
mismanagement. A private agricultural company is now running this R43 million farm
(SABC, 2006). . The DoA has responded to the shortcomings of the LRAD programme
with an agricultural extension support programme, this is the subject of the following
section.
4.5 Comprehensive Agriculture Support Programme: The DoA's response to
agricultural development
"The Department of Agriculture should redirect its budget and redeploy staff to create a special programme .
to assist land reform beneficiaries.v'"
The LRAD programme was established to redistribute land specifically for agricultural
purposes. However, the LRAD policy document only provided details on the land
17 South African Government: Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000: 10
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redistribution of land without providing any detail on post-transfer agricultural
development other than designating responsibility for extension support to the DoA
(Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000).
Wegerif(2004) indicates that the Provincial Department of Agriculture (PDA) provision of
post-transfer assistance includes business planning, on-farm development and technical
assistance. However, by 2003, most LRAD projects in Limpopo Province had not received
this support (Wegerif2004).
The gross absence of a strategy for agricultural development within the framework of the
2000 LRAD policy document and the poor delivery of extension support since 1994 has
resulted in LRAD having a limited impact on agricultural development (Hall et al, 2003).
The DoA confirms that the LRAD programme failed to provide adequate financial support
for the agricultural development aspect ofLRAD. In fact, the delivery of land through the
land reform programme far exceeds the availability of agricultural services to land reform
beneficiaries (Department of Agriculture, 2004).
In August 2004, in response to the lack of clear policy on post-transfer support for LRAD
and the growing demand for the agricultural support in a deregulated agricultural
environment, the DoA introduced the Comprehensive Agriculture Support Programme
(CASP) to assist with addressing agricultural development (Hall, 2004a).
R750 million , to be dispensed over a three year period, has been earmarked for CASP
(Hall, 2004a). The aim of CASP is to enhance the provision of support services to promote
and facilitate agricultural development targeting the beneficiaries of land and agrarian
reform.
The Department of Agriculture (2004) has identified six areas of support that CASP
addresses in terms ofproviding agricultural extension support:
1. Information and knowledge management
2. Technical and advisory assistance, and regulatory services
3. Training and capacity building
4. Marketing and business development
5. On-farm and off-farm infrastructure and production inputs
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6. Financial assistance
However, it is unclear how these aspects of support will impact on LRAD projects as
CASP is not specific to LRAD and feeds at least four different programmes (of which
LRAD in only one). CASP identifies four categories of client: the hungry and vulnerable,
subsistence and household food producers, farmers (including LRAD farmers) and
commercial agriculture (Department of Agriculture, 2004) which are not necessarily
aligned with the LRAD programme's categories of project.
4.6 Agricultural support services
LRAD is a unique component of the land reform programme in that it focuses on creating
viable farming operations. However, this is huge challenge, as found by Mamphololo and
Botha (2004) because LRAD beneficiaries lack information for making decisions.
Ranchod (2004: 74) explains that "human capital is one of the most consistent and
economically important predictors of farm efficiency." The legacy of apartheid has left a
severe shortage of agricultural skills in black communities and especially former homeland
areas (Ranchod, 2004). Therefore, the supply of agricultural support services to emerging
farmers is critical to successful LRAD projects . The DoA has set up a dedicated support
service called the Agricultural Development Support Services (ADSS) that deals with
accessing funds for LRAD projects so that inputs and other extension support can be
obtained by emerging farmers (Lonsdale, 2005, pers comm.*).
A workshop held in Pietermaritzburg (November 2005) revealed a number of problems
with extension relevant to this thesis. Firstly, there is a severe shortage of competent
extension personnel. Secondly, there is little contact between extension personnel and
target communities. Thirdly, there is insufficient information on veld and natural resource
management and especially on communal rangelands (Morris, 2005). Finally, the training
of emerging farmers has not been very successful. The lack of transport to training
workshops and the commencement of training only late after projects have been initiated
has contributed to this (van der Westhuizen, 2005). And although mentorship has been
recommended as a means of exchanging knowledge and showing farmers directly on farm
• Lonsdale, J. Project Manager, ADSS, Cedara .
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processes this has only been implemented on a small scale with varying degrees of success
(Terblanche, 2003).
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that there is room for improvement of the LRAD programme.
LRAD policy formulation has been conceptualised poorly. The process for graduating
LRAD projects remains unclear. CASP categories of client are not aligned with the
categories of project stipulated in LRAD policy. Theoretically, LRAD farmers could fall
into all four of the CASP categories of client and has implications for the type of extension
support provided to LRAD farmers. The non-alignment of land redistribution and
agricultural policies and programmes may be indicative of the coordination and
cooperation problems between the DoA and the DLA.
The role of extension support remains vital to LRAD. However, evidence from Limpopo
Province suggests that extension support available is inadequate. Additionally, the
favouring of large groups of LRAD beneficiaries may not be conducive to successful
agricultural projects.
LRAD remains exclusionary, only enabling those with the relevant resources to participate.
The LRAD programme does not address the land need of the majority of previously
disadvantaged communities. Instead it intends to establish emerging black farmers that
will contribute to the economic growth of the agricultural sector. However, the
achievements of LRAD so far have not been impressive and it remains doubtful that the
objectives of land reform will be attained through LRAD. Also, security of tenure for
LRAD beneficiaries is not guaranteed, as it seems that government has the authority to
confiscate LRAD projects that are not performing. It can only be hoped that with the post-





The previous chapters have shown the complexity of land reform and that the monitoring
and evaluation of land reform remains difficult. M&E of land reform in South Africa
remains predominantly implementation focused. This research aims to explore the
dimensions of an LRAD project in order to provide recommendations for enhancing the
LRAD programme. Therefore, an approach suited to exploration is required. The
approach is discussed below and locates the research in the constructivist paradigm
although drawing on both quantitative and qualitative research methods.
This chapter has three objectives. Firstly, a review of different research approaches.
Secondly, a research design informed by the research approach. Thirdly, explanation of
the methods utilised by the research.
5.2 Research approach
Adams (2003) clarifies that methodology means more than the application of the methods.
Methodology indicates the philosophical approach behind the methods. Adams (2003)
goes on to say that there is nothing absolute about science as scientific perspectives are all
human constructions. Importantly, Adams (2003) indicates that it is the role of the
researcher to interpret the reality through methods that can provide insight into this reality.
Determining how to approach social research is often difficult because of the complexity
of issues involved. A review of the philosophical approaches or paradigms that will
inform the research approach is undertaken below.
5.2.1 Positivist paradigm
Positivism verifies claims through empirical and observational means only. The positivist
paradigm has difficulty explaining uncontrolled, complex contexts (Guba and Lincoln,
1989). Essentially, the positivist paradigm is used for measuring, describing and judging
and therefore is limited when applied to the social sciences (Bharadwaj, 1996).
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Social research avoids using of the positivist paradigm for a number of reasons. Firstly,
linear science does not cater for alternative ways to think about a particular situation (Guba
and Lincoln, 1989). The fact that differences in opinion between stakeholders cannot be
accounted for shows that the positivist paradigm is incompetent when dealing with
qualitative data. Also, science makes factual claims based on statistical methods; this is
often inappropriate as speculation is an important component of building research
(Bharadwaj, 1996). Secondly, the over-dependence on science and its formal quantitative
measurements for hard data in an unpredictable environment results in biased or left out
material (Checkland, 1993). Guba and Lincoln (1989) state that nature cannot be predicted
whereas science maintains certainty. Experimentation using scientific method makes
science's claims certain under the conditions set. However, the argument is whether this
certainty is valid in an unpredictable, dynamic and complex world (Checkland, 1993).
Thirdly, the positivist paradigm traditionally keeps the researcher or observer outside of
the situation. Social sciences are intrinsically different from the natural sciences where the
observer is concerned. Observations may be attributed different meanings depending on
the individual doing the observation. This subjectivity forms the core of social research
recognising that an error in the eyes of one individual may be seen as success by another
(Checkland, 1993). As a result, positivist approaches to research, although popular in the
past, have become increasingly redundant where complexity is integral to the research as in
the case of the Loteni site (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Stake, 1995).
5.2.2 Constructivist paradigm
Constructivism is a holistic approach that has developed an interactive process that
includes the researcher and stakeholders in constructing the realities of the case.
Historically, research has ignored other actors in the situation and their values and
constructions. The constructivist paradigm enables stakeholders affected by the research to
table their claims, concerns and issues (Stake, 1995).
Constructivism, also known as social constructionism or phenomenology, recognises that
knowledge, rather than being discovered, is constructed (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). This
explains how people experience and describe the world in which they live. Thoughts,
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descriptions and interpretations of the world are socially constructed (Slife and Williams,
1995).
Constructivist research IS determined by involving stakeholders in negotiations.
Constructions of reality are developed by the stakeholders. These constructions, i.e.
qualitative data, are used for the research rather than quantitative data. Constructivist,
methodology rejects the idea of an objective reality but rather emphasizes that realities are
social constructions (Guba and Lincoln, 1989).
Having discussed the philosophical perspectives of research it is now necessary to outline
wherein the current research is located.
Positivism and constructivism represent two opposite ends of a continuum, as shown in
Table 2. A preference for the positivist paradigm is unlikely in this research as perceptions
of individuals and other social phenomena do not fit within the positivist tradition (Adams,
2003). Preference for the constructivist end of the continuum provides opportunity to
represent reality from the stakeholders perspective. Constructivism is also open to the
utilisation of a range of methods, even those informed by the positivist paradigm. The
point here is to provide a representative reality and constructivism itself is a construction of
the mind presented to enable exploration of a social constructed reality.
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h" IhilfTable 2: Continuum extremes 0 comnetinz DJ OSODI ica nersnectives
Characteristics of positivism Characteristics of social
constructivism
Ontological • External and independent of the • Reality is socially constructed and
position: the nature observer apprehendable in multiple forms
of reality • Objective and ordered • Interpretive: socially and
• Single reality experientially based
• Belief in laws , uniformity and • Changing realities
generalisability of knowledge • A product ofhuman minds and
• Reductionist and deterministic has no independent status of its
own, reality is determined by
meanings individuals give to
experience
Epistemological • Value free acquisition of sense • There is no neutral ground for
position: acquiring data accessible by the scientific knowledge since all observation is
knowledge of reality process which is the only reliable value laden
foundation for knowledge • Observer becomes part ofwhat is
• Neutrality observed
• Dualism: researcher remains • Getting close to the subject
objective and exterior to the • Adopting a holistic view of social
subject phenomena
• Reduction of the natural world • View social phenomena in their
• Nomothetic (law giving) natural environments
generalisations • Idiographic (relating to
• Direct experience individuals) generalisations
• Sense data
• Empirical verification
Aim of the research • Suited to the study of "It" beings • Suited to the study of human
to generate causal and fundamental beings
laws to human behaviour • Those metaphysical things that
• Explanation, prediction, control posit ivism discounts or cannot




Attitude of the • Detached, independent, impartial • Involved, interacts with the
researcher subject in order to gain
understanding of the phenomenon
Methods • Natural sciences methods • Multiple methods to establish
• Measuring operationalised different views of the same
concepts phenomena
• Use of large samples • Small samples investigated in
• Manipulation and control of depth over time
isolated variables for the • Social constructions can be
measurement of their relationships elicited and refined through
with others interaction between the researcher





Quantitative research is utilised in the pure sciences where explanation for certain
phenomena and control of these phenomena are sought (Stake, 1995). Quantitative
research is strongly linked to the positivist paradigm.
Qualitative research is associated with a constructivist paradigm (Go1afshani, 2003). It is
an alternative to the traditional form of quantitative scientific method and focuses on
personal interpretation. Qualitative studies draw out patterns and relationships even if they
are not expected. Here the data is gained experientially rather than by a procedure or an
operation. The methodical observation and careful instrumentation in controlled
environments of quantitative research is replaced by qualitative researchers making direct
subjective interpretations of data (Stake, 1995). Qualitative research is derived from
paradigms that try to capture reality and produce descriptive data that describe interactions
in the social world (Stake, 1995; Kitchin & Tate, 2000).
Qualitative research, used in social research, looks for understanding complex relationships
in context specific settings (Go1afshani, 2003). As far back as 1971, von Wright (in Stake
1995) argued that there is a difference between explanation and understanding, even if
understanding is sometimes expressed by explanation (Stake, 1995). The difference is that
explanation (quantitative research) is seeking to identify cause-and-effect relationships,
whilst understanding (qualitative research) is assessing human experience (Slife and
Williams, 1995).
Given the desired information (explanation) and process (understanding and
empowerment) outcomes of the research, both quantitative and qualitative research
methods offer opportunities for exploration. This research utilises predominantly
qualitative but also quantitative methods to provide explanation and understanding of the
situation under study.
This study is a critical examination of the implementation of LRAD at Loteni up to the end
of 2005. The overarching question addressed by this study is: How can the LRAD
programme be enhanced?
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In order to assist with examining the primary research question, the study was designed to
explore the following sub-questions:
• Is LRAD achieving its objectives?
• How does LRAD contribute to land reform objectives?
• Can market based land reform achieve the objectives ofland reform in South Africa?
• How is the achievement of land reform objectives measured?
The complex and dynamic nature of the situation being research required a variety of
methods to reveal the level, quantity and quality of detail needed to ensure an accurate and
realistic analysis of LRAD at Loteni. This research represents a construction of the
realities posed by the different stakeholders from which the researcher makes
. . 18
interpretations.
5.3.1 Choice of research site
In 2003, when this research was initiated on the LRAD programme there were only a few
projects in KwaZulu-Natal sufficiently advanced in the process to warrant investigation. At
that time, the DLA identified Loteni and Equeefa Projects as having been transferred to the
beneficiaries. Most of the other LRAD projects in KwaZulu-Natal were still waiting for
approval. Permission was applied for in order to conduct research into these projects as
required by the DLA. After a six month application process, the DLA granted permission
for research to be conducted into the LRAD project at Loteni. However, permission to
conduct research at Equeefa was refused. This was primarily because it was a Tongaat
Hulett operation and the management reasoned that they did not have the capacity to assist
with academic research.
The LRAD project at Loteni, known as the Sibonginhlanhla Project, consists of 15
beneficiaries already living in the area. Field research commenced in June 2004 as a result
of the application process for permission. A more detailed description of the research site
is provided in Chapter 6.
18 The term ' stakeholder' is specifically defined in this thesis as those parties with a stake in the
Sibonginhlanhla Project (e.g. DLA). Whereas the term 'role player ' is more inclusively used to reflect
parties that were or are involved in the Sibongihlanhla Project, including stakeholder parties .
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Drawing generalisations from a single case study is difficult. However, literature shows
that where the research approach supports exploratory and indicative studies, insights for
academics and practitioners prove useful (Adams, 2003). Therefore, it is also important
that multi-dimensional approaches to context specific research consider issues of validity
and reliability (Golafshani, 2003).
The term reliability is a concept used in quantitative research. Reliability in quantitative
research is concerned with consistency of results obtained in broad-based research which is
only valid for the positivist paradigm (Adams, 2003). Interpretive approaches utilise
alternative terminology. Instead, trustworthiness of the research is vital to reliability of
qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003). Validation in qualitative research is determined by
confidence in the findings accepting that rigor, in the context of qualitative research, is
exploring subjectivity and social interactions (Adams, 2003; Golafshani, 2003).
5.4 Methods of information collection
Information gathering was performed using the following methods.
5.4.1 Secondary data
Documents from the DLA and DoA were obtained regarding the LRAD programme and
the Loteni Sibonginhlanhla Project. This information was vital in providing some
background to the case and data for comparison purposes.
5.4.2 Semi-structured interviews (SSD with key informants
SSIs were held with key informants involved with the Sibonginhlanhla Project. This
process assisted in confirming information obtained from _the secondary data as well as
providing new information, perceptions, concerns and issues about the LRAD programme
and, specifically, the Sibonginhlanhla Project.
A SSI with each Sibonginhlanhla Project farmer was undertaken to obtain their perceived
issues and concerns about the Project. The structure and content of the questions posed to
all 15 of the Sibonginhlanhla Project beneficiaries was loosely informed by the sustainable
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livelihoods framework (SLF). Basic demographic and household information about the
Sibonginhlanhla Project beneficiaries was also captured through these SSIs.
SSIs were held with three key informants engaged with the Sibonginhlanhla Project
including the DLA, the DoA, and Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. These informants were
selected primarily on the basis of their involvement with and knowledge of the
Sibonginhlanhla Project. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife was also chosen as a key informant on
the strength of the regional manager for Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife being closely involved
with commercial farmers in the area. The set of questions for these SSIs was based on the
information obtained from the secondary data.
Therefore, three distinct sets of information emanated from the SSI process. The first set
of information provided insight into the issues and concerns of the Sibonginhlanhla Project
farmers. The second group of information was about the institutional arrangements and
processes of implementing LRAD at Loteni obtained from the DLA and DoA. A third set
of information was obtained from Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife providing the perspective of
established, predominantly white, commercial farmers on farming in the Loteni area and
their concerns about black emerging farmers.
5.4.3 Focus groups
The first two sets of information were the subject of focus group discussions . This process
enabled for consensus between farmers, on certain issues and concerns, to be reached and a
rich picture (see Section 6.2) to be drawn of the agreed upon concerns and issues affecting
the Sibonginhlanhla Project. Three methods of interactive data collection were used: rich
picturing, visioning and a planning matrix.
The data collected from the SSIs with the farmers was represented in the form of a rich
picture. The aim of this rich picturing exercise was to provide a visual representation of
the concerns and issues affecting the Project from the collective perspective of the farmers.
This construction of the farmers' reality is in keeping with the constructivist paradigm. A
discussion of the rich picture enabled the farmers to improve their understanding and
awareness of the Sibonginhlanhla Project and provided a basis from which they could pose
interventions for future development of the Project. This process was aimed at being
83
emancipatory in nature. Human improvement was considered important in the research
process.
Rich picturing is a tool taken from Soft Systems Methodology (SSM). SSM, informed by
the constructivist paradigm, is an approach that recognises that problems do not exist
separate from the people involved in them and appreciates the multiple viewpoints of those
participants (Checkland, 1993). This tool was used to collect a range of qualitative
information about the complex situation of the Project. Rich picturing was chosen, not
only because it combines insights into and different perspectives of a complex situation,
but also because it has the ability to engage illiterate and semi-literate people as full
participants in the process of depicting the situation. It is important to note that rich
picture only depicted the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers' perspective. This was done
intentionally to ascertain the farmers ' awareness of factors that affected them. However,
other stakeholders' perceptions have been included separately in order to ensure that a
representative reality of the LRAD project at Loteni is understood.
A visioning exercise was used to determine what the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers
wanted to achieve. A vision was described as the most ideal situation for the
Sibonginhlanhla Project to be in. Due to the literacy barrier, the farmers depicted, on a
flipchart, their vision for the Sibonginhlanhla Project.
A planning tool was introduced to the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers as a proposed
intervention. This tool was provided so that the farmers could start to plan a direction
towards obtaining their vision . The planning tool took the form of a conventional matrix
shown in Figure 1.
Fig!!re l: Planning matrix
Picture reference Date IObjective IAction Person responsible l
Start lend I I l
The rich picture and vision were used as two ends of a spectrum (shown in Figure 2, p84).
The planning matrix was intended to provide the means for achieving the vision.
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The purpose of the planning matrix was to develop objectives and appropriate action for
the achievement of the vision identified by the farmers for the Sibonginhlanhla Project.
Table 3 below shows the phases of research conducted at Loteni. In the first phase of
research, the investigation phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted at the
Sibonginhlanhla Project site. This process enabled for information about and issues
affecting the Project to be exposed. Second phase research provided the Sibonginhlanhla
Project fanners with visual representations of (1) the present situation of the Project, in the
form of a rich picture and (2) a vision of what they wanted to achieve. Finally, follow up
research allowed for a comparison ofthe Sibonginhlanhla Project over time.
Table 3· Phases ofthe research at Loteni
Investigation Conceptualisation Follow up
of issues
Date June - October 2004 November 2004 November 2005
Data Secondary data, semi- Focus group Semi-structured interviews
collection structured interviews
method and observation
Outputs Background and Rich picture, Update on the changes at







Sample Sibonginhlanhla Sibonginhlanhla Sibonginhlanhla Project
Project farmers, DoA, Project fanners farmers, Ezemvelo KZN
DLA, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, DLA, DoA, DoH,
Wildlife Indlovu district planner,
KZNSGA
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Secondary data and the three sets of information provided by the SSIs are reported in
Chapter 6. The farmers' perspective is explained through the rich picture. Further
information and extrapolation on information already set out in the rich picture is provided
by the DLA, DoA and the perception of commercial farmers in the latter part of Chapter 6.
This provides for a broader constructed representation of reality, beyond that of the
farmers' perspectives contained in the rich picture, so that comparison of these different
perceptions can occur. Analysis of the research occurs in Chapter 7. The four groups of
key informants remain the primary information resources but other information from role
players is used to enrich the data and thus the analysis. This research specifically focuses
on analysis from information obtained from the three stakeholders: the Sibonginhlanhla
Project farmers, the DLA and the DoA. Examination of the Sibonginhlanhla Project over
time (June 2004 -November 2005) enables for analysis of LRAD implementation at Loteni
and challenges posed for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. Further, the M&E activities
proposed in Section 3.4.3 are reported on and a policy analysis is performed by drawing on





6.1 The LRAD programme in KwaZulu-Natal
The LRAD programme was initiated in August 2001 and by 31 March 2003 only one
LRAD project had been processed and transferred to the respective beneficiaries in
KwaZulu-Natal (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). This project, the Sibonginhlanhla
Project situated at Loteni in the Drakensberg, is the focus of this study. Figure 3 (P87)
shows the progress of land reform in KwaZulu-Natal during the period I April 2002 to 31
March 2003 and that the only LRAD project processed was that of the Sibonginhlanhla
Project: Moshesh/Coombe (Department of Land Affairs, 2003).
By March 2005, the LRAD programme in KwaZulu-Natal had improved delivery
significantly. The period I April 2004 to 31 March 2005 established 27 LRAD projects, as
shown in Appendix 2.
6.1.1 Background to the LRAD programme at Loteni
The study area of Loteni falls within the Impendle West district of Sub-region Four of the
iNdlovu Region. Loteni is a small rural community situated at the base of the southern
Drakensberg. The southern Drakensberg forms part of the western boundary between
KwaZulu-Natal and Lesotho. This area previously formed part of the KwaZulu homeland
under the apartheid dispensation. Seven farms have been owned in freehold title by black
landowners since 1886. Other landholders in the area are the State, Mkhomazi State Forest
situated in the east, and the Loteni Nature Reserve (operated by Ezemvelo KwaZulu-Natal
Wildlife) in the West. Agriculture is the main form of land use at Loteni, and includes
cropping and grazing of livestock. Loteni residents live in traditional housing consisting of
mud, wood, stone and grass. There is a general store, two tuckshops, a community hall,
church and two schools in the area (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999).
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Figure 3: Projects processed during period 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003
Type of Project name Number of Number Number of District Municipality
project beneficiaries of hectares
women
Labour Corrie LynnlPetrus 23 314.4437 Umgungundlovu Howick
tenants Stroom
Labour Portion 16 of 5 of 9 6 30 Uthukela Klip River
tenants Elandslaazte
Labour EbouwenilPortion 7 of 13 8 95 Uthukela Klip River
tenants Driefontein
Labour Mt St Bernards 63 9 937 Umzinyathi Umvoti
tenants
Labour Boshoek 20 13 313 Amajuba Utrecht
tenants
Labour SherwoodIWeltevreden 83 21 629 Umgungundlovu Howick
tenants
Labour GlenbellaIWelverdient 59 6 596 Uthukela
tenants
Labour Portion 4 of 17 8 327 Uthukela Klip River
tenants Kleinfontein
Labour Portion 54 of 4 of 6 1 64 Uthukela
tenants Elandslaagte
Labour Balmoral/Onverwaght 46 20 200 Umgungundlovu Mooi River
tenants
Labour Goudina 25 0 335.4138
tenants
Labour Geluk 9 4 50 Amajuba Utrecht
tenants
Labour Uitvlught 30 15 110 Zululand Vryheid
tenants
Redistribution Mabaso/Mngundeni 300 100 1867.1196 Umzinvathi Utrecht
Labour MtAlice 22 3 150 Uthukela Okhahlamba
tenants
Labour Groothoek- 40 16 912.0914 Uthukela Ladysrnith
tenants Grange/Klippoort
Commonage RietvalleiIPotshini . 70 675 Uthukela Ladysmith
Redistribution Palmietfontein 50 21 500
Redistribution Kalazo 177 117 276
Labour Dansekraal 8 4 50 Uthukela Ladysmith
tenants
Labour Craignathan 52 475 Uthukela Dundee
tenants
Labour Springfield Stud 13 5 26.3590 Umgungundlovu Mooi River
tenants
Labour Tweefontein 40 10 383 .5890 Umgungundlovu uMshwati
tenants
Labour RietfonteinIRosedale 13 1 47.2886 Uthukela Bergville
tenants
LRAD Moshesh/Coombe 15 8 301 Umaunzundlovu Imnendle
Commonage Bromsgrave 53 440 Ugu Hibiscus
Labour Corriesrus/Umvoti 7 95.3849 Umgungundlovu Mooi River
tenants Heights
Ncalu 61 196.1411 Sisonke Ixono
Grand Total 1.272 393 10199.6788
(Department of Land Affairs, 2003, 75)
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6.1.2 The history of land redistribution at Loteni
As a result of tensions over land in the late 1990s, the Impendle area was identified as
important for land redistribution purposes (Drimie, 2003). In 1995, the Loteni Land Crisis
Committee investigation determined that overcrowding, a high tenant population and a
lack of access to grazing lands were a root cause of tensions. At the same time due to new
labour law, white commercial farmers were evicting farm labourers from their land so as to
avoid land claims made by tenants and farm staff. As a result, theft was becoming
problematic as farm labourers lost their jobs. The Minister of Land Affairs decided to
resolve this land tension through the acquisition of land for redistribution to the community
(Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999).
The Department of Land Affairs (DLA) under the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant
(SLAG) was to settle 352 members of the Loteni community on land for residential and
productive purposes. The 352 beneficiaries were one of four groups that the greater Loteni
community was divided into. Each of the four groups was to apply to the DLA separately
(Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999).
The proposed project consisted of 11 farms which were to be transferred to the 352 SLAG
beneficiaries and totalled approximately 1500 ha (refer to Table 4, p89). Seven of the
farms were already utilised for residential purposes by the community. Through a land
swap the Department of Land Affairs acquired the farms Bravo 10665, Glenora 10187 and
Westview 11447, with the former KwaZulu-Natal Parks Board, in exchange for Duarte
Castle 9426. Moshesh 8399 and the Remainder of The Coombe 6260 had been identified
for transfer from private ownership to community ownership. To enhance the SLAG
acquisition process a full time project facilitator was employed to interact with the
community for data gathering purposes. Workshops, surveys and interviews were
conducted and documented with various stakeholders. Land owners offered to sell their
land to tenants living on farms and a land commissioner was to be appointed to deal with
issues of land ownership at Loteni (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999).
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Table 4: Farms forming part ofthe SLAG project at Loteni
Farm name Registered owners in 1999 Extent (ha)




Moshesh Mariannhill Mission Institute 235
The Rem of the Coombe Mariannhill Mission Institute 68
Total 303
The Ridge Private (Loteni land owners) 370
Maitland Private (Loteni land owners) 130
FP 178 Private (Loteni land owners) 144
Cathcart Private (Loteni land owners) 78
Shirley Private (Loteni land owners) 24
Sunset Private (Loteni land owners) · 35
The End Private (Loteni land owners) 102
Total Approx 830
*Note: Only portions of these farms will be for use by the Loteni community
(Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999: 3)
The consultative process used by the DLA was part of the planning for development at
Loteni. Design agents then planned a settlement to house the 352 beneficiaries and
provide running water, electricity, telephones, roads and a clinic. An extensive report by
Urban-Econ Development Economists (1999) was compiled that assessed and provided
recommendations for SLAG development at Loteni . This included the building of a craft
centre, an agricultural training institution, water pipelines to schools and other recreational
facilities,
However, in 2000 a review of land redistribution in South Africa placed a moratorium on
redistribution projects. This halted all work on the proposed development of Loteni under
SLAG. In 2001, the DLA was obligated to redistribute land under the new Land
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme. This had serious
implications for the 352 SLAG beneficiaries at Loteni. The original plans of land
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redistribution and associated development at Loteni under SLAG were scrapped and only
15 people from the original 352 SLAG beneficiaries were eligible to benefit from the new
LRAD programme.
Unlike SLAG, the focus of LRAD was not to provide land for settlement purposes but
rather agricultural development. Through the LRAD process, 15 LRAD beneficiaries
obtained the title deeds to two farms at Loteni. There were at least two other groups in the
area waiting to be considered for LRAD grants by the DLA.
6.1.3 The Sibonginhlanhla Project
The Sibonginhlanhla Project consists oftwo farms, Moshesh 8399 and the Remainder of
The Coombe 6260, situation latitude 29°29'42"S to 29°30'50"8 and longitude 29°34'1O"E
to 29035 '35"E. These farms were purchased from the land owner, the Catholic Diocese of
Mariannhill, by the DLA on behalf of the 15 beneficiaries of the Project. In fact, the
reason that the Diocese had made this land available for land redistribution purposes was
because the Loteni community had been utilising this land for grazing purposes. The land
transaction was secured through the R20 000 per member LRAD grant. An independent
valuer (Shead and Lang) put the figure on the land and associated buildings at R308 350
(see Table 5).
Table 5: Valuation of Moshesh and The Coombe farms prior to LRAD acquisition
Valuation
Land at Moshesh 8399 (234 ha) R146250
Buildings at Moshesh 8399 RI04100
Rem of The Coombe 6260 (68 ha) R 58 000
Total valuation R308350
(DLA memo, undated)
The Mariannhill Diocese, St Anne's Mission, offered to donate the buildings on Moshesh
8399, except for the church and one hectare surrounding it. Therefore, the final selling
price was reduced to R203 325 (see Table 6, p91).
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Table 6: Final price for acquisition of Moshesh and The Coombe farms
Selling Price
Price for Moshesh 8399 (233 ha @R625 per ha) Rl45625




Application process for LRAD
There was urgency for the LRAD application of the Sibonginhlanhla Project to be
processed because of the length of time that land disposal had already taken at Loteni.
Besides, LRAD applications are processed faster than SLAG applications and the DLA did
not have to obtain much information, as this had been comprehensively documented in
material related to the SLAG programme. As a result of this, the beneficiaries did not see
much paper work including the proposed business plan drawn up for them by the DoA.
However, the Provincial Grants Committee (PGC) bases its approval on the endorsement
of the business plan by the DoA. This means that the approval of the Sibonginhlanhla
Project was made outside consultation with thy beneficiaries.
Transfer oftitle deeds
The LRAD project was initially set up in 200I but only was approved by the PGC in May
2002. The transfer of the properties to the Sibonginhlanhla CPA took place in January
2003 and the title deed, for the 302.9301 ha farm, was officially handed to the CPA in
December 2003. The remaining capital (indicated in Table 7, p92) from the LRAD grant
was used to buy a tractor, trailer, plough, fencing and seed potatoes (Department of Land
Affairs, undated). The DoA South West Region compiled a business plan for the
Sibonginhlanhla Project detailing the proposed plan for the development of the farm. The
Sibonginhlanhla Project remained unproductive, other than for minimal subsistence
agriculture, for three years whilst transfer of the title deed occurred two years after transfer
of land to the beneficiaries.
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Table 7: LRAD beneficiary grant transaction
LRAD grant
R20 000 per member x 15 beneficiaries R300000
Less selling price of Moshesh and Rem of The R203325
Coombe
Grant remaining R 96685
Research into the situation of the Sibonginhlanhla Project at Loteni commenced in June
2004. By the end of 2004, the 15 beneficiaries had bought a tractor, although none of the
beneficiaries could operate it, and trailer with the rest of their LRAD grant. The DLA
donated fencing but it was not enough to fence off the whole farm. The Department of
Agriculture was the designated extension support. They provided an advisory service on a
quarterly basis (Department of Land Affairs, undated). However, the promises of soil
analysis and agricultural training were not met. Potatoes were planted and harvested by
the Sibonginhlanhla Project in 2004.
In 2005, the ADSS mobilised CASP funding through the Siyavuna Programme which
enabled the beneficiaries to obtain agricultural training, more fencing and other inputs.
They contracted a farmer to assist with the planting of seed for their crops. However, by
the time this research had been completed, no large scale cultivation ofthe Project land had
occurred. The research below is an account of the development of the Sibonginhlanhla
Project from June 2004 until November 2005.
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6.1.4 Demographic information on the membership of the Sibonginhlanhla Project
Demographic information for the membership of the Sibonginhlanhla Project was obtained
from documents in possession of the DLA and research carried out at Loteni. Information
indicated below is included in Appendix 5 (Figure 4) and Appendix 6 (Figure 5).
Income ofthe Sibonginhlanhla farmers
The data from 2001 shown in Figure 4 was obtained from the DLA. The data from 2005
shown in both Figure 4 and 5 was obtained through interviews with Sibonginhlanhla
membership in 2005.
Income within the Sibonginhlanhla Project is limited. Eight of the member farmers do not
have a stable monthly income. They make a marginal income from selling vegetables and
other crops, doing maintenance such as wall-plastering in the summer, sewing and selling
clothing and working other people 's fields within the community at Loteni. The other
seven members obtain income from varying sources, including pensions and child grants
and employment at the Loteni Nature Reserve.
In 2001, DLA records indicate that the average income of the Sibonginhlanhla members
was R551 per month. The maximum and minimum incomes were R2000 and RO
respectively. In 2005, this research determined that the average income of the
Sibonginhlanhla members had increased to R896. The maximum and minimum incomes
were R1560 and R180 respectively. Over the period 2001-2005, an increase in average
income ofR345 (63%) occurred which is equivalent to a 12.5% increase year on year (see
Figure 4, p94).
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The increases in incomes are attributed mainly to social grants like pensions (R780 per
month), child support grants (180 per month), disability grants (R780 per month), and
foster care grants (R560 per month). Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife employed three members at
R960 per month.
Figure 5 (P95) shows the percentage contribution of pensions, child support grants (CSG),
disability grants (DG), foster care grants (FCG) and employment to total income (R13600
per month) of Sibonginhlanhla Project members in 2005. Eighty two percent of income
emanates from social grants and only 18% of incomes can be contributed to employment.
95



















moo OFCG • Employment
Collectively the Sibonginhlanhla membership owned 86 cattle and 84 goats. Contributions
to these livestock totals varied through the Sibonginhlanhla membership. The type of
cattle would not fetch high grade meat prices. In 2005, Avian flu substantially diminished
the chicken population at Loteni.
Education
There was a low level of educational training amongst the members. This research
revealed that the average formal education level of the Sibonginhlanhla farmers was Grade
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5. Five members had not been to school at all; seven members had primary education; two
members had a high school Grade 10 qualification and one member has a high school
Grade 11 qualification (refer to Appendix 5).
Family dependents
There was a notable discrepancy between statistics released by the DLA and the LRAD
beneficiary applications forms in 2001 and this research in 2005. The DLA statistics
indicate a higher average of dependents (7.27) than both the LRAD applications indicated
(4.5) and the research in 2005 found (4.93). It is reasonable to assume that the time
interval between the LRAD applications in 2001 and the research in 2005 resulted in a
number of changes within families and the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership. These
include new births , independence of former dependents and a change in membership. The
DLA statistics seems to reflect the total size offamilies including extended family that do
not reside at Loteni.
Gender and age
The Sibonginhlanhla Project consisted of 8 male and 7 female beneficiaries at inception.
However, by 2005 this demographic had changed to 9 male and 6 female beneficiaries.
All the members have lived their whole lives at Loteni. The youngest member was born in
1970 and the oldest in 1920. The average age of the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership
was 55.5 years. A fifth of the farmers are in their 70s and 80s and the limited extent to
which they can contribute to farming places more responsibility on those capable. The
findings in 2005 indicated that one more farmer was widowed and another became
divorced.
The members ofthe Sibonginhlanhla Project
The purpose of this section is to introduce the members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project,
shown in Figure 6 (P98) below, and provide some detail about their particular personal
circumstances.
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Africa Ndlovul9 and his wife live near the community hall. They are both pensioners and
are well known in the community. They feel that because of their age they cannot move to
the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm.
Michael Duma and his wife, Thembani, feed 9 people at home. They do not have a steady
income other than a grant they receive from the government for taking on an orphan and
Thembani's pension. Thembani says she has a small garden at home and they have begun
a small garden at the Sibonginhlanhla Project.
Nonhlanhla Nkabini gets a child support grant for her 8 year old child. Her husband is
deceased. She says she battles to make ends meet and sells clothing to help buy food and
pay for her children's school fees of RIOO per year. Thokozile, Nonhlanhla's mother,
presently resides with Nonhlanhla as they feel she is too old to live alone. Thokozile's
homestead lies dormant.
George Duma is a pensioner. He contributes to his grand children's school fees and
welfare.
Thobile Mthalane is the daughter of George Duma. She is another single parent with four
children, three of whom school in Pietermaritzburg. Thobile works for Ezemvelo KZN
Wildlife for 3 months of the year. She maintains the paths at Loteni Nature Reserve. She
also plasters walls and tills land for cash. Thobile, also a Sibonginhlanhla member, is
currently building herself a house at the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm.
John and Margaret Mnikathi have seven children and four grand children. They are both
unemployed but manage . to survive on John's KZN Wildlife severance package,
Margaret's pension and social grants. They are planning to move onto the farm.
19 Note: The first name mentioned is the LRAD beneficiary.
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Photograph of Sibonginhlanhla Project membership
(Daniel Bailey, 2004)
Sibongile Mgoza is no longer a member of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. The
circumstances of her resignation from the Project are unclear but the poor progress of the
Project played a role in her decision to leave. Her membership has been taken up by Soka
Mhlongo. Soka Mhlongo is the father of 7 children. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife has
employed Soka at Loteni Nature Reserve for the past 25 years. His wife has applied for
child support for their children. They are presently building on the Sibonginhlanhla
Project farm as their present home is situated a long distance away.
Albert Mnikathi is a pensioner. He had 8 cattle stolen by suspected Basotho raiders a few
years ago.
Sylvester Mnikathi is unemployed. Sylvester is a widower and cares for his three children
with the help of his mother. They survive on his mother's pension.
Sipho Mnikathi is the chairperson of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. He is unemployed. He
and his wife have five children and receive a child support for four of them. At present, he
is building a house at the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm.
Nomthandazo Molefe is the secretary of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. She is trying to
collect enough money to build a house on Sibonginhlanhla Project farm. Presently, she
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resides at Mpophomeni near Howick in a 30m2 house with her sister and nine children.
Her three children live with her at Mpophomeni.
Paulos Zuma is married with nine dependents. The Zuma family obtain one disability
grant and four child support grants for their children.
Ntombikayise Duma works for R500 per month. She has 7 dependents but has not applied
for child support. The Duma family has not decided to move to the Sibonginhlanhla
Project farm.
Bonani Malaba has six children. Her husband works at the Loteni Nature Reserve. The
Malaba also obtain child support for three of their children. The Malaba family is
considering moving to the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm.
6.2 The Sibonginhlanhla Project: The farmers' perspective
This section provides a description of the Sibonginhlanhla Project from the perspective of
the 15 beneficiariesmentioned above.
As described in the methodology semi structured interviews (SS1) were used to gather
information from the members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project (see Appendix 8 for SS1
interview questionnaires). This information was used to produce a rich picture (see Figure
7, pIOO) of the situation facing this group of emerging farmers. Meetings were held to
discuss the issues captured by the rich picture. This process of discussion facilitated
thinking about other issues affecting the Project. Some of these issues only became
vocalised later on in the research process and hence are not captured in the rich picture but
are included in this section. This is information provided directly from the farmers unless
otherwise stated.
lOO
Figure 7: Rich picture of the Sibonginhlanhla Project
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To facilitate explanation ofthis rich picture the following headings have been used:




• Agricultural productivity of Sibonginhlanhla Project
• Role players and stakeholders
• The vision for the Sibonginhlanhla Project
Additionally, this section refers directly to Figure 7 and uses numbers to assist with
locating depictions (for example, Figure 7: 2 refers to Figure 7 and position number 2 on
the rich picture).
6.2.1 Off-farm infrastructure
The first issue the farmers raised was the lack of basic infrastructure to support farming in
the Loteni area. Loteni is situated about 40km from the nearest town, Underberg, on poor
gravel roads (Refer to Figure 7: 1). Transportation is limited and as a result Loteni remains
relatively isolated. The farmers felt that gravel roads from Underberg and Impendle to
Loteni were inadequate for transporting produce. The farmers complained about the prices
that they had to pay for travel. Prices to the most frequent destinations are shown below in
Table 8.
Table 8: Taxi fare prices (2005)
From Loteni to: Underberg (40km) Impendle (50 km) Howick (145 km)
Return trip R30 R30 R70
Single / One way R20 R25 R50
trip
Telephones are available at Loteni, however people have to walk between 2-3 km to access
them. Cell phone coverage is not comprehensive as the Loteni Valley is in a network
shadow. There is no running water or electricity (See Figure 7: 2).
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People fetch water from the Loteni River and use candles and paraffin for light at night.
.The use of fire is common for cooking, warmth and light, and wood from nearby wattle
(Acacia Mearnsii) stands is the predominant fuel.
6.2.2 On-farm infrastructure (including equipment)
As described by the farmers, the Sibonginhlanhla Project consists of a farm (Figure 7: 3)
without infrastructure. There is no water available on the farm. The watering of crops is
done by hand and carried from the Loteni River up to the fields. This is portrayed by the
drawing of a woman carrying water on her head walking the steep path and dreaming of an
irrigation system in Figure 7: 4.
"The tractor is a big problem."- Albert Mnikathi, Sibonginhlanhla farmer
The farmers purchased a tractor and trailer with their LRAD grant (Figure 7: 8). The
farmers indicated that the tractor was not functioning and needed to be repaired. However,
the farmers do not know how to operate or repair the tractor. The farmers were
considering selling it and some members of the group felt that they were on the receiving
end of a bad deal set up by a tractor salesman in Pietermaritzburg. Repairs can only be
done at Stepmore (15km away) or Underberg (40 km).
Fencing was another major issue for the farmers. They wanted to be able to:
1. Demarcate their farmland boundary - shown by the kneeling farmer in orange erecting
a fence in Figure 7: 9;
2. Contain their livestock - shown by the cow, goat and horse eating the cultivated fields
in Figure 7: 10; and
3. Reduce the 'potential of stock theft - indicated by the arrows pointing over the
mountains in Figure 7: 11.
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In 2003, the Project purchased some fencing with LRAD funding and fenced a section of
the farm with the intention ofusing this fenced area for grazing livestock. In 2005, four of
the male farmers put up another section of fencing along the boundary with the Loteni
road to reduce livestock wandering.
6.2.3 Residence
The rich picture shows a representation of land divisions and one division is marked with
an 'R' in Figure 7: 12. This represents the issue of residence. The farmers have only
recently, since the end of 2005, been able to start building their homes on the farm. The
mentor appointed by the DLA initially opposed any settlement on agricultural land without
the approval of the authorities. Up until 2005, the farmer's were still trying to obtain
permission to move onto the farm. It seems as if there was some confusion about whom to
approach on this matter. The farmers wanted to be present on the farm in order to
counteract stock theft but also to reduce travelling distances, of up to 3 km over steep
terrain, from present residences to the Sibonginhlanhla farm.
In 2005, The DLA, DoH, town planners from the Umgungundlovu district, DoA and the
farmers met to discuss the location of the new houses on the farm. The DoH required
nuclear settlements in the event of service provision being supplied to them by local
government. There are three sites for houses at Sibonginhlanhla, five farmers and their
families at each site. By the end of 2005, no houses had been completed. At least one
member and his family did not want to move onto the farm as they were too old.
6.2.4 Extension support
The LRAD farmers stated that there was a DoA extension worker assigned to the area
(Refer to Figure 7: 13). However, the extension worker that visited was not always the
same person and they did not visit regularly. In the farmers' opinion this was a factor
contributing to their slow achievement. As shown by the rich picture, the DoA extension
had promised to provide them with agricultural training and inputs. However, DoA
extension support did not manage to provide, this citing lack of transportation resources
and time.
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In 2004, the fanners wanted the agricultural training that the DoA had promised so that
they could start planting. However, it was only in 2005, with the assistance of the CASP
grant, that the fanners were able to afford to participate in agricultural courses and buy
needed inputs. By the end of 2005, two members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project had been
on a planting and farm management course. The fanners continue to request assistance
towards making the Project operational (Figure 7: 7).
6.2.5 Theft
Livestock theft was raised as an issue (Refer to Figure 7: 11). The Loteni community has
faced numerous occasions whereby livestock have been stolen and the community say the
culprits are Basotho cattle rustlers. A member of the Loteni community lost 27 head of
cattle on the 12 November 2005. Sibonginhlanhla members have also been affected by
cattle raids. George Duma lost 12 cattle in 2002 and Albert Mnikathi had 18 cattle stolen
from him in 1999. The farmers related livestock thefts to the fact that they are not allowed
to live on the farm, the predominant area where their livestock are put out to graze. The
stock theft unit (represented by the yellow van), based at Loteni, had failed to recover the
livestock.
Fencing has been bought and erected to contain livestock within the farm boundaries and
keep livestock that does not belong to Sibonginhlanhla out. However, the fences do not
stop stock theft as any fence in the path of the animals is cut.
Whilst conducting this research 29 head of cattle were stolen from a member of the Loteni
community. The newly erected fence along the roadside was cut to allow passage and the
whole fence collapsed. According to the KZN Wildlife Regional Manager, the fence was
poorly erected as only a portion of the fence should have collapsed if cut. He said that the
collapse was due to the standards (fencing poles) being suspended rather than dug into the
ground.
6.2.6 Agricultural productivity of the Sibonginhlanhla Project
The Sibonginhlanhla Project is situated on a spur. The land is rocky and steep, which
makes it susceptible to erosion (shown in Figure 7: 20). As a result only certain sections of
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the farm are arable. Additionally, the farmers complained that years of overgrazing and
poor veld burning regimes had reduced the quality and quantity of forage available for
grazing (portrayed in Figure 7: 5).
The farmers said that the land was under utilised by their membership. Most of the
farmers live relatively long distances from the farm and thus prefer to use land closer to
their homes for cultivation (see Figure 7: 6).
The farmers said that they cannot cultivate on a larger scale because they have no seed to
sow. They blame the government for this and for not allowing them to stay initially on the
farm. To assist with purchasing agricultural inputs the farmers invested R20 per month in
a joint bank account (see Figure 7: 14). However, the payments are not regular as the
farmers cannot always afford the R20. Most forms of income are through pension and
other social grants (Figure 7: 15).
The Sibonginhlanhla farm was spatially planned to ensure that every farmer had a plot for
household cultivation and the remainder of the farm was designated for collective
production under the auspices ofthe Sibonginhlanhla Project (represented in Figure 7: 3).
The KwaZulu-Natal Spice Growers Association (KZNSGA) had offered to provide paprika
plants to grow at Loteni and find a market for the produce (see Figure 7: 17). Since this
initial offer, there has been no contact between the KZNSGA and the Sibonginhlanhla
Project.
The weather at Loteni is unpredictable. This is represented in Figure 7: 19 by the rain
gauge and thermometer. Productivity is often hampered by drought. The lack of rain in
2004 resulted in land lying fallow and a reliariceon external sources for food. Income
usually spent on seed and other inputs was used for buying maize.
The issue of labour was discussed and it was indicated that labour would be hired when the
rains started in late spring 2005. This would be labour to help Sibonginhlanhla specifically
with hoeing, planting, watering, weeding and harvesting. The tractor would assist with the
fetching and carrying of water, tools and implements and harvest.
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Productivity by the end of2005
The fanners received assistance from Cedara ADSS in the form of a CASP grant. This
enabled them to buy inputs and with the remainder of the grant want to employ a
contractor to plough and plant 10 ha of maize. This would cost Rl5000 of which the
members have paid R7000 already. The members were hoping that the contractor would
arrive on 16 November 2005.
By November 2005, only six of the members had utilised Project land for household
cultivation purposes. As stated before, some of the fanners live too far away from the land
to warrant them using the land for cultivation purposes. Seven of the members were
cultivating land at their own residences (i.e. off-farm) and of these seven, four members
were using both household and Project land.
6.2.7 Role players and stakeholders
A number of role players and stakeholders were identified at Loteni. They are included for
reference in Appendix 3. The role players are represented in the rich picture by the
community hall and the meetings between groups in Figure 7: 16. The most involved role
players during the setting up of the Sibonginhlanhla CPA were the Loteni Land Crisis
Committee (LCC) and the Loteni Development Committee (LDC). The LCC initially
identified Loteni as being important for land redistribution. The LDC was instrumental in
the LRAD process. This committee, chaired by a woman, identified the LRAD applicants
for the DLA. The ward councillor, Mr Kunene, was also part of this process. The DLA
and DoA were identified as the most important stakeholders for the Project.
6.2.8 The vision for the Sibonginhlanhla Project
The visioning exercise undertaken on the 8 November 2004 posed the current agricultural
yields against those of the vision. The blue and green writing in Figure 8 (p107), shows
that in 2004, the Sibonginhlanhla Project purchased seed potatoes for RI00. These
potatoes, known in Zulu as amazambane, were planted and harvested for household
consumption.
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The farmers vision for the Sibonginhlanhla Project is to produce for external markets. The
red writing in Figure 8 shows that the farmers are expecting to produce commercial crops
and livestock. Table 9 (p108) shows the crops, livestock and infrastructure identified as
necessary for achieving their vision.
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li t k d i fr tru tu identified from the visionT bl 9 Ca e rODS Ives oc an III as c re
Crop Livestock Infrastructure
Cabbage (amacabishi) Cattle (inkomo) Fenced grazing camps
Tomatoes (amatomatisi) Goats (imbuzi) Working tractor (ugandaganda)
Spinach (isipinshi) Sheep (isikhephu) Storage shed (igushede)
Sorghum (amabhele) Pigs (ingulube) Plough (igeja)
Peaches (amapentshisi) Chickens (inkhukhu) Crop sprayer




White and red maize (umbila)
Paprika
A market for paprika was identified in Pinetown and the KZNSGA promised to facilitate
this transaction. The farmers recognised that they would have to secure loans from sources
like the Land Bank in order to initiate this paprika project but initial attempts failed as
described in section 6.2.7. A pig market was identified at Alberton. Markets for other
crops and livestock were restricted to Loteni due present demand and the lack of
transportation to other destinations.
6.3 Department of Land Affairs
This information was obtained through extensive consultations with Khosi Madonsela, the
DLA field officer, over the 2003-2006 period.
6.3.1 Policy change and its effects for Loteni
The DLA has been working in the Loteni area since 1995, initially to clarify issues ofland
ownership. The ownership of these properties was resolved through the Loteni Land Crisis
. Committee. The registered owners of the properties were all deceased and so it was a
matter of transferring the deeds to the next of kin. In 2000, the moratorium on land
redistribution resulted in the halting of the SLAG project that was to provide housing and
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basic services at Loteni. Six years was spent on planning the SLAG project and a large
amount of resources were wasted.
The LRAD programme was introduced by the DLA in order to replace the SLAG proposal
at Loteni. The selection of LRAD beneficiaries was managed by the community. This
was done to prevent accusation of the DLA manipulating the selection process. The Loteni
Development Committee (LDC), a body set up to deal with concerns of the community,
was authorised by the community to decide on who the LRAD beneficiaries would be.
The process of selection by the LDC was a private affair and a response by the members of
the committee could not be obtained. However, as the DLA field officer pointed out,
"Fifteen (farmers) was a conservative number looking at the number of hectares and
activities that they are going to do on the farm."
Since the successful transfer of land to the Sibonginhlanhla Project, two other farming
groups have formed in the Loteni area. These two groups are hoping that they too can
benefit from the LRAD programme.
At the beginning of the LRAD programme the relationship between the DLA and the
Loteni community was strained. After the change in policy away from SLAG, some of the
community felt that the department had failed them. Those that were not selected to be
LRAD beneficiaries were left saddened and there may have been some jealousy towards
the 15 LRAD beneficiaries selected.
The LRAD grant enabled the Sibonginhlanhla Project to purchase some 300 ha of land.
The remainder of the grant the beneficiaries spent on fencing and a tractor and trailer. The
fencing was used to enclose a small area for livestock and the tractor has not been
operational for some time. A mentor was appointed by the DLA and paid RIOOO per
month to guide the Sibonginhlanhla Project. However, this mentor soon lost interest as a
lack of funding at the time hindered the progress of the Project. The DLA recommended
the Sibonginhlanhla Project for CASP funding and funds were approved.
The DLA considers the Sibonginhlanhla Project under the food safety net category as
documented by LRAD policy. However, their concern is that the members are impatient to
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become commercial farmers rather than gradually developing their infrastructure, capital
and skills.
6.3.2 Coordination and collaboration of institutions
The DoA has complained that the DLA transfers land that is not suitable for agricultural
production. This has created some tension between the two institutions. The DoA blames
the DLA for the difficulties they encountered with LRAD projects, again, based on the
claim that the land is not suitable for agricultural production. At the Sibonginhlanhla





• distance from markets
Additionally, internal DoA coordination between ADSS and the Extension Support
(including coordination between the Provincial and District DoA) especially over CASP is
very poor. After the DLA has identified projects that need CASP funding, it is the role of
the Extension Support and ADSS to implement CASP. However, the confusion between
the Extension Support and ADSS over CASP funding and projects to benefit has resulted
in delays. It was the perspective of the field officer that there would be under-spending by
CASP in 200412005 as a result of a lack of coordination between ADSS and Extension
Support.
6.4 Extension Support - Department of Agriculture
This section details some of the problems associated with extension as described by
Caswell Nakuna, the extension officer for the Impendle region in which Loteni is situated.
He explained that institutional constraints impacted on his ability to perform his job.
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6.4.1 Staff contingent
"The DoA does not have sufficient staff to provide the necessary service. ,,20
The key problems he identified related to a lack of staff, the large number ofhouseholds to
which he was expected to provide extension support and a lack of transport. In general,
extension officers are responsible from providing extension support over a large area (in
excess of lOOkm radius), which strains both the resources of the Department and the
extension worker.
However, the extension officer also indicated that he managed to visit the Sibonginhlanhla
Project monthly. He was aware of most concerns made by the Sibonginhlanhla Project
farmers, but not their intention to produce crops for markets external to Loteni. He was
responsible for providing agricultural training to the farmers. However, because the
LRAD grant funds had been utilised elsewhere the farmers had not been able to access this
resource.
On a personal level the extension officer indicated that he was from the former Venda
homeland. His different cultural background caused tension for his work with Zulu
communities and was one of the reasons why he was looking for work closer to his home
in Limpopo Province.
6.4.2 Logistical arrangements
Extension officers report to the DoA headquarters in Pietermaritzburg weekly. They
tended to use this time for administration purposes but due to the large area covered by
extension officers, petrol consumption was high. "The vehicle has a small petrol tank.
There is only one petrol station in the area and I have to keep returning to Boston to fill up.
The vehicles need to be fitted with long range fuel tanks." Communication was identified
as difficult as cell phone reception is disrupted by the mountainous geography.
The extension officer was unaware of the LRAD programme or the impact of LRAD on
his work. The extension component of the DoA was focused on providing technical
20 kuNa na, 2004, pers. comm.
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support to rural fanners irrespective of how the farming group was formed, acquired land
or functions (CPA or otherwise).
6.5 Agricultural Development Support Services (ADSS) - Department of Agriculture
Jimmy Lonsdale, project manager for ADSS and supervising the allocation of
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) funds to the Sibonginhlanhla
Project explained that the implementation of the CASP in 2005 had improved the
extension support available to the Sibonginhlanhla Project. ADSS had become involved
with the Sibonginhlanhla Project as their application for CASP funding under the Siyavuna
Programme, a programme that targets black emerging farmers, was recommended by the
DLA. The ADSS administers funding through CASP and the ·Siyavuna Programme.
CASP funding was allocated by national government to be spent on infrastructure.
Siyavuna funds are specifically for inputs, training and mentorship (not wages or diesel).
ADSS provides support to the DoA Extension Support and DLA in the implementation
phase of LRAD projects. The Siyavuna funding of some R398800 allocated to the
Sibonginhlanhla Project had to be spent by the end of2006.
Information about the balance of the LRAD grant was difficult to obtain. Lonsdale
estimated it to be about RIO 000. This, according to Lonsdale, should be transferred to the
relevant municipality for the provision of infrastructure and services.
6.5.1 Constraints for the business plan
The DLA deals with the transfer of the land, the business planning and the monitoring and
evaluation. However, due to the lack of expertise in agriculture in the DLA the DoA and
other consultants have taken on designing business plans. The business plan prepared by
the DoA Extension Support South West Region, according to Lonsdale, will be
implemented. However, there are some constraints.
It was difficult to send members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project for agricultural training.
This was because of the distant location of Loteni from the training centre. ADSS could
not provide transport to the training. As a result, three opportunities for training were lost
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as members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project failed to attend these agricultural training
workshops.
Eventhough, analysis of the soils had been deemed necessary by the DoA Extension
Support it was not done. This analysis would have provided information about the soil
structure and chemical composition. Lonsdale indicated that irrigation would saturate the
land, as the soil is predominately shallow clay and suggested that water from the Loteni
River would be pumped up to a 5000L water tank on the farm. However, a simple
irrigation system has still not been implemented.
Contracting out farming operations was encouraged by Lonsdale as the Sibonginhlanhla
members did not have the resources to farm themselves. This would have cost Rl500 per
hectare for ploughing and planting of maize seed. Green maize had good crop returns
(R48000 per hectare) and Lonsdale expected this crop to be viable for the Sibonginhlanhla
Project.
6.5.2 On-farm expenditure
ADSS mobilised the funding available from the CASP grant into the Sibonginhlanhla
Project bank account and a number of purchases were made. In 2005, purchases for seed
and fencing were made and an amount had been allocated to pay for a contract farmer to
plough and plant the Sibonginhlanhla Project fields. The funding also enabled a few
Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers to participate in an agricultural training. Agricultural
training (including pigs poultry, cattle and crops) in South Region was done by an
independent agricultural group called Zakhe Training Institute situated in Baynesfield.
The management of this CASP funding and the farm was left to the LRAD beneficiaries in
order to provide farmers with real experience. This process was, in the ADSS manager's
opinion, not conducive to ensuring viable operation of the farm. For example, a shed was
bought by the Sibonginhlanhla Project and paid for with CASP/Siyavuna funds. However,
the shed has not been constructed as a concrete base has to be established and the shed
erected on top of this. As a result of mismanagement of funds by CASP/Siyavuna
beneficiaries, like in the example above, 2005 is the final year in which funds will be paid
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into a beneficiary bank account. Instead, the DoA will administer all funds for
beneficiaries.
Mentorship was to become operational again from 2006 onwards as a result of Siyavuna
funding. Mentors were to be contracted for 50 hours a month with remuneration of about
R7500. This means that Sibonginhlanhla will be allocated a mentor but this will probably
only occur in 2007.
6.6 Commercial farmers
There were numerous problems encountered at Loteni by commercial farmers as explained
by Edward Goosen, Regional Manager for Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. As explained in
Chapter 5, Goosen was a key informant for information regarding commercial farmers.
His interaction with commercial farmers in the area, both on a personal and professional
level, established him as a reliable source on commercial farming in the region. Theft,
agricultural competition and labour were three issues that contributed to farmer anxiety and
the general lack of enthusiasm towards assisting emerging black farmers.
Commercial farmers were cautious about assisting with LRAD projects and other small
scale black farming enterprises. Firstly, farmers face the constant threat of crime from
within the community and further afield. One commercial farmer previously sold eggs to
the community. However, this stopped when he was robbed of his merchandise and
vehicle. Commercial farmers are also affected by stock theft predominantly executed from
the Lesotho side of the border. Secondly, commercial farmers may consider LRAD
emerging farmers as competition. Commercial farmers are interested in decreasing market
competition to ensure higher prices for products. Therefore, assistance to emerging
farmers from established commercial farmers is limited.
Surprisingly few people are employed by established commercial farmers in the Loteni
area as most farms deal in livestock few labourers are required. Commercial farmers
utilise chemical compounds for the control of livestock sicknesses, weeds and crop
production which decreases the need for a large labour force. Additionally, there is usually
limited scope for promotion or skilled positions as people are insufficiently educated and
farm managers are contracted in from outside the Loteni area. The decrease in the number
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of labourers working on farms has been a result of land claims and labour laws. A large
labour force has become a liability for commercial farmers as labour laws impose a
minimum wage and other policy favouring farm Iabour." Land tenure reform has
impacted on the number of people living and working on farms. To reduce the risk ofland
claims commercial farmers evict farm labourers and dwellers. For example, a commercial
farmer in the Loteni area could not rid himself of labour tenants so he burnt their homes
down in order to avoid future claims on his land. Therefore, commercial farmers are
hesitant to assist black farmers after negative experiences with labour.
Summary of the findings
Loteni land disposal
• Catholic Diocese ofMariannhill sold land to DLA under the SLAG programme
• 352 beneficiaries of SLAG programme
• LRAD replaced SLAG in 2000
Demographics ofthe Sibonginhlanhla Project membership
• Average age was 55.5 years old
• The Project consists of9 males and 6 female
• Average number of dependents is 4.93
• Average education level is grade 5
• 83% of income is from social grants whilst only 18% can be contributed to income
. from employment
• Average monthly income has increased from R551 per month in 2001 to R896 per
month in 2005
Farmer key issues identified were:
'Off-farm infrastructure
• Tele-communication limited
• Piped water and electricity were absent
• Roads were poor quality
• Transport was unreliable and expensive
21 Increased pay, less working hours , entitlement to land after a certain number of years etc.
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On-farm infrastructure (including equipment)
• Lack of on-farm infrastructure
• Tractor is dysfunctional
• Inadequate fencing
Residence
• No on-farm residences have been established
Extension support
• Lack of service
• Promises of agricultural training and inputs not provided
Theft
• Livestock theft problematic
• Fencing does not prevent cattle rustling
Agricultural productivity of Sibongihlanhla Project limited by
• Rocky and steep terrain
• Poor quality veld
• Unpredictable weather
• Lack of finance for seed and other inputs
• Distance from homesteads to Project land
The fanners' vision for the Project is to generate produce for markets.
The DoA Extension officer identified the lack of resources as being a major Issue
constraining his work. These resource constraints were:
• insufficient number of staff
• lack of transport
• poor communication
Also, the extension officer was unaware of relevant agricultural policy (like the LRAD
programme).
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DoA ADSS provides additional support to LRAD projects, in KwaZulu-Natal, in the form
of funding from CASP through the Siyavuna Programme. In addition to the LRAD grant
(R300000), a CASP grant of R398800 was approved for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. This
grant has to be spent by the end of 2006.
Implementation of the business plan drawn up by the DoA Extension Support South West
Region was confirmed, However, a number of concerns were raised:
• A number of agricultural training opportunities were missed
• Soil analysis ofthe Sibonginhlanhla Project had not been done .
• An irrigation system had not been designed or constructed
Contracting out operations for agricultural production was deemed necessary, due to the
lack of necessary resources, but viable for the Sibonginhlanhla Project.
By the end of2005, a number of on-farm purchases were made including fencing, seed and
a shed which was waiting to be erected. A few of the Sibonginhlanhla Project members
were afforded agricultural training and finance was earmarked for outsourcing ploughing
and planting of green maize. It was evident that a mentor would be appointed by the end
of2007.
Commercial farmer concerns affect their potential to assist black small scale fanners in the
Loteni area. These concerns are:
• Theft and other crime in the area
• Negative experiences with labourers related to land claims and labour laws
• Agricultural competition from emerging black fanners
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Chapter 7: .
Analysis of the findings
This chapter provides deeper insight into the implementation of the LRAD programme at
the Loteni Sibonginhlanhla Project. Analysis is drawn from Chapter 6 and additional
information is provided for better understanding of the LRAD programme and the
Sibonginhlanhla Project. Information is taken from personal communication, where
specified, as well as interpretation of information received and observations made by the
research team.
7.1 Demographics of the Sibonginhlanhla Project
The low monthly incomes of the Sibonginhlanhla Project members restrict any form of
savings or contribution to on-farm infrastructure or productivity. It is important to note
that most of the incomes are in the form of social grants as unemployment within the
membership is high. Incomes have increased in the period 2001-2005 but this is not due to
the presence of income generating activities or development of infrastructure in the region
but is the result of accessible social grants.
The current low level of education and farming competency amongst the beneficiaries
limits the capacity of the Sibonginhlanhla Project to become commercially productive, at
least in the short term. Favouring older LRAD beneficiaries, in the case of
Sibonginhlanhla(55.5 average age), is cause for concern. Older people may have a stable
income in the form of a pension but their physical ability to contribute to agricultural
development of land is limited. Some of the children of the LRAD beneficiaries do assist
with household food production and it is expected that they would continue to assist in the
event of a family death. However, the knowledge and experience lost as a result of an
LRAD beneficiary death will test the resilience of the Project.
7.1.1 The youth and the community
The role of children is essential to the success of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. The youth,
and specifically the Project farmers' dependents, will have to assist the Project with
agricultural endeavours due to the elderly component of the present Project membership.
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Also, many of the fanners are women who have additional household commitments and
therefore can only devote a limited proportion of their time to the Project. Furthermore, it
is important for the youth to participate if the long term viability of the Project is to be
ensured.
Loteni has a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate and due to the migratory patterns of the
working generation at Loteni in search of work in the cities and other farming areas, the
spread ofHIV/AIDS into Loteni homes has increased. As a result, there has been a rise in
instances of funerals, which are expensive. These funerals further exacerbate the dire
financial situation of the Loteni community as a whole.
The Loteni community is a very close-knit community, especially amongst the older
generation. This is a result of the area originally being settled by only a few inhabitants.
The families have had a long history of partnership and interdependence. Hence there is a
tendency, especially amongst the older generation, to share resources including
contributions towards funeral costs of friends and family where necessary.
The Sibonginhlanhla Project is affected by the same ethos of community concern and
interest. This Project does not operate in isolation from the broader community. However,
the Project has not been able to offer anything substantial to the community.
7.2 Infrastructure
The lack of off-farm infrastructure at Loteni limits agricultural production and access to
external markets. The poor state of the roads and lack of transport available restricts any
sale of agricultural products to within the Loteni community. The lack of infrastructure
and services in areas where land reform is being implemented has been found by Del
Grande (2006) to be a common problem within the municipalities mandated to provide
integrated planning and development (IDP) within their jurisdiction.
On farm infrastructure is equally poor. The livestock of the farmers roam freely, as there
. are no fenced camps and as a result damage crops. This fact and the lack of irrigation
infrastructure has limited attempts at cultivation. Livestock farming would require a
substantial investment in fencing, dipping equipment and transportation as well as training
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in livestock breeding and grazing strategies as the land is presently over grazed and poorly
managed. Cultivation seems the less expensive option, although some fencing to prohibit
grazing would have to occur. There is a natural spring on the farm that could be dammed
for limited irrigation and household usage in the interim until a pump and piping for an
irrigation system is installed , which further supports the option of cultivation.
7.3 Residence
The farmers have been waiting to occupy their land since they received the title deeds in
2003, almost one year after the official transfer of the properties to the Sibonginhlanhla
Project Common Property Association (CPA). Only in late 2005 did the Sibonginhlanhla
Project farmers obtain 'permission' to live on their land.
The farmer's confusion over their access to land is of concern, especially when they have
the title deeds. It seems that their initial mentor informed the farmers that they were not to
build on the farm without permission. The farmers did not know from whom they should
get permission. This created confusion and tension for the farmers as there was a need to
move onto the farm as many of the members lived relatively distant from the farm. This
became an important issue to resolve for the farmers. Hence their focus was not on
production but rather on securing the necessary arrangements and infrastructure for farm
operation. However, this issue over residency was out of their control for reasons that are
unclear and delayed the farmers in establishing agricultural produce on their land. This
illustrates the importance of efficient post-transfer support to LRAD projects.
The research team influenced this matter by asking questions around the issue of residency.
The Sibonginhlanhla Project memberships' lack of clarity on the issue of residence and
misunderstanding on ownership resulted in them querying the issue of building farm
residences with the DLA. The 'permission' the farmers sought was needed from by
government departments and these reasons are described below.
The land use planner for the Indlovu District and the DoH wanted to ensure that any
service provision could be carried out without vast expense or difficulty. Nuclear
settlements are favoured as they are more easily and cheaply connected to piped water and
electricity services . The DoH required that the farmers build on terrain conducive to the
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construction of other infrastructure, like roads. The DoA wanted to ensure that land
demarcated for homes was not prime agricultural land or negatively affected the
environment. However, this proved difficult as sites for building had to be on relatively
flat land in an area of steep and rugged terrain. As a result only three main zones for
construction were demarcated, the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership took the decision
about where each member's family would reside within each zone. The buildings were to
be built out of a mixture of block brick and traditional mud and wattle, depending on what
each family can afford. The Sibonginhlanhla Project membership still hope that basic
services will eventually reach Loteni and then their farm.
At their original homesteads, the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership had, on average,
almost 4 buildings per plot. These had been built over the life time of the home owners.
Therefore, moving to the Sibonginhlanhla Project land and the construction of new homes
will be a lengthy process and initially involve straddling between original homes and their
new homes at the Sibonginhlanhla Project.
7.4 Stock theft
The issue of stock theft in the Loteni area is a severe problem and increases the agricultural
risk for the Sibonginhlanhla Project as it has been demonstrated that fencing does not
prohibit stock theft. However, the erection of inadequate fencing along the road may have
been avoided had the farmers been provided with proper training in or supervision with
fence construction. Also, the age of the men involved in this endeavour may have
restricted their ability for digging the many holes required for comprehensive fence
construction.
Stock theft is often blamed on the Sothos. But as the Regional manager from Ezemvelo
KZN Wildlife remarked it is most likely to be other people in areas neighbouring Loteni
(Goosen, 2005, pers. comm."). This dislike for the Sothos has a long history and dates
back to before the Zulus fought for the British against the Sothos in the late 1800s. In fact,
the seven farms under freehold ownership at Loteni (shown in Table 4, p89) were payment
• Goosen, E. Regional Manager, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, Loteni Nature Reserve.
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for fighting for the British during the Basotho Wars (Urban-Econ Development
Economists, 1999).
The result is that stock theft remains problematic from within the Loteni area and across
the border limiting the potential for intensive stock farming.
7.5 The natural environment
The Sibonginhlanhla Project land may have soils that are well-drained and have fair
cropping potential (although no soil analysis has been done and opinions differ on soil
structure) but the farm is situated on a spur which is steep and rocky thereby reducing the
land available for cultivation to only 40 ha (Xulu, undated). The rainfall for the region is
good at 900rnrn per annum, most of this falling during summer. But winters are
particularly cold with snowfalls and temperatures frequently below freezing point thereby
limiting crop production. The Loteni river runs in the valley very close to the farm. The
water is of good quality providing water all year round. However, the terrain does not
allow easy access to collect water. There is no irrigation system and collection is done by
bucket. This is a major factor hindering the production of crops as reliance on rainfall is a
great risk especially in drought prone areas like this. The carrying capacity of the farmland
at present is low as the veld is in poor condition due to overgrazing and irregular burning
regimes. Therefore the stocking rates have been recommended to not exceed 2.5 ha/animal
unit for 250 days of the year and must be reduced to 3.64 ha/animal unit for 365 days if
grazing during winter occurs (Timler, 2001). Considering that eventually 40 ha out of a
total of 303 ha farmland will be under cultivation only about 250 ha will be available for
grazing purposes. Therefore, the farm can accommodate a maximum of 100 animal units.
This, again, means that there is limited growth for the Sibonginhlanhla Project 's livestock
since they have already exceeded the grazing capacity as the Project collectively own some
86 head of cattle and 85 goats.
Summer crops and livestock, including goats, sheep, cattle and poultry, are all suitable
activities for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. According to the Urban-Econ Report, certain
horticultural crops like peaches, plums, apples and some other deciduous fruits would be
suitable for cultivation (Urban-Econ Development Economists , 1999). As has been
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explained above, the limitations on land available makes the farm suited to small scale
production.
The Sibonginhlanhla Project is a small farm but can produce agricultural products. The
extent of agricultural production on this farm is limited by the size of the farm, climate,
geography and veld condition of the area, especially whilst there is no irrigation available.
7.6 Markets
The geography and poor transport systems restrict market opportunities in areas beyond
Loteni. The costs of transport may be prohibitive for moving produce to markets.
Additionally, running a viable business without reliable communications has been difficult
for the Project. For example, they could not contact their contract farmer to ascertain his
arrival date for ploughing and planting of their fields. The KZNSGA offered to provide
the Sibonginhlanhla Project a market for paprika in Pinetown. However, there has been no
response from the agent involved in this initiative. Therefore, agricultural markets for the
Sibonginhlanhla Project are not established and finding viable markets for produce, grown
on a relatively small scale, remains unlikely.
7.7 Loans and collateral
The ownership of land was to enable emerging farmers the ability to access loans and use
their land as collateral (Wegerif, 2004; Lyne and Darroch, 2002). However, in practice
this has not been possible for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. The Sibonginhlanhla members
applied for a loan at Ithala Bank (represented in Figure 7: 17). However, their application
was rejected on the grounds that they did not submit a viable business proposal and some
of the members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project had been black-listed for failing to keep up
with instalments at particular stores. This indicates that the requirements for a loan were
not clarified on application by the financial institution concerned.
The rejection of their application for a loan felt like a huge failure to the Sibonginhlanhla
Project members who were thoroughly disheartened. After this disappointment, the
members have not attempted to obtain any further loans. Fortunately, the initiation of
CASP enabled the Project to obtain necessary funds to initiate an ambitious business plan
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drafted by the DoA Extension Support (explained in more detail in section 7.13).
However, loan possibilities for the Sibonginhlanhla Project remain limited as it also seems
doubtful that the business plan developed by the DoA, on behalf of the Sibonginhlanhla
Project, would be endorsed by financial institutions.
7.8 Work force
The issue of labour became an important issue in the event of the Project becoming
productive and even producing for markets. Although the Loteni area has an active labour
force and contracting in labour to work on the farm would be done easily, compensation
for work done could be a problem. The likely possibility of a lack of cash flow for the
Sibonginhlanhla Project may only make payment possible in the form of food rather than
cash. Additionally, the impact of HIV/AIDS on the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers could
result in reduced productivity.
7.9 LRAD Policy at grassroots
The LRAD policy was poorly understood by the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers. This
may be indicative of the .educational level of farmers. However, an important
consideration is the fact that the medium of communication in government departments is
English. Policy documents in the Zulu language were not available on site (like the LRAD
policy document, the CASP policy document, DoA agricultural assessments, business
plans and applications for funding) and this limited the ability of LRAD farmers to make
informed decisions. It also increased reliance on external support services to assist in
decision making.
7.10 Reliance on external support for decision making
The lack of information provided to the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers about factors that
impact on them, like LRAD policy, has made farmers reliant on the authorities.
Dependence was shown in the way that the farmers rely on the authorities to support their
decisions and sometimes take decisions for them. For example, the fact that the farmers
are the owners of the land and yet were still required to obtain permission to build their
residences from an external source is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, it
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creates confusion over ownership of the Project. The owners of the Project should be the
ones taking decisions as the government does not own the Project. Secondly, even though
the fanners may have the title deeds to the land, the process of obtaining permission from
an authority creates confusion over who owns the land and thus terms of tenure. There is
research to show that if security of tenure is disputed then project sustainability may be
compromised (Goebels, 2005). Thirdly, decisions that are taken by government
departments and officials for the fanners perpetuates dependence on external sources
without fostering independent collective action or sustainability of the Project in the long
term. And lastly, this is a show of power from the state that is, in a sense, autocratic as
they have the ultimate authority on any matter related to the tenure security of the fanners
and project operation.
The issue of the broken down tractor shows (1) poor decision making over the acquisition
of a tractor initially, (2) an absence of mechanical skills and (3) the inconsistency of
government involvement in decision making. The reasons for purchasing such an
implement are questionable especially when no training on its use or maintenance was
considered. However, the fanners' view of agriculture was such that for fanning to be
successful it must be mechanised. The absence of mechanical skill within the
Sibonginhlanhla Project membership has led to the desire to rather sell the tractor at a loss
than learn how to resolve the problem. The way in which the problem with the tractor was
described to the research team, it sounded as if it could be something as simple as a flat
battery and yet the fanners was immobilised by this. This has practical implications for
training around ensuring that fanners do have some level of mechanical skill. Policy and
extension have to react to what the fanners need and their capability to fulfil these needs as
opposed to what the farmers' or the government want. Additionally, government needs to
decide on their level of involvement in decision making within their areas of competency.
Over the two years that this research was conducted limited progress was made on the
Sibonginhlanhla Project. The vision of the fanners to produce for markets has not been
achieved. Although some of the inputs, like fencing and training, have been realised, with
the support of the CASP grant, this is insufficient for emerging fanners to become
productive. This was illustrated by the Sibonginhlanhla Project fanners' reliance on a
contract farmer to plough and plant their fields for them.
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Extension support may be implemented with the best of intentions. However, it
perpetuates the development model of dependency on external organizations. In
development work there has been a shift away from this for reasons of sustainability
(Ziervogel, 2006). In the case of the Sibonginhlanhla Project, CASP funding has provided
the farmers with another chance to obtain financial resources to farm for profit. However,
any agricultural production will be dependent on efficient external support that fosters the
Project towards independence and sustainability.
7.11 Unrealistic expectations and lack of planning
The farmers' expectations of the Sibonginhlanhla Project and the perception of their own
ability proved to be too high. Their expectation of achieving commercial production was
unrealistic considering the resources available presently. The farmers' unrealistic
expectations of their own ability may indicate their initial enthusiasm, but now they are
tired and lack self-confidence. Their ability to utilise the Sibonginhlanhla Project land
productively, even at a subsistence level, has been compromised. The farmers have land
available at their homesteads for subsistence and household production that lies fallow
after putting their energies into meetings, trainings and other work for the Sibonginhlanhla
Project. This indicates the importance of clarifying LRAD farmer expectations prior to
commencing farm operation. In the case of the Sibonginhlanhla Project, a food safety net
project - at least for the short term - remains the most logical approach to the gradual
improvement of livelihoods.
One member resigned from the Project due to the slow pace of progress and her different
expectation of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. She wanted land for residence and household
cultivation.
The members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project have been operating without a plan of action.
The vision exercise was the first time that the membership had congregated to discuss
possible activities for their farm. As shown by the vision is can be concluded that the
farmers are aware of the different crops and livestock options as well as the infrastructure
necessary for producing these. Local knowledge of these agricultural products is apparent
and planting seasons understood (where w = winter crop and s = summer crop). However,
the farmers consider their indigenous agricultural knowledge inferior to commercial
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agriculture and are thus openly unsure about implementing an agricultural project that
produces for external markets.
7.12 Post-transfer extension support
The support systems that the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers require have put an immense
strain on government resources . Emerging small scale farmers require agricultural
extension services, credit facilities and banking services (van Zyl et al., 1995). Whilst the
demand for these services is apparent, they have not yielded any significant improvement
for the emerging small scale farmers ofthe Sibonginhlanhla Project.
Prior to CASP, the extension support to the farmers was not sufficient for the scale ofneed.
As a result, decision making has been absent or poorly informed regarding agricultural
production. This shows the high level ofreliance on external support by emerging farmers.
For example, promises made by DoA extension support were misleading. The department
had promised to provide agricultural training and inputs, like seed and fencing. However,
these promises were not fulfilled. This research has determined that the extension support
and funding available to the Sibonginhlanhla Project before 2005 amounted to, at most, a
visit every month from the extension officer whose impact on the Project was negligible.
Although the DLA indicated that DoA extension visits only occurred on a quarterly basis
(Madonsela, 2004, pers. comm").
During this time, the DLA was more supportive to the Sibonginhlanhla Project than the
DoA. The DLA was involved with post-transfer support to the Project through
dissemination of LRAD funds, some advice on the utilisation of these funds and the
appointment of a mentor. The system of post-transfer support is shown to be inconsistent
with LRAD policy which supports Hall's (2004a) findings on the status of land reform
projects.
Additionally, no less than three surveys were conducted by the Department of Agriculture
and Environmental Affairs South West Region (2001 and undated) and Natural Resources
Section (January 2004). The first was a preliminary agricultural report for the Moshesh
8399 and Rem of the Coombe 6260 farms in 2001. The second was a business plan for the
• Madonsela , M. 2004. DLA field officer, Pietermaritzburg.
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Sibonginhlanhla Project and the third was an agricultural resource plan for the
Coombe/Moshesh farms. A summary and short analysis ofthese reports is given below.
In 2001, a preliminary Agricultural report for the Rem of the Coombe 6260 and Moshesh
8399 was performed by the DoA Hilton Extension Office, South West Region. This report
suggested that the land be used for settlement as the potential incomes from crop and
animal production would constitute a maximum of R62798.30 a year. Additionally, if the
land was to be used primarily for productive purposes then it was suggested that both
farms should be settled by one farmer (Timler, 2001). This analysis indicates that the land
is not viable for commercial agricultural production and would have been better utilised for
settlement purposes. This, again, questions the logic behind the implementation of the
LRAD programme at Loteni.
In 2002, a business plan was compiled by the DoA Underberg Extension Office, South
West Region. The plan proposed by the DoA Underberg Extension office was to plant 40
ha of crops, those being red maize and potatoes. It was proposed that the Sibonginhlanhla
Project farm chickens (broilers and layers at 25 000 birds), sheep and dairy cows. The
livestock numbers would depend on a veld condition assessment carried out by the
department. The DoA also proposed building a processing centre at Loteni where potato
chips from potatoes, popcorn from maize, butter from milk and canning from broiler meat
can be performed. Additionally, the DoA suggested that a training centre be built to ensure
that people obtain proper agricultural training. The centre should offer accommodation for
at least 10 people. This would also operate as a tourism centre from which handwork and
other craft can be sold to passing visitors. This business plan indicated that potential
income could reach R300000 per annum (Xulu, undated).
The assumption was that RI00000 capital, remaining from the LRAD grant, would be
present for initiation of the Project. However, it is highly unlikely that that RI 00000
would be sufficient to initiate this ambitious Project. Importantly, the proposal has not
considered some of the vulnerable aspects of Loteni, like stock theft. Neither has the plan
incorporated a process of training for those operating the Project.
The Natural Resources Section of the Department of Agriculture and Environmental
Affairs performed an agricultural resource assessment and management plan for the
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Coombe/Moshesh Farms in January 2004. This document proposed three scenarios.
Scenario 1 combined irrigated and dryland cropping with animal production. Scenario 2
combined irrigated crop production with animal production, while scenario 3 concentrated
on dairy production. The plan recommended that the community receive training in
livestock, vegetable production and soil conservation (Botha, 2004). As indicated before,
intensive livestock production is not advisable from a security point of view. Dairy
production is expensive on infrastructure and promises low returns especially with the
distant locality of Loteni. The cultivation of crops remains the most viable option at this
stage ofproject development.
The three reports compiled for this relatively small land area (303ha) is indicative of the
poor coordination within the DoA during this time. It is of concern that these documents
were not distributed to the LRAD beneficiaries and thus the Sibonginhlanhla Project has
not been able to utilise these resources. The reports are also inconsistent in their findings
and recommendations for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. This also shows the ineffectiveness
ofpost-transfer support provided to emerging farmers.
What happened instead, as the Sibonginhlanhla Project was unaware of any business plan,
was that the remainder ofLRAD beneficiary grant, after acquisition of the land, (R96 675)
. was spent on a tractor and trailer (R70000), fencing and seed potatoes.
In August 2004, when CASP came into existence it was hoped that this programme would
remedy most of the problems with extension support described above. At Loteni, CASP
was only implemented in mid-2005 and the constraints experienced by the DoA Extension
Support have not been remedied. Problems posed for CASP, as a result of fairly
dysfunctional extension support in the past, are examined below.
Resource constraints continued to be problematic for the provision of extension support.
The DoA battled with a low number of staff available to cater for the extension support
need and this has reduced the impact of their work23. Staff turnover was high and the DoA
had to continue hiring personnel. Interviewing for new staff on a regular basis creates
23 The DoA advertised 1007 posts, between April 2004 and March 2005, but only 850 positions were filled.
The department was also fmding it difficult to recruit well qualified and experienced staff (Department of
Land Affairs, 2005).
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unnecessary administration which restricts the DoA from performing its real functions.
Additionally, especially at an entry level, the DoA has to provide adequate supervision and
capacity building of a new staff member.
The staffing problems compound logistical problems in situations that are already difficult.
Project managers only saw their staff weekly, rendering management of personnel and
projects more difficult. This was exacerbated by the long distances that DoA extension
staff travel. Long travelling distances also indicate the problem of safety for staff and the
many hours travelled is often an inefficient use of resources.
Prior to CASP, the lack of direction for post-transfer support within the LRAD policy was
problematic for the DoA extension. This resulted in the approach to extension support for
LRAD projects being no different from other projects.
The need for agricultural training and mentorship remains critical to small-scale farming.
Small-scale black farming in South Africa was purposely restricted by white elite
governments of the past in order to supply labour to white farmers and reduce black farmer
competition. This has resulted in a deterioration and loss of knowledge and skills in
agricultural practices in black communities (Goebel, 2005).
Over the period 2001-2005 the Sibonginhlanhla Project beneficiaries had built up the idea
that training would enable them to farm productively like their commercial farmer
counterparts. This perception resulted in training becoming a high priority especially since
the DoA extension component had been promising and thereby consistently reaffirming
this belief in agricultural training. This shows the uniformed nature of the Project farmers
regarding training, and the extent to which training enables for productive land utilisation,
and that the DoA extension officer had not been briefed about funds for training or the
initiation of CASP. It was only in 2005, as a result of ADSS (and not Extension Support)
mobilising CASP funding, that a few members were able to attend a course on farm
management. The impact of this intervention remains to be seen but without follow up
training, advice or mentorship this training will probably have a limited impact.
The Sibonginhlanhla Project records indicate that they did receive some support from a
mentor in 2004, on instruction from the DLA and funded by the LRAD programme.
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However, as a result of the slow progress of the Project the mentor lost interest in
providing assistance. Therefore, the establishment of a mentorship programme is not new.
However, the issue of how this programme of mentorship, now funded by CASP rather
than LRAD, will be implemented continues to remain unclear.
Support for emerging farmers has not been forthcoming from commercial farmers in the
Loteni area. The predominant reason for this seems to be racially based. If the mentorship
programme becomes operational their neighbouring farmers may be employed to assist.
The sustainability of such appointments needs to be considered carefully by the DoA
especially where prejudices exist but consistent mentorship remains critical to the success
of projects.
7.12.1 Coordination and collaboration of institutions
The role of government in land reform is critical. Post-transfer support is problematic as
admitted in the DLA annual report published at the end of 2005 (Department of Land
Affairs, 2005). Some of these problems are external to government explained in Chapters
1 and 2. However, a large proportion of these problems are due to present government
structures.
LRAD policy puts the responsibility of land transfer in the hands of the Department of
Land Affairs and agricultural production with the Department of Agriculture. The
apparent lack of communication and subsequent poor coordination and collaboration
between and within the two departments in terms of policy alignment, land use planning
and service provision has been instrumental in the stagnation of the Sibonginhlanhla
Project. Information at the district level has been erroneous or non-existent. These
problems have been exacerbated by the centralisation of headquarters in Pietermaritzburg
as the DoA extension officer was unaware of the LRAD programme. This indicates
further .the low value the DoA ascribed to LRAD as their responsibility for providing
agricultural support was not specified in the policy document which may also indicate a
lack of consultation between departments in the drafting of the policy. Therefore, the
capability of the DoA to provide the necessary post-transfer support to LRAD projects was
undermined by:
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1. The LRAD policy's lack of detail on post-transfer agricultural development and the
roles of each institution
2. The expectation that a single extension officer could initiate and operate a farming
enterprise without LRAD specific training, additional expertise or support.
This resulted in the DLA carrying the bulk of the post-transfer support which is outside
their mandate and field of competence. Other examples indicating problems between
institutions include that the Department of Agriculture blames the Department of Land
Affairs for the difficulties they encountered with LRAD projects due to the fact that the
land is not suitable for agricultural production. In response to the DoA's claim that land
transferred was not conducive to agricultural development, the DLA referred to
agricultural assessments that were not performed, submitted after land transfer or under
utilised.. The reports generated for the Sibonginhlanhla Project have not been used for
post-transfer development. Wegerif (2004), in research undertaken in Limpopo Province,
confirms that agricultural assessments there were also not utilised properly.
The disparity in possible land use scenarios between the DoA extension and DoA natural
resource section shows the poor coordination and communication within the institution.
Additionally, the fact that none of these proposals were discussed with or disseminated to
the farmers has ultimately wasted resources and the chance of the Sibonginhlanhla Project
to adopt a proposed plan.
The DoA ADSS complained that it did not receive all the necessary information on the
Sibonginhlanhla Project. For example, records on expenditure were not supplied by the
DLA to ADSS. As a result, ADSS managers were making uninformed decisions regarding
funding allocation for acquisitions and other inputs (Lonsdale, 2005, pers comms*).
From the foregoing it can be concluded that the effectiveness of institutional support to
emerging farmers is compromised by a lack of available resources but also, and more
importantly, the lack of coordination and collaboration between and within institutions
responsible for agricultural extension support. CASP may be able to provide funding for
Lonsdale, J. Project manager ADSS . DAEA, Cedara .
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inputs, infrastructure, training, mentorship but without government departmental support
that is effective, small scale farming enterprises will continue to fail.
7.13 Agricultural model
The agricultural model that the government is driving is commercial agriculture.
Therefore, extension support, mentorship and training of emerging farmers is based on the
commercial agricultural model of high input, high output farming. In Chapter 1, this form
of agriculture is portrayed as inefficient and in Chapter 2 as in global decline. However,
the DoA continues to promote a mode of agricultural production and support that is elitist,
giving preference to more resourced beneficiaries, and environmentally and economically
unsustainable and resource inefficient. In a struggling agricultural economy where farming
subsidies are absent and profit margins are ever decreasing, the perpetuation of this model
through emerging farmers, especially where the global agricultural market is elitist and
inefficient, seems misinformed. Pursuing solely large scale agriculture restricts the success
for the majority of small scale emerging farmers.
7.14 Policy Analysis
The research at Loteni identified a number of problems with LRAD policy. This section
sets out to examine four of these problems in more detail under the following headings:
• Disposal ofland under LRAD
• Beneficiary selection
• Category ofproject
• Policy: post-transfer; and
• Organisational learning
7.14.1 Disposal of land under LRAD
The Sibonginhlanhla Project does not fit the technical description of an LRAD project.
The primary objective of LRAD is the redistribution to black people of 30% of commercial
agricultural land (confusion over this objective was emphasised in Chapter 4). However,
the land was put up for sale by the Catholic Diocese of Mariannhill and was not used for
commercial agriculture in the past. Therefore, the Sibonginhlanhla Project is not situated
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on former commercial farmland, white owned or otherwise, and therefore cannot be
counted as contributing to the redistribution of 30% of commercial agricultural land.
However, contrary to the policy specifications, the DLA continues to regard this project as
an official LRAD project.
7.14.2 Beneficiary selection
LRAD policy does not specify how the beneficiary selection process is conducted. Loteni
was an unique case where the shift in policy from SLAG to LRAD has disadvantaged the
greater Loteni community. The decrease in the number of beneficiaries under LRAD has
made the issue of selecting LRAD beneficiaries important for this case. However, the
selection process is a secret held by the community at Loteni. The truth about the selection
process for the LRAD beneficiaries of the Sibonginhlanhla Project may never become
public knowledge as the DLA distanced itself from this process. It is unclear why 15
beneficiaries were chosen but this seems to be a decision taken by the DLA and the LDC.
Is it possible that the decrease in the number of beneficiaries for LRAD compared to land
for settlement purposes (the SLAG programme at Loteni consisted of 352 beneficiaries)
indicates that there is a perception that more land is required for agricultural production.
However, there is no specific mechanism in the LRAD policy for determining the number
.ofbeneficiaries and this would vary depending on the type of category ofproject pursued.
7.14.3 Category of project
The LRAD policy document distinguishes between four different categories of project.
These are detailed in Chapter 4. The categorisation of projects enables stakeholders to
pursue the objective of that category of project.
However, there were at least two problems identified here. Firstly, the requirements for
implementation of each category of project should be stipulated in policy. There are
marked differences between each category of project. The inputs and resources required
vary depending on the category of project. For example, food safety net projects will not
devote all their time and resources to agriculture. According to Schmitz (2001), the cut-off
points in terms of hectarage for cropland, horticulture, pasture grazing and extensive
grazing are 40, 15, 50 and 600 ha respectively, above which projects are considered to be
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commercial. Therefore, the Sibonginhlanhla Project, which only has 40 hectares of
potential cropland, whilst the remainder of the 303 hectare farm is dedicated to grazing,
would not be considered a commercial enterprise and thus the category of project is easily
determined if such a definition was put into practice. However, the Sibonginhlanhla
Project was initiated and managed by government departments in the same way as all the
other LRAD projects irrespective of the category of project. Thereby, the categorisation of
project is made irrelevant.
Secondly, classification of the Sibonginhlanhla Project into one the four categories was not
done in consultation with all stakeholders. As a result, the DLA categorised the
Sibonginhlanhla Project as a food safety net project while the Sibonginhlanhla Project
farmers wanted to produce for markets. The DoA had already started to implement the
business plan with its focus also on production for external markets. This created a
discrepancy between the DLA's perception, the DoA perception and Sibonginhlanhla
Project farmers perception of the type of farming to be undertaken.
7.14.4 Policy: Post-transfer
The post-transfer stage of the LRAD Programme was problematic for all stakeholders
involved and limited action was taken to enhance this. This highlights that LRAD policy
does not adequately address post-transfer agricultural development. LRAD policy only
provides land on which agricultural development may take place as the LRAD grant
enables for acquisition of land and some inputs. When the LRAD Programme was
initiated there was no programme in place to develop emerging farmers once the land was
transferred to the beneficiaries. This fact made the institutional arrangements for carrying
out extension support to LRAD farmers difficult. Since the inception of CASP there is
more finance available for post-transfer agricultural support. However, . CASP was
designed to provide extension support to a range of agricultural programmes and not just
the LRAD Programme. As a result of being designed separately, the two programmes are
not aligned comprehensively.
It remains unclear if, at inception, the LRAD programme was to be complimented by
CASP. This confusion arises as, firstly, the CASP was implemented four years later than
the LRAD programme and, secondly, the LRAD grant, in most cases, provides finance for
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some initial on-farm purchases. This points to a lack of thought between the DLA and the
DoA about post-transfer support in LRAD policy. LRAD policy-makers should have been
involved with the formation of CASP policy. Whether CASP was to compliment LRAD
or not is now irrelevant as emerging black farmers have been waiting since 1994 for an
agricultural support programme that will assist them. However, the effectiveness of CASP
is still to be examined but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
7.14.5 Organisational learning
Attempts have been made to promote organisational learning. For example, a number of
staff involved in land reform in South Africa were selected to visit Brazil to engage with
their land reform counterparts and process there in order to bring back knowledge to South
Africa (Madonsela, 2005, pers. comm.*). However, although this experience was useful
for gaining insights into land reform in Brazil it seems that this learning opportunity has
not enhanced land reform in South Africa.
M&E has not been utilised fully by government as described in Chapter 3. A culture of
fear predominates in institutions where M&E is seen as exposure to public scrutiny.
However, this does not contribute to organisational leaming. The implementation
problems of SLAG were not reviewed and as a result the same mistakes were duplicated in
the LRAD programme. M&E is still focused on outputs rather than outcomes. Therefore,
the M&E of LRAD remains focused on land delivery rather than the impacts of land
delivery on the target population.
The learnings associated with Sibonginhlanhla Project can contribute to the
implementation of future LRAD projects. A repeat of the Sibonginhlanhla Project should
be avoided. M&E systems can assist in the process of organisational learning so that
LRAD performance is enhanced . Additionally, projects should be monitored so that
problems can be identified and LRAD project beneficiaries assisted to avoid
disillusionment.
• Madonsela, M. 2005. DLA field officer, Pietermaritzburg.
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7.15 Working towards the same objective?
As seen at the Sibonginhlanhla Project, the expectations of the different stakeholders vary
significantly. Table 10 below shows the main areas of disconnection between the
SibonginhlanhlaProject farmers, the DLA and the DoA. The DLA operates according to
the LRAD policy and understands the Sibonginhlanhla Project to be categorised as a food
safety net project. However, LRAD policy is not clear enough in providing adequate
means of assessment for determining each category of project as stated in Chapter 3 and 4.
Objectives and indicators for each category of project is absent and LRAD objectives have
no means for assessment either.
Table 10' Table of Disconnection between stakeholders
Sibonginhlanhla LRAD CASP(DoA) Effect
Vision (DLA)
Objective To produce To provide To provide Ineffective
agricultural goods land in order agricultural utilisation of
for markets to improve extension land
household support to
food security emerging
(Food Safety farmers (Le. to
Net Project) implement the
Sibonginhlanhla
business plan)
Proposed Residence and Small scale Crop, poultry, Delayed
land use agricultural farming livestock implementation






M&E Planning matrix M&E of land Output based No review of
was introduced for reform but not indicators but no programmes
management specific to results based
purposes LRAD M&Ehasbeen
proposed
Post- Expecting Not the Responsibility of Poor extension
transfer guidance DLA's DoA but support
support responsibility department lacks




The DoA operate according to the CASP policy where the objectives are different from the
LRAD policy. The CASP policy does not entertain the same categories of project as
LRAD policy. Similarly, M&E of CASP is based on outputs rather than results and there
are no indicators to assess the achievement of objectives. Importantly, the M&E of CASP
funded projects is mentioned as a function of the DoA. This raises two issues. Firstly,
there may be duplication of M&E of a LRAD project by the DLA and then the DoA.
Secondly, according to the Department of Agriculture (2004: 26), the DoA "will monitor
projects on a continuous basis according to the monitoring and evaluation schedules in the
business plans". But as was the case with the Sibonginhlanhla Project, their business plan
had not been implemented nor did the plan contain a monitoring and evaluation schedule.
Therefore, M&E of CASP funded projects can account for funds spent however it cannot
determine whether these funds have made any significant impact on the respective project.
7.15.1 LRAD programme objectives
The LRAD programme aims to achieve objectives that, at current implementation levels,
will remain unachievable. This thesis has identified that the primary aim of the LRAD
programme is to enable black emerging farmers to obtain land for agricultural production.
However, the objectives of the LRAD programme have been stretched to reach further than
just agricultural production. Chapter 8 shows the objectives of LRAD and proposed
indicators developed by the author. The LRAD programme is expected to achieve the
objectives of land redistribution but LRAD is not designed to do this. LRAD is designed
to promote black agriculture but to expect LRAD to achieve transformation on such a large
scale is short sighted and relates to the lack of M&E information available for policy
makers to consider during programme design.
7.15.2 Sibonginhlanhla Project objectives
This research ascertained that the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers have a different vision
for their land. A series of workshops were held with the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers
to work, firstly, on a vision for their project (discussed already) and, secondly, on a plan of
action for the attainment of this vision (refer to Table 11, p139). This process revealed a
number of problems with the establishment of objectives and indicators for the
beneficiaries as the concepts of evaluation were not fully understood. Therefore, a
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planning matrix was utilised to facilitate achievement of their vision. Objectives for
attaining their vision, associated activities for each objective and farmers responsible for
carrying out the activities were identified. Pictures were utilised to make the identification
of each objective easier for illiterate farmers (see Appendix 7). This process was accepted
as being easier to understand but still difficult for the farmers to work on.
Table 11: Sibonginhlanhla Project activity chart (English interpretation ofAppendix 7)
Date Objective Activity Person
responsible
29Nov04 4Dec04 To erect fencing Communicate with DoA S. Mnikathi
around the farm (J. Lonsdale at ADSS)
29Nov04 4Dec04 To build houses on Communicate with T.Duma
the farm DLA (M. Madonse1a)
26Nov04 To utilise the Farm the garden G.Duma
tractor P. Mnikathi
M.Duma
29Nov04 To plant vegetables Plant vegetables T.Duma
Jan05 To plant beans Plant beans S. Mnikathi
29Nov04 To plant potatoes Plant potatoes T. Nkabini
MayO5 To breed and Purchase livestock S. Mnikathi
May05 produce sheep and T.C. Molefe
chickens
Jun05 To harvest crops Communicate with DoA N. Molefe
(Kunene)
This process of planning made it clear that there was a disparity between the
Sibonginhlanhla Project vision, to produce for markets, and their objectives and associated
activities for the achievement of their vision, which tend to indicate farming at a food
safety net level. The low level of management capability within the Sibonginhlanhla
Project membership shows that the farmers need assistance and guidance in their pursuit of
producing for markets.
Their vision is not specific enough to enable for a business plan to be drawn up and thus
this Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers would need assistance with this. It is probable that
they would accept the business proposal established by the DoA without many changes not
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because it is realistic but rather because it is appealing and fits their vision of producing for
markets.
The poor establishment of M&E in both LRAD and CASP policy and with emerging
farmers themselves questions whether the stakeholders are working towards the same
objectives. This research at Sibonginhlanhla Project has shown clearly that the
expectations (and thus objectives) between stakeholders are not the same. Additionally,
the objectives of the Sibonginhlanhla Project are vastly different from the objectives of the
LRAD programme showing how each LRAD project is context specific.
In terms of the CPAs, the Sibonginhlanhla Project has not been given in further training on
the operation of a CPA. To the farmers the CPA remains just a legal requirement for
acquisition of land and their Constitution is under utilised. This shows that the concept of
a CPA is not fully understood.
7.16 What was the justification for LRAD at Loteni?
The shift in mode of land disposal at Loteni, from the SLAG to LRAD programme, was
implemented without consultation with the Loteni community, the Land Crisis Committee,
the Loteni Development Committee or the previous land owner, the Catholic Diocese of
Mariannhill. The perspective of the Mariannhill Diocese on the disposal of the land should
be considered important since they had participated in the land reform process at Loteni
and provided the Sibonginhlanhla Project land at a reduced price. Importantly, the lack of
consultation with stakeholders about the shift in land disposal renders the motivation for
farming at Loteni unclear, especially since the community was expecting land for
settlement purposes under the SLAG programme.
The primary objective ofLRAD is the provision of land for agricultural development, The
responsibility for post-transfer support is that of the DoA. This thesis has documented, that
the post-transfer development of the Sibonginhlanhla Project has not been sufficient to
promote agricultural development even on a small scale.
The Sibonginhlanhla Project is clearly made up of individuals who are markedly poor.
Appendix 4 confirms that the socioeconomic characteristics of the 352 beneficiaries under
141
the SLAG programme are very similar to those of the Sibonginhlanhla Project
beneficiaries. An important consideration in the implementation of LRAD is the scale of
benefit to communities. Direct beneficiaries of LRAD are limited to small groups as in the
case of Loteni where 15 beneficiaries were allocated 303 ha for agricultural development.
In comparison, SLAG offered to benefit 352 individuals and their families for primarily
residential purposes. This shows the difference in scale of benefit and land use between
the programmes confirming Moyo's (2000) argument that land redistribution, through
processes like LRAD, does create a rural farming elite in the context of Loteni.
In terms of land use, the Sibonginhlanhla Project has failed to become a productive
agricultural enterprise. A viable agricultural project would have positive implications for
the community, for example, by providing employment thereby justifying the project.
However, the Sibonginhlanhla Project has not yielded any economic returns or benefits to
the community. An LRAD project that creates household stability through a food safety
net project has merits, but the history of land reform at Loteni warrants that LRAD provide
justification for the shift from SLAG which would have provided for household
subsistence farming anyway.
The amount of financial and human resources to initiate farming, even at a subsistence
level, is of concern. The Sibonginhlanhla Project, thus far, has spent R400000 (R300000
LRAD grant and RI00000 of the R398800 CASP grant). This seems somewhat excessive
considering that only 15 individuals are benefiting and no agricultural production has been
initiated. In comparison, the estimated cost for service provision (water, roads and
sanitation) at the Moshesh Farm according to Urban-Econ Development Economists
(1999) was R500700. That estimate was based on the assumption that 800 people would
benefit. Therefore, the expenditure per individual through the LRAD programme is
significantly higher than any of its predecessors confirming Cousin's (2000) concern that
LRAD expenditure would be disproportionate to the number of those benefiting.
The Sibonginhlanhla Project is an example of how financial resources have not resulted in
the initiation of viable farming ventures. Mentorship, training and extension support form
a crucial part of the process. However, this has to be done in such a way as to make
farmers responsible for their actions and not dependent on external sources. LRAD was
designed to enable the building of agricultural skills already available in communities to
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assist emerging farmers in their farming endeavours and develop their farms into larger
enterprises over a longer period of time. However, LRAD should never have been
implemented without a complimentary comprehensive post-transfer support plan.
This section has questioned the wisdom of implementing LRAD at Loteni. The
justification for the LRAD at Loteni seems weak. An aspect noted at Loteni was the need
for land for purely settlement purposes. This initial reason for the DLA presence at Loteni
was to clarify issues of ownership and land tenure. The Urban-Econ Report documented
that the most important needs of the Loteni community were identified as job opportunities
and improved housing (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999). The preference for
LRAD by the government has left a huge demand for land for settlement purposes at
Loteni. The Sibonginhlanhla Project beneficiaries could only access land through the
LRAD programme. Although the farmers may have all been dedicated to farming initially
the frustrating experiences in attempting to initiate farming at Loteni has left many of the
Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers disinterested. Some of the older beneficiaries do not
actually have any intention, due to their limited physical capacity to participate in the
labour, of farming the land themselves but rather saw the LRAD programme as an
investment that they hoped would subsidise their pensions and create a livelihood
opportunity for their children.
Therefore, if the LRAD programme does not attempt to ascertain the need for
agriculturally productive land within a particular community but continues with land
disposal regardless, the success of that particular LRAD project remains unlikely.
Providing land for agricultural purposes solely is inadequate, given the wide variety of
possible land uses, and is problematic for the success of the LRAD programme as LRAD




As stated in the introduction, the aim of this study was to provide leamings and insights
into ways in which the LRAD programme could be enhanced. This process of discovery,
research and interpretation has resulted in a set of considerations that could contribute to a
process of improvement within the LRAD programme and thus the improvement of future
LRAD projects. Therefore, this section is not about drawing definitive conclusions or
making fixed generalisations about the LRAD programme but rather providing a
contribution based on research experience for LRAD policy-makers, implementers and
other people dealing with land and agrarian issues to consider in their work.
This research has shown that LRAD policy as a means to address land reform objectives is
questionable. There are critical problems with the implementation of LRAD projects.
Until implementation processes can adequately achieve the targets of respective land
reform programmes, it is pointless shifting approaches to land reform. Even the effect of
expropriating land will be limited without efficient implementation systems in place to
ensure the quick delivery of land to the respective beneficiaries.
The farm invasions in Zimbabwe have created a nervous farming environment in South
Africa. In this regard, government's response to land reform and invasions is critical to
farmer and investor confidence. Government's response to the slow implementation of the
land reform programme must not jeopardise the integrity of the programme (that is, by
inappropriate "fast tracking"). Additionally, illegal land invasions need to be condemned
openly, followed by swift and decisive action, if productive agriculture in South Africa is
to continue. The Department of Land Affairs has been slow in the validation of land
claims but this does not justify land invasions. In South Africa it is apparent that poor land
delivery is leading to an increase in land invasions and expropriation of land to invaders
may only intensify land invasions.
There is a direct link between economic policy and land reform. .Presently, economic
policy dictates land reform policy. In the case of Loteni, the shift to macroeconomic
policy favouring agricultural development on land has impacted negatively on the broader
community by ignoring their land and livelihoods needs. This illustrates that land reform
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dependent on economic policy does not benefit the majority of previously disadvantaged
black South Africans.
In principle, LRAD does address land ownership patterns, empowering rural communities
and promoting agricultural production in South Africa. However, the slow progress of
LRAD in transforming land ownership patterns and developing agriculture questions the
wisdom of government utilising LRAD as the flagship for land redistribution in South
Africa. The present form of the policy and the implementation problems that have arisen
at Loteni confirm this. Even if LRAD manages to redistribute 30% of agricultural land to
black emergent farmers by 2014, the production capacity of the majority ofLRAD projects
will be severely limited by resource constraints. The inadequate post-transfer extension
support for the current number of LRAD projects would continue to be insufficient and
ineffective should the redistribution of 30% of agricultural land be achieved. Should
CASP assist with agricultural development initially, there is no guarantee that farmers will
utilise resources appropriately or that finance will result in a viable farming enterprise.
Additionally, the budget that would be required for the post-transfer farm development of
LRAD projects, should 30% of agricultural land be redistributed under LRAD, would not
be economically viable for the South African economy at current levels of economic
growth. The shrinking agricultural economy would caution against over-expenditure on .
agricultural development especially when LRAD perpetuates commercial agricultural
practice that is not efficient or sustainable.
The Government of South Africa has shifted emphasis from the original rights-based
principles of land reform. The establishment of GEAR and now ASGISA has entrenched a
market based framework for land redistribution and utilisation as a priority over the rights-
based principles sought initially by land reform.
8.1 Recommendations
The purpose of this thesis was to address the question: How can the LRAD programme be
enhanced? A number of recommendations have been made below. These
recommendations were formed through direct and indirect contact with a range of role
players, land reform and LRAD policy and intervention at the Loteni LRAD project and
are a direct outcome of this thesis research and writing process.
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Implications for LRAD policy
Government needs to be cautious when trying to meet land reform targets (i.e. the
redistribution of 30% agricultural land by 2014) if this is at the expense ofnational food
security. Government must be careful not to see land reform merely as a means for
redistribution of land and neglect the post-transfer development of redistributed land.
Government has said that it is committed to land reform and that land reform is more than
just transferring land to black owners: it is about creating productive ventures on the land.
Whether government has the capacity with current resources to implement an effective
post-transfer development strategy is questionable. However, LRAD cannot be
implemented or its objectives satisfied without a comprehensive strategy in place that
stipulates the requirements of LRAD, the needs of the people, and the roles and
responsibilities stakeholders have to play for success.
LRADpolicy
One of the key findings of this thesis has been the lack of clarity of LRAD policy.
Although the objectives of this programme are stipulated in the policy document, clear
indicators are not. Additionally, and more importantly, there is no clear direction for the
post-transfer support which the policy document indicates is the key responsibility of the
DoA. Although CASP addresses some of the key concerns for post-transfer development
it is not aligned comprehensively with LRAD policy.
Shown below are the strategic objectives of LRAD as described in the LRAD policy
document. Indicators are proposed as a result of this study to provide clarity on objectives
and as a means for assessment of the objectives in order to improve programme
performance. Further, an additional objective is proposed.
Strategic objectives of Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD)
(as set by the Ministry for Agriculture and land Affairs, 2000. Indicators developed by
Daniel Bailey)
1. Contribute to the redistribution of 30% of the country' s agricultural land over 15 years.
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Indicators:
• 30% land transfer.
• Independent audit of transfer of land confirms increases/decrease III land as an
instrument ofpolitical conflict in SA.
• Increase in number of small and medium scale farms.
2. Improve nutrition and incomes of the land dispossessed who want to farm on any scale.
Indicators:
• Reduced vulnerability per key primary health indices (Infant and maternal mortality/
TB/ cholera and STIs).
• Increased availability and range of cash crops in rural poor communities.
• Increase in school attendance (School attendance is a recognised indicator of poverty
reduction).
• Increased number of income earners per household.
• Increased potential access to cash crop markets.
• Increase in available cash per household (compared with baseline data).
• Assessment of assets: TV, hifi, tractor etc.
3. Decongest overcrowded former homeland areas.
Indicators:
• Increased land accessibility and agricultural production amongst rural poor.
• Increase in number of small-scale farming co-ops.
• Fewer farms on more land.
• Decrease in illnesses (HIV infection rate).
• Increase in interest in reducing risk-taking health behaviour.
4. Expand opportunities for women and young people who stay in rural areas.
Indicators:
• Increase in number of women! young people who choose to remain or move to rural
areas.
• Increase in number of young people employed III the formal and non-formal
agricultural sector.
• Decreased dependence on subsistence farming.
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• Entrepreneurship: Increase in cooperations formed within the community.
Presence of organised groups (e.g. craft groups, community gardens,
caterers).
Additional objectives for LRAD include:
1. Increased access to agricultural land by black people and to contribute to the
redistribution of approximately 30% of the country's commercial agricultural land.
Indicators:
• Statistical measure (as 1 above)
• Increase in the number of black owned farms .
2. Overcome the legacy ofpast racial and gender discrimination in ownership of farmland,
Indicators:
• Increased percentage land owned by women.
• Increased percentage land owned by black people.
• Increased participation of women in decisions affecting land use .
• Increased leadership of women in rural areas .
3. Facilitate structural change over the long term by assisting black people who want to
establish small and medium sized farms.
Indicators:
• Increase in number ofblack owned farms.
• Increase in financial assistance to emerging black farmers.
• Increased number ofvisits per month by extension services.
• Increased participation of women in decisions affecting land use.
• Increased leadership of women in rural areas especially in established cultural/
religious institutions.
4. Stimulate growth from agriculture.
Indicators:
• Increased area ofland available for cultivation.
• Increase range and yield of crops planted.
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• Increased scale of land irrigation.
• Increase use of technology.
• Increased evidence of extension support.
• Financial support services available.
5. Create stronger linkages between farm and off-farm income-generating activities.
Indicators:
• Increased access to markets.
• Decreased dependence on subsistence farming only as a means of livelihood.
6. Empower beneficiaries to improve their economic and social well-being.
Indicators:
• Increase in Adult literacy rate.
• Increase in number of years at school.
• Increased access to formal employment.
• Increase access to primary health services (sanitation, drinking water, reduction in
HIV/AIDS prevalence, access to reproductive health - contraceptives, infant / maternal
mortality rate, access to medical care/facilities, awareness ofhealth information).
7. Enable those presently accessing agricultural land in communal areas to make better
productive use of their land.
Indicators:
• Responsible access to and use of fertiliser.
• Range of crops.
• Access and responsiveness to markets.
8. Promote environmental sustainability ofland and other resources.
Indicators:
• . Increase in land area protected (Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife).
• Decrease in land degradation / and reclamation of degraded land.
• Decrease in pollution levels / waste disposal and other emissions.
• Increase in responsible burning regimes.
• Popularised grazing strategies.
•
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Decrease in wood collection for fuel/use of alternative energy sources.
New objective and indicator as a result of this research
To make the LRAD programme beneficiary compliant.
Indicators:
• Development of context specific objectives and indicators for each LRAD project in
consultation with beneficiaries.
• Distribution of LRAD policy in language of choice.
• Understanding ofLRAD policy.
• Development of business plan in consultation with relevant stakeholders.
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)
Government M&E has concentrated primarily on the land reform process as a whole. This
thesis has highlighted the fact that M&E has to address the requirements of LRAD and not
just land reform in general. It is therefore recommended that M&E be set up specifically
for LRAD related projects.
Additionally, the means for assessing land reform, in the form of the QoL report, is
questionable. The inconsistency found in the research process will have to be rectified if
QoL is to remain the primary tool for evaluation of the Land Reform Programme
A M&E system will pose challenges for government in that it may uncover intelligence
that officials may be opposed to. An effective M&E system acts on intelligence regardless
of political agendas or prerogatives. Universities and NGOs should assist the monitoring
of land reform projects.
The adoption of CASP as the agent for post-transfer agricultural development creates a
new dimension for the M&E of LRAD projects.
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Common Property Associations (CPAs)
Policy needs to be amended for the inclusion of indicators by which the evaluation of the
effectiveness of CPAs can be measured. This could assist with M&E of LRAD projects as
most operate as CPAs. Additionally, the reconsideration of the Land Rights Bill which
was shelved by the DLA in 2001 is important for strengthening these associations
especially where LRAD projects remain as food safety net projects.
Reading to understand
The LRAD Policy is only available in English. This information should be freely
accessible to all citizens of South Africa (in the official languages). Therefore, it is
important that LRAD policy documents are supplied in the Zulu language in KwaZulu-
Natal. Further, it would be of benefit for other documentation, like the CASP, business
plans and agricultural assessments, to be provided in a language the LRAD beneficiaries
are able to engage with.
The process towards achievement ofa common vision between stakeholders
The categorisation of projects in policy has been shown to be irrelevant in practice with
regard to the Sibonginhlanhla Project. The process of land reform is about improving the
livelihoods of people and the LRAD process is a means to attaining improved livelihoods.
However, classification of projects into different categories complicates this process. The
Sibonginhlanhla Project should be in its context as a unique project where the stakeholders
should be in consultation with each other to determine the best course of action towards
achieving a commonly understood objective, which could be production for household
consumption, production for markets or both. However, a what is important in achieving
the objective(s) of the project is that a clear process for action is established, which is
driven by all stakeholders, so that gradual development of the Project can occur.
Therefore, indicators for the objective(s) need to be identified so that a system ofM&E can
assist in directing the process towards success. As much as possible, this process should
be aligned with CASP processes to ensure effective support from government departments.
It is imperative that the extension support understands their responsibilities identified by
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stakeholders involved in the Project. A business plan should reflect these processes
towards the stated objective in a manner that financial institutions will endorse.
Business plans
The process for the drafting of business plans needs to include relevant stakeholders to
ensure that the proposal is desired and viable. Ideally, business plans should be drawn up
by emergent farmers in consultation with DoA Extension Support and design agents, and
not, as in the case of Sibonginhlanhla Project, solely by DoA Extension Support. An
important consideration for the business plan is that it can be submitted to financial
institutions and approved for loan purposes where CASP funding cannot support the
Project.
Farm andfarmer development
• LRAD projects must be complimented by a comprehensive programme ofdevelopment
for emerging farmers that increases self sufficiency and independence with decreasing
reliance on extension services or mentors. This should include a process of education
in management practices whereby skills for M&E can also be acquired.
• Key agricultural projects should be identified by the DoA to which they provide
dedicated extension support with their own field staff and other resources as necessary.
Projects that the DoA cannot manage are identified for assistance by mentors, non-
governmental organisations, agricultural institutions and other independent sources,
which are monitored by the DoA on a periodic basis. This will make better use of the
limited DoA staff contingent whilst improving agricultural extension support services.
• The employment of extension officers is critical to the sustainability of LRAD projects.
Selection processes need to ensure that the best person is chosen for the job (Preferably
local, committed and appropriately qualified personnel). Training programmes for
extension staff need to be in place for better understanding of LRAD policy,
management principles, project planning and transfer of other information (e.g. new
technology). Extension staff vehicles travelling long distances in areas where






decentralisation of the provincial offices and district offices to local offices would
ensure for better use ofresources and greater impact of extension work.
A mentorship training programme needs to be established to ensure that mentors are
properly equipped to assist the emerging farmers they support. This includes a briefing
on the LRAD programme, resources available for LRAD projects, expectations of the
mentor and the project they undertake to mentor. Further, in addition to the proposed
mentor salary, a system of profit sharing would be conducive to encouraging dedicated
support from mentors and reduce drop out rates.
Commercial farmers wishing to sell their land must be incorporated into the LRAD
strategy (this is currently being reviewed by DLA, that is the sale of property according
to a market based value or a productivity related value). Sale to emerging farmers
should be encouraged with the use of incentives. The transfer of land to the LRAD
beneficiaries must be speedy in order to avoid commercial farmers selling elsewhere.
As part of their sale agreement, a process of mentorship of LRAD beneficiaries should
be included.
Appropriate incentives (For example: remuneration, tax rebates, reduced interest on
loans and fees) need to be considered in order to encourage white commercial farmers
and former commercial farmers to foster emerging farmers on a continuous basis.
There are present resources that are under utilised. For example, the University of
KwaZulu-Natal could act as an education and information agent. Training could be
conducted with DoA staff within this capable setting. Additionally, students could
engage with some of the LRAD projects to assist with programme evaluation, project
sustainability and implementation.
Enabling a farming environment
LRAD requires the scrapping of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, 70 of 1970, as
smaller farms are more affordable. Lyne and Darroch (2002) also recommend reducing the
inflation rate and decreasing the cost of subdividing and transacting farmland so that
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farming can be accessible to those at whom land redistribution is aimed. This would also
make agricultural production more accessible to more people making livelihoods more
stable and sustainable.
Land reform should not be seen as an isolated programme
This thesis has argued that merely distributing land to people has limited effects on the
livelihoods of those that stand to benefit. Post-transfer support and development must
accompany land reform initiatives if people are to benefit from land reform. Post-transfer
support has to include government sectors like health, agriculture, education, housing,
welfare and especially local government. The role of local government through integrated
planning and development (IDP) should facilitate development on infrastructure and
services to support land reform projects.
It is therefore critical that inter departmental communication and collaboration occurs to
ensure effective overlap of development initiatives that can support and encourage local
communities in the pursuit improved livelihoods.
Increase the budget
The DLA's budget is about 0.5% of the national budget. If land reform through LRAD is
to alleviate poverty then more finance will have to be made available not only to the
institutions that administer land and support services but also the beneficiaries of land
reform.24 The Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme is one such vehicle
whereby finance is made available to emerging farmers. However, as yet it is unclear how
many people will benefit or what impacts this programme will have.
Although the DoA has not attained spending targets yet, the DLA is consistently spending
its budget which now points to under funding of, rather than under spending on, land
reform.
24 Social grants, as the dominant source of income for people in rural areas, should be increased to assist
LRAD beneficiaries with their agricultural enterprises.
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Determining the land need
A needs assessment should be performed with communities where land is in demand. This
will identify what the land is in demand for (agriculture, residence or both) thereby
suggesting the appropriate means of land disposal. It is important that the DLA considers
land redistribution for settlement purposes as an alternative to the LRAD programme for
settling the land need but also for increasing the rate of land redistribution to eligible
applicants. Any approach to land redistribution and post-settlement support needs to be
aligned with other programmes across departments and municipalities. A budget to
adequately address land reform and development needs to be substantial enough to show
that government takes this task seriously.
The LRAD policy also fails to consider all forms of agricultural production including
pennaculture and tunnel propagation where smaller amounts of land are required.
Theoretically this would then enable more people to benefit from LRAD.
Regulating land ownership
Land in South Africa is still relatively cheap compared with global prices and it is
important that government consider ceilings on land ownership. A step towards regulating
foreign ownership has already been made through the PEFOL.
The review of the willing buyer willing seller principle has indicated that criteria need to
be established for situations whereby different approaches to land reform, like
expropriation, should be taken. This must be done in conjunction with a needs assessment
of potential beneficiary communities with serious attempts to listen and act upon the views
of the poor.
Sale ofLRADfarms
The sale of LRAD farms is a potential problem for government achieving its goal of
redistributing 30% agricultural land by 2015. Consideration needs to be given to sales of
LRAD farms both in economic distress and where farmers use LRAD grants to upgrade
farms and sell for profit.
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Enforcement ofthe law
It needs to be made clear that land invasions and unlawful eviction are not tolerated by
government. This thesis has brought out that there is a clear discrepency between what is
on paper (the law) and what actually happens in practice (enforcement). Law makers need
to ensure that the law enforcers, the police, have the resources, the know-how and the will
to deal with land invasion scenarios. This also indicates that a process of awareness
campaigning around issues of land rights would assist in alleviating land tensions between
land holders, land occupiers and the landless. The marketing of land redistribution as a
procedure for procuring land should also be considered.
Ownership vs leasing ofland
While the transfer of land to previously disadvantaged communities is a requirement for
inequality and poverty reduction, government should consider reviewing its land
ownership and property rights legislation to ensure security of tenure for all who live on
land whilst promoting agricultural and non-agricultural ventures. Also, land invasions and
evictions continue to undermine the effects of land reform in South Africa. Temporary
lease agreements could assist with securing tenure until alternative plans have been made.
Further recommendations for Loteni:
Crime
Stock theft at Loteni is an issue that could be addressed through the Ukuhlamba-
Drakensberg Transfrontier Park between Lesotho and South Africa. Civilian patrols by
locals working with local police and the Loteni stock theft unit could improve security in
the Loteni area.
The improvement ofinfrastructure
If government is committed to its development goals and growth of the economy it is
necessary to provide basic infrastructure. Evidence from Loteni suggests that roads are a
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priority if the LRAD beneficiaries are to access markets. Local government needs to
become more focused on service delivery at Loteni.
Markets
Special attention should be given to the needs of small scale farmers to ensure equitable
access to the market for all participants. Small scale agricultural production for markets
should be promoted through incentives.
Sustainable utilisation ofnatural resources
Agriculture is viable if the supporting natural resources are sustained. This is an important
issue especially where inexperienced emerging farmers are concerned. Monitoring of land
use and natural resources, with appropriate enforcement, is critical to the sustainability of
LRAD projects and rural livelihoods.
Understanding between stakeholders
The viability of LRAD projects is dependent on the LRAD beneficiaries . However, the
Sibonginhlanhla Project consists of people without farm management experience. Whilst
production for markets may be possible over time, after some farming experience has been
gained, it is too early in the Project to encourage this. It should be the role of government
departments to ensure that LRAD beneficiaries only undertake what they are capable of.
DoA extension drafting a business plan without consultation with those it is destined for is
an example of the misunderstandings that persist within government and between other
stakeholders. In the case of the Sibonginhlanhla Project, their aspirations have not yielded
a commercial crop and the diversion of producing for markets has resulted in unnecessarily
low utilisation of land for subsistence cultivation.
Landfor settlement
Importantly in the context of the proposed Loteni project under SLAG, Bravo farm was
identified as the preferred land for agricultural activity (Urban-Econ Development
Economists, 1999). However, Bravo, Westview and Glenora are still under state
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ownership and these large tracts of land, totaling 2241 ha (more than seven times the size
of the Sibonginhlanhla Project), could assist with alleviating the land need at Loteni.
Tourism
A SWOT analysis shown in Appendix 4 shows that one of the opportunities for Loteni is
tourism. The issue of land reform and tourism has been sidelined by LRAD and perhaps it
is time for government to consider this as alternative land use.
8.2 Conclusion
In conclusion, land reform, and specifically the LRAD programme, cannot be seen in
isolation from a broader strategy for development in South Africa. Municipal structures
and associated IDPs are important in this process of developing a comprehensive plan, that
includes land reform, agricultural reform, food security, local economic development and
rural development, to improve the livelihoods of people living in South Africa.
The recommendations above have been suggested to enhance the LRAD Programme. Key
among the recommendations made to enhance LRAD is a set of measurable indicators for
each of the stated objectives of the LRAD programme. Adopting such indicators will
enable the programme to contribute to the improvement of the lives and livelihoods of the
intended beneficiaries of LRAD. This makes M&E critical to not only the consistent
improvement of LRAD but informing the development of new land reform policy.
8.3 Further research
The effectiveness of CASP for post-transfer agricultural development needs to be
ascertained. Additionally, indicators for the objectives of CASP need to be identified and a
system ofM&E established.
Research into appropriate extension approaches that foster the development of emerging
farmers would further contribute to project sustainability. Linked to post-transfer
extension support is the role of mentorship. Research into approaches to mentorship that
suit South African situations would enhance the impact ofmentorship interventions.
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Research into exploring the land need in South Africa would inform policy on an
appropriate multi-dimensional approach to land redistribution. Exploration into how to
enhance IDPs in the facilitation ofland redistribution.
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Appendix 1: Example of land invasion
173
174
---_ _.__ _ ----- - - -- - --- - - -- ..-._ _ -
175
Appendix 2: LRAD Projects 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005
allow l<J nd Affil if's offi cials to meet with farm worker s on
weekdays and in thei r absence. if it ;~ on eheu- pro perty.
Th is results in a lot of intimidati on and poor co-opcr acicn
by labour tenants.
A significant pe rcentage of land within t he
Zululand, \,JMgung~Jndl ovu and Ug'.J Distr ict Munidp,dit.ies
have Rest itutio n C laims on them. Eg. Approxtrnately 95%
of land available with in the Ugu Dist rict Municipality is
claimed under the Restitutio n. This poses a challenges for
redistri butio n an d th e Settlement of Labour Tenant
Claims,
There arc also many 'cros s border ' LRAD
projects where applicants fro m the Eastern C <l PC want to
buy land in KwaZ1,.lh.l·N<ltal.
Achievements
Despite these challenges Provincial Land Refo rm Office in
Kwa'Zulu..Natal has bee n able to imple ment it Labour Te nant
Strategy> with the most notable settlement negotiat torv
acquisit io n being for the Beste rs Pro ject in Northe rn KWaZlllu~
N, ,,,I • wore 485 Labour Tenant ' took ownership of 14235
hectare s.
In term s of partnerships, the Minister attended the launch
of INKEZO Land Co mpany in September 2004. INK EZO is 0
Section 2 1 Company crea ted up by the South African Sugar
Asso ciation (SASA) with the objective: of facilitating the
t ransfer of 78 000 hectares of land under sugar cane
production by 2014.
KwaZulu-Natal PLRO - con so lidated LRAD Pro jects I Apr il 2004 to 31 March 2005
, OG S
!
i\D~I~~.§E~· ~J~~~'; ····· · ·······+··:";···-·;-~+··;·:
! -~ugar(ane Ip C29 ,·
! !, I
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Appendix 3: Role players identified by the Sibonginhlanhla farmers
The iNdlovu Regional Council is responsible for land use planning, infrastructural
development (roads, electricity, water) and the promotion of tourism.
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife: The neighbour to the community and of importance in terms of
employment and tourism is the Loteni Nature Reserve. There have been tensions between
this organisation and the community over issues of trespassing for grazing purposes and
poaching. This nature reserve is involved with assisting different projects in and around
Loteni.
KZN Spice Growers Association is attempting to establish paprika production with
Sibonginhlanhla. The Spice Growers association of South Africa was identified as the key
stakeholder for income generation in the short term through the propagation ofpaprika.
The Loteni Development Committee (LDC) is a locally established institution involved
with development in the area.
The Loteni Land Crisis Committee (LCC) was established to inform government of the
land shortages and encourage land reform at Loteni.
The Business Support Centre (BSC) is sourcing a loan (R25000) for Sibonginhlanhla's
paprika initiative.
The Land Bank has assisted the DLA in the administration of LRAD grants.
Sibonginhlanhla has tried to obtain a loan from this bank for production purposes.
KwaZulu-Natal Agricultural Union (KWANALU) is the voice of farm labourers and
owners. KWANALU has agents that visit Loteni.
Commercial farmers, there are a number of established commercial farmers in the area.
178
Appendix 4: Socio-economic information of SLAG beneficiaries
The most important socio-economic characteristics of the 352 SLAG Loteni beneficiaries
are:
• The average household size is seven people per household
• The majority of the population is still of school going age
• Most of the community has an educational level of standard four
• The average income per household is R650 per month
• 44% of the community has no income at all
• 16% of the population are unemployed, while 11% are formally employed
• most of the community members have lived in the Loteni area for longer than 10 years
• The Loteni community owns large numbers of livestock




• Road to Loteni Nature Reserve established
• Linked to Underberg
• Strong community ties
• High rainfall area - agricultural potential
• Good soils
• Tourism established at Loteni Nature Reserve
• Local knowledge of Loteni history














Lack of infrastructure (roads, electricity, water, sanitation, social facilities)
Mountainous (i.e. steep slopes)
Low income levels
Poverty is high .
Large number ofdependents








• Agricultural potential - stock and crop
• Irrigation and water storage potential
• Tourism potential - Loteni and other nature reserves, eco-tourism attractions, tour
guiding
• World Heritage Site
• Agricultural training
• Local market for animal and crop production





• Pollution ofwater sources
• Removal of indigenous forests
• Poverty




• Inadequate land management
(Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999)
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Appendix 5: Demographic information for the Sibonginhlanhla Project
lDep lDep lDep ~Amount Amount
Name Gender Irapp2001) IroLA2002) 1'2005) [Edu2001 ~du2005 IMs 2001 M:S 2005 IroLA) 2005)
~lbertMnikathi Male 1 1 1 0 0 married married ~570 IR 1,560
Nonhlanhla Nkabini-
iKhoza Female ~ ~ 2 7 7 Married K\Tidowed RO ~ 180
[Ihokozile Nkabini Female ~ 0 0 0 Widowed Widowed R570 R 780
Bonani Malaba-Molefe Female ~ 10 6 6 6 married married R 2,000 R 1,500
Michael Duma Male 14 9 8 7 married married IR 700 R 1,340
Irhobile Duma-Mthalane female ki 5 4 10 10 divorced divorced IRO IR 180
~ohn Mnikathi Male 8 ~/A 11 6 6 married m-arried ~/A IR 540
Ntombikayise Duma female 8 7 7 5 5 married married R500 R500
Nomthandazo Molefe-
Kunene Female 3 6 3 10 11 married divorced R570 R360
George Duma Male ~ 5 3 P 0 married married R570 R 780
Africa Motloung Male 6 7 4 0 b married married R570 ~ 780
Paulos Zuma Male 7 7 & 3 4 married married R600 R 1,500
not not
Soka Mhlongo !Male not.member not member r member 6 member married not member R960
Sylvester Mnikathi Male ~ N/A 3 10 11 married married RO R 1,140
Sipho Mnikathi !Male 3 16 5 7 7 married married R500 R 1,500
not not Not
Sibongile Mgoza Female 5 N/A member 7 member Widowed member R570 not member
Total R7.720 R 13.600
Average 4.5 7.27 4.93 5.27 ~33 1R551 R907
Appendix 6: Source of income
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Name Source of income k\.mount
Ifension CSG DG IPCG Employment
Albert Mnikathi 1560 tR 1,560
Nonhlanhla Nkabini-Khoza 180 tR 180
[Ihokozile Nkabini 780 R 780
Bonani Malaba-Molefe 540 960 R 1,500
Michael Duma 780 560 R 1,340
Irhobile Duma-Mthalane 180 R 180
~ohn Mnikathi 540 R540
Ntombikayise Duma 500 R500
Nomthandazo Molefe-
Kunene 360 tR 360
GeorgeDuma 780 tR 780
Africa Motloung 780 tR 780
Paulos Zuma 720 780 tR 1,500
Soka Mhlongo 960 tR 960
Sylvester Mnikathi 780 360 R 1,140
Sipho Mnikathi 1780 720 R 1,500
Total 6240 3600 780 560 2420 R 13,600
% contribution ~5.88 26.47 5.74 4.12 17.79
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Appendix 7: Sibonginhlanhla Project activity chart (refer to Table 11 for English interpretation)
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Appendix 8: Leading questions for the semi-structured interviews with the different role players at Loteni
Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers:
Infrastructure
1. Is it easy to get to Underberg?
2. Will it be difficult to get crops to Underberg to sell?
3. Do you think you will be able to make a profit?
4. Where can you buy fertilisers? Are they expensive?
5. Who can help you buy fertilisers?
6. Can you use the tractor yet?
7. Do you have electricity and running water at home?
Environment
1. Is the soil good here?
2. Do you need to irrigate the fields or is their enough rain?
3. When was the last drought or flood?
4. How long have you been a farmer? Do you think the land is still in good condition for growing crops? When was the land in better
condition?
5. Do you plant crops every year? What do you plant? Who helps you plant?
6. Is it for family consumption? Can you sell any produce?
7. Do other people use the Sibonginhlanhla land?
8. Who controls land use at Loteni? Can local people participate in decision making over resources?
Understanding ofpolicy
1. What is your understanding of LRAD?
2. What do you think LRAD is meant to do?
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3. Do you think other people in the community know about LRAD?
4. How were the LRAD beneficiaries chosen? (i.e. democratically or dictatorially)
5. Do you think people who were not chosen are jealous/angry/upset?
6. Do you remember SLAG?
7. What about the people who were promised homes? Are they angry with government for not providing houses?
8. Where you one ofthose people?
Support services
1. How often does the extension worker visit Loteni?
2. What has the DoA contributed to the project?
3. Do you think the DoA extension worker must continue to visit or is he/she wasting your time?
4. Has the DLA returned to visit?
5. Have they offered to help?
6. Have any other organisations offered your group assistance?
Finance
1. How many family members live away from home? Do they send money home?
2. What other income do you have?
3. How easy is it for you to obtain a loan?
Visioning
1. How often does the group meet?
2. Who leads the meetings?
3. What do you talk about?
4. What does the group want to do with the land? Does everyone agree?
5. Has the group written this (the goals of the project) down?
6. What do you need to achieve your goals?
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7. How long will this take?
8. How has/will this project make your life better?
Demographics
1. How many dependents do you have? What are their ages?
2. What formal education have you had?
3. What form of income do you get and approximately how much is this?
DLA field officer:
1. What is the history behind the involvement ofthe DLA at Loteni?
2. How was the shift from the SLAG approach to the LRAD approach received at Loteni?
3. How were the LRAD beneficiaries selected?
4. How has the agricultural development component of LRAD been implemented at Loteni?
5. What is the relationship like between the DLA and the DoA?
6. How does the DLA see the Sibonginhlanhla Project progressing?
DoA extension officer:
1. How has the DoA assisted the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers?
2. What does the DoA want the Project to achieve?
3. What constraints is the Project / DoA facing? And how can these be remedied?
DoA ADSS project manager:
1. What is the role of the DoA ADSS in LRAD?
2. What is the situation at Loteni from the perspective ofADSS?
3. Which business plan will be implemented? And how?
4. Do you see the Sibonginhlanhla Project being viable?
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5. How effective is the DoA in providing extension support?
KZN Wildlife regional manager:
1. Are the commercial farmers in the area supportive of emerging black farmers?
2. What are some of the key issues for established commercial farmers in the area?
